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Standard Oil and Microsoft— 
intriguing parallels or limping 
analogies?
BY JOHN J. FLYNNf
I. Introduction
The computer industry and the law o f antitrust have been pre­
occupied with the struggle between the federal and several state 
g o v e r n m e n ts  and M ic r o so ft  fo r  m o st o f  the p ast d e c a d e , 
M icrosoft’s use o f its domination over the personal computer (PC)
* Hugh B, Brown Professor of Law, College of Law, University of 
Utah.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: I appreciate the comments and criticism s o f  earlier  
drafts o f  th is article by Professor Harry F irst and Professor Darren  
Bush. N e ith e r  is resp o n sib le  fo r  any o f  the view s o r  con clu sion s  
expressed herein. The views expressed in this article are mine and have 
not been so licited , encouraged, supported or pa id  fo r  by any person, cor­
poration. think tank or other entity with any relationship to any litiga ­
tion, legislation, ideology or legal or economic issue o f any kind related  
to this topic. I  did give some thought to creating a "Foundation ” like the 
Truth and Justice Foundation or “Institute" like the Institute fo r  the Pro­
tection o f the Competitive Process and the American Way and designat­
ing m yself as President or Fellow thereof. A lack o f  funding overcame the 
temptation.
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industry by virtue o f  its control o f  the operating system software 
for the ubiquitous persona] computer has been the focus of contin­
uing antitrust controversy. This article began as a response to an 
effort to discount the sim ilarities between m onopolization charges 
against M icrosoft brought by the Antitrust D iv ision  and several 
K ates and those launched alm ost a century before against the 
Standard Oil Company o f New Jersey. It evolved into a broader 
article as it became apparent that seem ingly  modern concepts like 
"strategic conduct," "raising a rival’s co st ,” "predatory pricing," 
;ind “network e ffects .’' are really not that new and were tactics 
used by Standard Oil to gain mastery over the refining and trans­
portation o f crude and refined o il in the latter pari o f  the 19th cen­
tury, In the M icrosoft case, allegations that M icrosoft engaged in 
"strategic conduct" in licensing its dominant W indows operating 
system  and used the power o f  the “network effects” conferred by 
its in sta lled  base on the vast m ajority o f  PCs to m aintain its 
monopoly of the operating system  market for PCs evoked echoes 
from the similar allegations made against Standard Oil gaining and 
maintaining its monopoly over oil refining. W hile the tactics fo l­
lowed by M icrosoft and Standard Oil look place in quite different 
businesses having characteristics unique to the products they each  
produced, the consequences o f  the exclusionary behavior followed  
have been similar— dom ination o f  the industries they each oper­
ated in and the acquisition o f  power to determine the price, innova­
tion and other efficiencies at all levels o f  those industries and the 
rights o f  competitors to succeed or fail on the com petitive merits.
Standard Oil was broken into 34 parts pursuant to an antitrust 
decree affirmed by the United Stales Supreme Court in 1911. Its 
market share o f  refining declined from 80% in 1910 to a market 
share for the divested parts o f Standard Oil o f  40% in 1940.1 One
1 See William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, Rewriting History: The 
Eitrlv Sham an Act M onopolization Cases, 2 I n t ’l  J. Econ. & Bus. 263 
1 1995); William S. Comanor, The Problem o f  Remedy in Monopolization 
Cities: The Microsoft Case as an Example, 44 A n ti t r u s t  B u ll. 115, 119 
(2001). Professor Comanor points out that in major m onopolization cases
lost by the government against U.S. Steel, United States Steel, American 
Can and International Harvester the successful defendants in those cases 
“invariably failed in the marketplace.1’ Id. at 120.
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can only speculate what the market for petroleum products might 
look like today if a single firm continued io dominate the refining 
and the transportation o f  crude and refined petroleum products, 
just as one can only speculate what the PC market would look like
10, 20 or 50 years from today i f  a single firm controls the operat­
ing system , application program interfaces and the Internet com ­
m unications link for PC s. S u ffice  it to say, it has long been  
assum ed that the consequences o f such a state o f affairs in ex ­
orably lead to the p o licy  judgm ent that either a m onopolized  
activity be regulated by a competitive process or by affirmative 
government regulation. The econom ic, political and social conse­
quences o f  the alternative o f leaving uncontrolled monopoly con­
trol over a basic industry or technology in private hands and free 
from the discipline o f  a com petitive process are assumed to be too 
dire for the good o f  society. The M icrosoft case2 however, raises 
the deeper question in the minds of a few o f whether this policy 
judgm ent should any longer be entertained or addressed in the 
context o f  an antitrust lawsuit in light o f the dynamic and com ­
plex industry in volved— an additional policy position explored  
and rejected by this article.
The M icrosoft case is significant for several additional rea­
sons: it is a case with substantial implications for the evolution of 
a new and revolutionary technology o f  basic importance to the 
econom y; it is a case shifting the focus o f  antitrust policy from a 
preoccupation with short-term or static allocative efficiency to 
one em phasizing the long-run econom ic significance o f innova­
tion efficiency as a value protected by antitrust policy; it is a case 
challenging the ability o f  the legal process to deal expeditiously  
and effectively with alleged displacements o f the competitive pro­
cess in the context o f a com plex and dynamic industry; and, it is a 
case raising the significance o f  workable remedies to the e ffec­
tiv en ess  o f  antitrust p o licy . Each o f  these im plications o f  the
3 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999} 
(hereinafter, Findings of Fact); 87 F, Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (here­
inafter, Conclusions of Law); a f f  d in part and rev 'd in part, 253 F, id  34 
(D C-Cir.  2001).
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M ic ro so ft case  b ear a  s trik ing  resem blance  to  the  S ta n d a rd  O il  
case at the beginning  o f the 20th century .3
A com p ariso n  o f  the tw o cases and  the fac ts  g iv in g  rise  to 
antitrust challenges to  the ir dom ination  o f  a new and basic tech ­
nology suggests that both firm s also fo llow ed  a sim ilar exc lu sio n ­
ary  p a th  in  a c h ie v in g  a n d  m a in ta in in g  d o m in a n c e  o f  th e  
technology. T hrough a com bination o f the good fo rtune  o f  being  
m the right p lace at the righ t tim e, the fo resigh t to  appreciate  w hat 
pari o f a new industry w ould  be the key to future pow er over the 
industry, the entrepreneurial drive of a single individual to  cap tu re  
con tro l o f  those key parts  o f  the industry , and a  w illin g n ess  to 
engage in p rac tices  g en era lly  in co m p a tib le  w ith  a c o m p e titiv e  
process determ in ing  success o r failure in  the industry . S tandard  
O il and  M ic ro so ft g a in ed , m a in ta in e d  o r  e x te n d e d  m o n o p o ly  
pow er over the ir respective in d u stries  by  m eans found  to  be in 
v io lation  o f  the S hennan  Act. B oth  firm s were found to  have used 
related industries to exclude com petitors in v io la tion  o f the m an­
date o f  an titru st po licy  that a  "‘com petitive  p rocess”— n o t c o llu ­
s io n  o r  m a rk e t  p o w e r— g o v e rn  tr a d e  an d  c o m m e rc e  in  o u r  
econom y w herever possib le .-* B oth firm s coop ted  a new  techno l-
■ United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909) 
Uiff'd, with remand on timing o f  remedy) Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1(1911).
4 The antitrust laws are designed to maintain a “competitive pro­
cess” as the rule of trade, not protect “compedDon” or competitors. The 
concept of "competition’7 has become synonymous with “allocative effi­
ciency only” in the minds of many. The concept of “competitive process” 
connotes a broader range of economic, political and social goals for 
antitrust policy. A consequence of invoking the connotation of a broader 
range of antitrust policy goals is to denote a greater range of structural 
and behavioral practices falling within the prohibitions of the antitrust 
laws. See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept o f  a Com peti­
tive Process, 35 N .Y .L . S e n . L . R ev . 893 (1 9 9 0 ) .
Government responsibility for maintaining a “competitive process” 
also makes clearer the role of government defined and protected property 
and contract rights to the protection and existence of competitive process 
open to all members of society. It may be a paradox to some, but such 
rights have long been recognized as state defined and enforced rights, not 
some sort of inherent right created out of “the ether.” See Felix Cohen,
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ogy th reaten ing  the ir m onopoly over a  key part o f the industry in 
w hich th ey  opera ted . The M icro so ft case, like the S tan dard  O il 
case o f 1911, w ith claim s o f  ty ing , price discrim ination, raiding 
r iv a ls ’ costs and strategic conduct, o ffers the opportunity to com ­
pare the tac tics fo llow ed to  gain and/or m aintain monopoly power. 
This artic le  concludes that the S ta n d a rd  O il case o f 1911 offers 
in trig u in g  p a ra lle ls  and not lim p ing  analogies fo r the M icrosoft 
case o f  2000 . A nd both cases challenge the historic resolve o f  the 
com m on law  that an antitrust policy  enforced through the jud icia l 
process c a n  and  m ust m aintain a com petitive process as the basic 
standard  u n d er which private  econom ic activity m ust and shall be 
governed  in  sign ifican t and basic areas o f  the econom y.5
P roperty and Sovereignty, 13 C o r n e l l  L .Q . 8 (1 9 2 8 ); Roscoe Pound. 
Liberty o f Contract, 18 V a l e  L . J. 4 5 4  (1 9 0 9 ) . A  logically consistent, if 
simplistic, position opposed to any government interference with “free 
markets,” for example, ought lo oppose all government interference with 
property and contract rights, including the recognition and enforcement 
of such rights. Might makes right would then be the order of the day 
rather than the complex mass of government interferences in the market 
like contract law, property law, tori Jaw, commercial law, intellectual 
property regimes and so on, either assumed or relied upon by opponents 
of government interference with the exercise of property and contract 
rights. “Markets” cannot exist for the benefit of all without government 
defining and enforcing contract, property and a host of other lights and 
liabilities—the scope of, limitation upon and means for enforcement of 
such rights. A  significant infrastructure of law has been created to do just 
that—a public benefit recipient of these rights cannot take advantage of 
without bearing the burdens necessarily attached to the benefit created; 
burdens necessary to foster and protect the rights of all to those same 
benefits. See John J. Flynn, An Antitrust AUegory, 38 H a stin g s  L .J , 5 17 , 
5 3 7 - 3 8  (1 9 8 7 ) . '
5 Early in the history of the common law and down to the present
day, a judicially implemented policy that property and contract rights be
exercised within the limitations of a state-maintained competitive process 
has been recognized as an inherent and essential part of and limitation 
upon the definition and enforcement of contract and property rights. It 
has long been recognized that one person’s property and contract rights 
may not be used to deny or infringe upon the property and contract rights 
of others by displacing the competitive process determining their success 
or failure and where an injury to the public could be identified as a result 
of competition being displaced. Some of those injuries were identified in
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In  nn a r t ic le  t i t le d  M ic r o s o f t  a n d  S ta n d a r d  O il:  R a d ic a l  
L essons f o r  A n titru st R eform ,6 D onald  J. B oudreaux7 and B urton
die Case of Monopolies, 16 Coke 84, 7? Eng. Rep. 1260 fKmg’s Bench
There are three inseparable incident* to every monopoly; (1) That 
ihe price will be raised, (2) After the monopoly grant, the iommad- 
ity is not so good as it was before. (3) It lends to the impoverish­
ment of divers artificers and others who before by their labour had 
maintained themselves and their families, who now will of neces­
sity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary. . . .  A society 
in which a tew men are the employers and the great body are 
merely the employees or servants, is not the mosl desirable in a 
republic; and it should be as much the policy of the laws to multi­
ply the numbers engaged in independent pursuits or in the profits of 
production as to cheapen the price to consumers.
A n  even more significant long-term injury to the public raised by per­
sistent monopoly power from an economic view is the delay or denial of 
new innovations being brought to the market: because of lack of a com­
petitive need or incentive to do so where restraints of trade or monopoly 
power displace the competitive process determining technological change 
and open market access for new innovation. See Joseph Brodley, The 
Economic Goals o f Antitrust: Efficiency. Consumer Welfare, and Techno­
logical P rogress, 62 N.Y.U. L. R e v , 1020. 1027 (1987); John J. Flynn, 
Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies and the Suppression o f  Technol­
ogy, 66 A n t it r u s t  L. J. 487 (1998). Both the Standard O il and Microsoft 
cases posed this most basic economic concern to the future of the indus­
tries they came to dominate by erecting substantial entry barriers to new 
innovation.
6 Donald J. Boudreaux & Burton W. Folsom, Microsoft atid Stan­
dard Oil: Radical Lemons fo r  Antitrust Reform, 44 A n titru s t B u l l . 555 
(1999).
7 Boudreaux is identified as the President of the Foundation of Eco­
nomic Education, located in irvington-on-Hudson, New York. The Web 
she for the Foundation, <www.fee.org> (visited June 4, 2001), indicates 
that it w as founded by ihe late Leonard E. Read, manager of the Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce. The Web page indicates that Read
believed that the "siatist ideas” that governed the Axis countries of World 
War II had not died off and “as a result of New Deal Programs and war­
time collectivism, socialist ideas were taking root in the United States,” It 
was to take on these "prevailing Marxist and economic policies” that 
Read devoted his life and apparently founded the Foundation of Eco-
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W. F o lso m 3 p u rp o rt to  com pare the S tan dard  OH case o f 1911s* 
w ith the M icro so ft case  o f  2 0 0 0 .lc> Their com parison finds no sim ­
ilarity betw een the tw o cases o ther than neither firm  deserved to 
be condem ned as an unlaw ful m onopolist under the Sherman Act 
and that boih  firm s w ere m odels o f  econom ic “effic iency" and 
“ innovation ." T he com parison  m isstates the findings o f  fact and 
law o f  the S ta n d a rd  O il case, ignores the exclusionary practices of 
S tandard  Oil and M icroso ft, m isses the legal/econonuc objectives 
o f  both cases, and  m isrepresen ts the purposes of the antitrust laws 
and  law' generally . A side  from  these lim itations and its ran ting  
tone, the a rtic le  is  a sp irited  po lem ic, if  not an illum inating  or 
in fo rm ativ e  e x p lo ra tio n  o f  e ith e r  the S ta n d a rd  O il case o r the 
M icro so ft case.
This artic le  b o th  responds to  Boudreaux and F olsom ’s critique 
o f  the S ta n d a rd  O il  and M ic ro so f t  cases and explores the deeper 
question  o f  w hich tac tic s  used by a  firm  to gain or m aintain dom i­
nance o f  an industry  shou ld  or should not be declared unlawful 
under the an titru st law s. The record  in the M icrosoft case is a well 
docum ented one o f  the com pany orchestrating  a series o f  actions 
w ith suppliers and  custom er* to  m aintain  M icrosoft’s m onopoly 
pow er over the o p era ting  system , application program  instructions
nomic Education. The foundation sponsors “Freeman Society Discussion 
Groups’’ and apparently publishes books that appear to range from con­
servative to right wing in ideology. Funding sources for the foundation 
are not revealed in the Web site.
* Folsom is identified as the “Chief Historian, for the Center for the 
American Idea,” located in Houston, Texas. The Web page for the Cen­
ter, <www.americanidea.org> (visited June 4, 2001 > identifies the entity 
as a program of the Free Enterprise Institute, a nonprofit entity "sup­
ported by foundations, businesses and individuals,” Its purpose is stated 
to be the development of ‘'programs [to] assist tcachers as they educate 
their students in the principles of American Civilization, including lib­
erty, private property, the rule of law, limited government and an endur­
ing moral order,” Its program s also appear to range in content from 
conservative to right wing in ideology. Funding sources for the center are 
not revealed in the Web site,
9 Supra note 3. 
lfl Supra note 2.
652 7 he an tu ru si baiter in
and, subsequently, the Internet browser link for personal comput­
ers. Like the conduct o f  the Standard Oil trust maintaining its 
m onopoly over refining by control of the transportation o f crude
oil and refined product, M icrosoft’s actions constitute a pattern of 
exclusionary conduct not easily explained as a legitimate com pet­
itive response consistent with the requirement that a competitive 
process determ ine market success rather than m onopoly power 
doing so. It is difficult to conclude otherwise in the M icrosoft case 
without also concluding that one must revisit the analysis and 
conclusions o f the Court in the Standard O il case at the beginning 
o f  the 20th century as well as the policy choice that the mainte­
nance o f monopoly power by the means follow ed by both firms be 
either regulated by government or effectively circumscribed by an 
antitrust remedy.
The next section o f  this article describes the history and cir- 
cum stances behind the Standard Oil case and the conduct found 
to be unlawful m onopolization in that case. Part III describes pro­
ceed ings against M icrosoft resulting in findings by the district 
court that M icrosoft unlawfully maintained a m onopoly over the 
operating system  market for In tel-com patible PCs, attempted to 
m onopolize the Internet browser market and unlaw fully tied its 
operating system  program to its browser program for access to the 
Internet. This section also explores the court o f appeals decision  
upholding the district court’s finding that M icrosoft unlawfully  
maintained its m onopoly over the operating system  market, d is­
m iss in g  the trial court's attem pt to m o n op o lize  find ings and 
remanding the tying claim  for further proceedings. The article 
concludes with a com parison o f the m ethods fo llow ed  by both 
Standard Oil and M icrosoft to gain dominance over their respec­
tive industries and suggestions about whether remedies similar to 
those im posed on Standard Oil should also be considered in the 
M icrosoft case.
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II. The ev o lu tio n  o f  Standard O il and the S ta n d a rd  O il case  
o f  1911
The Standard O il Corporation o f  N ew  Jersey was created to 
take over the affairs o f  the Standard Oil Trust which had been d is­
solved by order o f the Ohio Supreme Court in 1882.11 At the time 
o f  its formation, the trustees transferred their stock ownership in 
approximately 84 com panies to the new ly minted Standard Oil 
Company o f  New Jersey and its subsidiaries. When the Sherman 
Act case was filed  against Standard O il, the company produced 
10% o f  the country's crude oil, transported over 80% of the crude 
produced in Pennsylvania and Indiana, refined more than 75% of 
all the crude refined in the United States, operated more than 50% 
of the rail cars used to transport o il. sold over 80% of all the illu ­
m inating o il (kerosene) so ld  in and exported from  the United  
States, sold over 80% of the naphtha sold in the United States and 
sold over 90% o f the lubricating oil used by dom estic railroads. It 
controlled  an overw helm ing share o f  refining and o il p ipeline  
capacity in the United States.
The United States charged and proved that between 1870 and 
1906, the defendants gained their m onopoly  over m ost o f the
11 State v. Standard Oil Co.. 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892). 
The court dissolved the trust on the ground that it was beyond the corpo­
rate powers of the Standard Oil and the other corporations joining the 
trust to transfer corporate control to trustees and that the I rust Standard 
and the other corporations created established a monopoly over the oil 
refining business. The court condemned the monopoly created citing the 
law of Ohio and the common law as reflected by the Case o f Monopolies, 
supra note 5.
The trust was dissolved on March 10, 1892 as a result of the Ohio 
Supreme Court opinion and wiihin days was reorganized as a corporation 
under the laws of New  Jersey w ith shares d istributed on the same 
percentage basis to the same holders o f the trust certificates. See Row 
Chernow, Titan: The Life o f John D. R ockefeller, Sr. 333 (1998).
12 The history of the formation of the Standard Oil Company allega­
tions of the complaint claiming the formation and operation of the com­
pany violated the Sherman Act are set forth in the trial court opinion,
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909).
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trad e  an d  c o m m erce  in  p e tro le u m  p ro d u c ts  by secu rin g  from  
“com m on carriers  preferential rates and  rebates” ; acquisitions of 
com petito rs; agreem ents w ith  com petito rs lim iting  production and 
output and  d iv id ing  m arkets; operating  com panies represented to 
be in d ep en d en t w hen they were not; securing  inform ation from  
ra ilro a d  em p lo y ees to  destroy  the busin ess  o f  com petito rs; and 
selling  products below  cost to  drive ou t com petito rs.13 A s clearly 
d e m o n s tra te d  by the w ide ly  a c c e p ted  s tu d y  o f  S tan d ard  O i l ’s 
p rac tices by E lizabeth  G ranitz & B enjam in  K le in ,N com petitors 
were e ither driven  from  the m arket by m anipulation and orchestra­
tio n  o f  tra n sp o r ta tio n  ra te s  in c o m b in a tio n  w ith  the ra ilro ad s  
transpo rting  crude oil to refineries and re fin ed  product to m arket; 
bought o u t under threat o f being d riven  from  the market by d is­
c rim in a to ry  tran sp o rta tio n  ra tes; or, w ere persuaded  to jo in  the 
S tandard  O il T rust and enjoy the fru its o f  its grow ing m onopoly 
over re fin ing  and transporta tion  o f crude and refined oil products 
u n d e r the  th rea t o f  b e in g  d riv en  from  the  m arket by v irtue  o f  
S tan d a rd ’s contro l over transporta tion  ra tes and re fin ing .13 In  the
^ Standard Oil Co.. 173 F. at 190. Professor David N. Chalmers in 
his introduction to a 1966 edition of Ida T a rb e ll’s, The History of the 
S ta n d a rd  O il Com jahv originally  prim ed as a series of articles in 
M cClure's Magazine beginning in 1902, commented thal John D. Rocke­
feller and his associates “fought their way to control by rebate and draw­
back, bribe and blackmail, espionage and price cutting, and perhaps even 
more important, by ruthless, never slothful efficiency of organization and 
production.” Id. at xiii, Although Rockefeller's Standard Oil obtained its 
monopoly by means “not honestly industrial”— indeed, often ruthlessly, 
it was also operated as .in efficient, if not always a progressive and inno­
vative. enterprise.
N Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising 
a Rival's Cost: ” The Standard O il Case, 39 J. L, & Econ, 1 (1996).
15 Boudreaus & Folsom, supra note 6, at 560 assert: “Standard Oil’s 
large market share resulted from Rockefeller’s obsession with increasing 
its operating and distribution efficiencies. . . Some monopolists, at 
least in the short run, can be efficient. The question is whether their 
monopoly is gained or maintained by legitimate means. No mention is 
made about the practices of Standard Oil organizing and managing a rail­
road carte l to  drive out com peting re fin eries ; its coercive tactics 
employed to take over the new technology o f oil pipelines; bribery of
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jargon  o f today, S tandard  O il engaged  in “stra teg ic  conduct” in 
collusion w ith a cartel o f railroads raising  the costs o f  S tandard ’s 
riv a ls .16 By conspiring  w ith  railroads to  raise the transporta tion  
rates o f com peting  refiners w hile cu tting  its ow n. S tandard  Oil 
was able to acquire or drive out o f  business refinery com petitors 
victim ized by its practices. S tandard  O il gained and m aintained its 
m onopoly  over re fin in g  and u ltim ate ly  over crude  and p roduct 
pipelines by m anipulating a ra ilroad  cartel that it m anaged, no t by 
local price d iscrim ination as som e w ould have it .17
public officials; or, its numerous acquisitions of competitors and market 
divisions. Nor is there any mention of the leading article by Gran it/ it 
Klein, supra note 14, destroying the myth that the Standard O il case was 
premised upon a claim of predatory pricing and that Standard Oil gained 
its monopoly by being more efficient than its competitors.
1" For an extensive review of Standard O il’s role in organizing and 
enforcing a railroad cartel between the Erie Railroad, The New York 
Centra] and The Pennsylvania Railroad fixing the price for transporting 
oil and dividing the market between the otherwise competing railroads, 
.fee Granitz & Klein, supra note 14. The concept of raising a rival's cost 
as a means for restraining or monopolizing trade is set forth in Thomas 
G. Krauenmaker & Steven C, Salop. Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rat sing 
a Rival's Cost to Achieve Power Over Price, 92 Yale L. J. 209 (1986)
17 Boudreaux & Folsom appear to assume thal the government's case 
was based solely on a claim that Standard Oil gained its monopoly as a 
result of “predatory price-cutting,” supra note 6. at 559. They rely upon a 
study by one they call ^the authority on this issue,” John J. McGee. 
Predatory Pricc Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. Econ. 137 
(1958). McGee’s study, in light of the record of the case charging Stan­
dard Oil with a variety of strategic conduct well beyond “predatory iocat 
price cutting," misrepresents ihe basis of the Sherman Act case against 
Standard Oil. They also rely upon Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory  
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981), which 
also characterizes the Standard O il case as one involving “price cutting” 
driving competitors into bankruptcy. Id. at 265. Much of ihe rest of East- 
erbrook’s article consists of an abstract analysis premised upon staric 
economic models, not often encountered in reality or elsewhere, knock­
ing down the siraw-person of predatory pricing under conditions of per­
fect com petition erected at the beginning o f the article. Instead of 
analyzing the facts of the case in light of the law, the article ends up ana­
lyzing the conclusions of the model in light of its assumptions. Empiri­
cally based economic analysis has demonstrated thal predatory pricing
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Standard O il's manipulation o f transportation rates driving out 
com petitors and gaining control over the means o f  transporting 
crude and refined product was first used early in the history o f the 
com pany in an event called the C leveland Massacre. Transporting 
crude o il to refineries and refined product to consumer markets 
constituted a significant cost factor for producers and refiners.iS 
John D. R ockefeller, operating a refinery in C leveland, recognized  
this fact early in the developm ent o f  the industry and managed to 
secure substantial and secret rebates on transportation charges via 
p ip e lin e  and rail from  crude o il f ie ld s  in Pennsylvania  to his
viewed through the lens of strategic conduct is far more common than 
Eusterbrook and the courts have assumed and that it is a practice compe­
tition policy should evaluate with great care and not dismiss out of hand. 
See Joseph Brodley, Patrick Bolton & Michael Riordan, Predatory P ric­
ing; Strategic Theory and Legal P olicy . 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 (2000).
The Standard O il case was not one based exclusively or even primar­
ily on predatory local price cutting but was a case of raising rivals’ costs 
by manipulation of rail and pipeline transportation rates driving competi­
tors from  the market or into the hands of the Standard Oil Trust. While 
predatory local price cutting was a pan of Standard O il's overall tactics 
to control local distribution of kerosene, Standard’s primary weapon for 
gaining and maintaining control of refining was the orchestration of 
transportation rales to the advantage of Standard Oil and the disadvan­
tage of competing refineries and for the purpose of taking over control of 
transportation of oil by independent long-distance pipelines. For a com­
prehensive review of the case refuting M cGee’s study, see  Granitz & 
Klein, supra  note 14. Analyzing a case by assuming it was based on one 
set of facts when it was based on another set of facts may fit the demands 
of the ideology underlying the assumptions of a static model of perfect 
competition concerned solely with allocative efficiency, but hardly meets 
the requirements of a serious legal, economic or historical analysis.
1:3 In the early history of the oil industry, most crude oil was refined 
to produce kerosene and a large percentage of kerosene was exported to 
foreign markets where the demand was much greater than in the United 
States. Because refining reduced the volume of crude substantially, total 
transportation costs for kerosene including the cost of transporting crude 
to the refinery constituted 40% of the export price. Gaining a significant 
cost advantage in crude oil deliveries, carried with it a substantial price 
advantage in transporting and selling refined product. See  Granitz & 
Klein, supra  note 14, at 5.
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Cleveland refinery, and refined product from Cleveland to product 
markets in New York City and other major markets for sale and/or 
export.19 Rockefeller engineered an agreement between the three 
leading railroads (the Pennsylvania, Erie and New  York Central) 
and a shell corporation, The South Im provem ent Corporation  
(SIC) chartered by the Pennsylvania Legislature and controlled by 
Rockefeller and a few  other Cleveland refiners.20 The railroads, 
anxious to end cutthroat rate com petition among them selves,11 not
See. Chernow supra  note I I ,  at 112-17, 133-48. One secret 
rebate was 75% on oil shipped through a pipeline controlled by Jay 
Gould from the Pennsylvania oil fields to Cleveland, and comparable 
secret rebates from railroads serving the same routes. There was substan­
tial overcapacity of rail transport in the area and Rockefeller offered as 
an incentive to the rail lines for rebates the efficiency of consolidating 
shipments of refined product from Cleveland to New York. In addition, 
R ockefeller agreed to divide up shipm ents among the railroads in 
exchange for managing the cartel, rebates on shipments by Standard Oil 
(25%—45%  on refined product and 40%-50% on crude) not accorded to 
com petitors, “draw backs"—payments to Standard on the petroleum  
shipped by Standard’s competitors over the railroads, and specific infor­
mation on all oil shipped by competitors over the railroads. In effect, the 
railroads entered into a price-fixing and market division cartel with Stan­
dard Oil acting as manager of the cartel. The railroads paid Standard for 
its service as cartel manager by price cuts and payments by the railroads 
to Standard (drawbacks) for shipments made by Standard’s competitors 
over the lines of the cartel members. Sec Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal 
A n titru st Policy: Origination of an American Tradition 92-103 (1954).
x  See Chernow, supra note 11, at 135-37. Ida Tarbell. despite her 
possible bias against Standard Oil as the daughter of a victimized oil pro­
ducer in the Pennsylvania area where oil was first discovered, carefully 
documented the extensive collusion between the railroads and Standard
Oil destroying competition by small producers and refiners in The H is­
tory of the Standard Oil Company (Chapman ed. 1966).
21 The natural monopoly characteristics of railroads made inevitable 
rate wars between competing long-haul lines. The absence of effective 
rate regulation and excess capacity generated repealed rate wars between 
railroads competing for the oil business and drove rates below any ability 
to recover fixed costs. The only  a lte rna tive  to being driven into 
bankruptcy was for railroads to form cartels fixing prices and allocating 
traffic among themselves. The cartels soon fell victim to cheating by 
members of the cartel and repeatedly fell apart until Standard Oil. a dom­
inant customer, organized and managed the cartel agreement of the rail-
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only gave m em bers o f  SIC  re ba les u p  to  50%  on crude and refined 
oil sh ipm ents th ey  m ade, bu t a lso  "d raw b ack s” o r paym ents to 
S tandard  Oil on every barrel o f  oil o r  refined product shipped by 
refiners com peting w ith  S tandard  O i l .-
T ransportation  rebates and the im position  o f h igher rates on 
com peting  refineries w ith d raw backs paid  by com peting refiners 
to the railroads and  turned over to S tandard  Oil gave R ockefeller 
a substan tia l price advan tage o v e r com peting  refiners in C lev e­
land. as well as those in P ittsbu rgh  and Philadelphia. All hough ihe 
S IC  sch em e c o lla p se d  o n ce  ih e  sec re t te rm s o f  the ag reem en t 
becam e public, the th reat o f ru in o u s  transporta tion  rates was suffi­
c ien t to enab le  R o ck efe lle r to  tak e  over 22 o f h is 26 C leveland 
refinery com petitors over a 6 -w eek  period .-3 The C leveland M as-
roads o'.er oil shipments. As Herbert Hovenkamp observed: "In no other 
industry have attempts at both legal and illegal cartelization been so per­
sistent, widespread, systematic, or ultimately doomed to failure," Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Failure tit the G ilded Age: Federalism and the 
R ailroad Problem . 91 Y a l e  L.X. 1017, 1(353 (1988). State regulatory 
authority was limited lo regulation of short-haul traffic originating and 
ending within the regulatory stale and federal regulation, not instituted 
until 18S7, was limited to regulation of rates for traffic physically cross­
ing state lines by virtue of narrow court interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution. By stepping in as manager, in 
effect, of a railroad cartel for oil shipments. Standard Oil was able to 
benefit the railroads by eliminating rate wars over the traffic between 
members of the cartel and prevent cheating by cartel members while ben­
efiting Standard Oil by using its preferential rales to drive out or take 
over competing refineries.
Chernow also attributes the willingness of the railroads to enter 
into the agreement to their desire to end the fierce competition between 
lhem for shipping crude and refined product and Standard’s agreement lo 
even oui shipments by dividing the market between the previously com­
petitive railroads and enforcing the cartel agreement. Chernow. supra 
note 11. at 136.
:s Id. at 144. John D. Rockefeller’s brother Frank, testified that Stan­
dard Oil told Cleveland refiners that the combination with the railroads 
would enable Standard to “buy out all the refiners in Cleveland” and thai 
those who refused “will be crushed.” Id. at 195. The threat of being 
forced from business because of discriminatory rail rates was the primary 
incentive tor competitors to sell out to Rockefeller Although Rockefeller
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sacre began a pattern o f m anipulation o f  transportation rales and 
control o f  transportation  for crude and refined petroleum  products 
by S tandard  Oil to the substantial d isadvan tage o f com petitors, 
the  a c q u is itio n  o r e lim in a tio n  o f  co m p e tito rs  under the th rea t 
o f  being driven  from  the m arket, the m anipulation  o f rail ra tes 
to  destroy  and then  take over new techno log ies like the tra n s­
portation o f crude  and refined product by pipeline, and the u lti­
m ate d o m ina tion  o f  the entire oil industry  by the S tandard  O il 
C om pany.14
denied he had a primary role in the formation of SIC. C h lrn cw  maintains 
that “he look a leading role and zealously promoted it.” Id. ul 137. Stan­
dard Oil became what Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Stephen C. Salop, 
supra note J6, at 238. called a “cartel ringmaster” by inducing collusion 
between the railroads to both discriminate in transportation rates and 
refuse to deal with Standard's refining competitors on an equal looting, a 
pattern of conduct Standard Oil carried on for several years after the col­
lapse of the SIC scheme.
:J Standard Oil also gained control of tank cars for carrying oil 
through investments in rolling stock when railroads refused to do so. 
Rockefeller then used his overwhelming dominance over lank cars owned 
by Standard Oil to gain discriminatory rates from railroads in need of his 
lank ears to transport oil. See C h e r n o w , supra note II, at J70. Rocke­
feller belatedly recognized the advantage o f transporting crude and 
refined product by pipeline and launched the American Transfer Com­
pany to build Standard’s own pipeline system, while secretly taking over 
United Pipe Lines to build an integrated pipeline system and gain dis­
criminatory pipeline rates and quotas for Standard Oil from the combined 
system. See id  at 171-72.
An attempt by the Pennsylvania Railroad to challenge Standard’s 
crude transportation stranglehold in IS77 was met with a refusal to deal 
with the Pennsylvania Railroad, a closing of Standard refineries served 
by (he Pennsylvania, increased throughput from other Standard refineries, 
directions to undersell the Pennsylvania Railroad’s refineries, and dis­
criminatory freight rates negotiated by Standard with the Erie Railroad 
and New York Central forcing the Pennsylvania to cut rates. In coping 
with the all-out economic warfare launched by Standard Oil, the Pennsyl­
vania Railroad laid off workers, reduced wages and increased workloads. 
Railroad workers struck and triggered a bloody strike that resulted in 
widespread violence, destruction of equipment and buildings ultimately 
forcing the Pennsylvania to sell out its refining and transportation assets 
to Standard Oil. As part of the arrangement, Standard received a 10%
660 : The antitrust bulletin
In order to maintain control over its then patchwork pipeline 
system  and discriminatory railroad rates. Standard engaged in a 
number o f exclusionary tactics to prevent the new innovation o f  
long-distancc pipelines delivering crude to com peting refineries 
from taking p lace.15 To prevent a pipeline from being built across
rebate on every barrel of oil il shipped over the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
[he power to allocate shipments between the competing railroads, and a 
20-cent per barrel drawback on every barrel of crude shipped over the 
Pennsylvania Railroad by Standard 's competitors. id. at 201-03. 
Simultaneously, Standard Oil also obtained control over the pipeline 
competing with the Baltimore &. Ohio Railroad (B&Oi and control over 
crude oil supplies to Baltimore and West Virginia refineries enabling 
Standard to squeeze them from the market and force them to sell out to 
Standard Oil.
Extensive hearings on Standard O il’s discriminatory rail rates were 
held by a committee of the New York State Legislature resulting in the 
Hepburn Report outlining an extensive pattern of discriminatory rail rates 
for large shippers. The report stated that railroad rate favoritism toward 
Standard Oil was “ihe most shameless perversion of the duties of a com­
mon carrier to private ends . . .  in the history of the world.” Quoted in 
id. at 214. While some states attempted to regulate railroad rates during 
this period and federal regulation was instituted over interstate traffic in 
1887, neither was effective because of the division of federal and state 
jurisdiction under the then narrow interpretations o f the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Rate discrimination between 
short-haul and long-haul traffic complicated the issue politically and the 
complexity of regulating long-haul traffic effectively generated continued 
pressure to form cartels. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21.
-5 Standard Oil made substantial campaign contributions to politi­
cians, including President Garfield, in order to block construction of oil 
pipelines. See Chernow, supra note 11, at 210-11. When those tactics did 
not succeed in blocking construction of the first major pipeline to bring 
crude oil to the east coast, the Tidewater Pipeline, some Standard Oil 
officials advocated sabotaging the pipeline. Id. at 211. R ockefeller 
opposed that tactic and instead began a campaign to cut the pipeline off 
from its crude oil shippers, buy up its independent refinery customers and 
cut prices on its own pipelines to dry up shipments over the Tidewater 
Pipeline. The owner of the Tidewater Pipeline made peace with Standard 
within a year of completing its pipeline by agreeing with Standard to 
raise pipeline rates, sell a minority interest in the pipeline to Standard 
and divide the market for crude oil shipments from Pennsylvania. See id. 
at 214-15. Thereafter, Standard began a major program of building oil
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Maryland, Standard bought an exclusive pipeline franchise from 
the State o f  M aryland, bought up storage tank manufacturer 
capacity, obtained agreements from railroads to prohibit com pet­
ing p ipelines from crossing their right o f way, and bought up 
strips o f  land from farmers to block access for the new pipeline.24 
W hen these steps failed to stop construction o f the new long-dis­
tance pipeline. Standard Oil turned to bribery of elected officials 
in Pennsylvania and New York to prevent the new pipelines from 
using ihe power o f  em inent dom ain to construct their lines.-' 
Despite these efforts, a major independent crude line was finally 
com pleted  to the east coast provoking a price and supply war 
betw een Standard and the new  pipeline. Standard acquired the 
east coast refiner}' customers o f  the new pipeline, thereby depriv­
ing it o f  custom ers for its throughput o f  crude, filed  harassing 
lawsuits and began a whispering campaign attacking the financial 
solvency o f the Company operating the line.-8 Within a year o f its 
com pletion, Standard O il’s tactics drove the pipeline owners to
pipelines to all major refining areas despite its long-standing opposition 
to relying upon the new technology. The Tidewater affair caused Stan­
dard to realize the future for transportation in the industry lay with 
pipelines and signaled to competitors that resistance to Standard Oil was 
futile. See id. at 215.
Boudreaux & Folsom, supra cote 6, at 561, claim Standard Oil had a 
“proven record of creative innovation.’' No evidence is cited in support of 
this claim. A more accurate assessment is that Standard Oil had a proven 
record of bare knuckled exclusionary conduct and was willing to use any 
means to exclude competitors. While Standard Oil operated its facilities 
efficiently and was innovative in finding uses for crude oil by-products in 
its refining operations, its primary means for competing included manag­
ing a railroad rate cartel excluding its competitors, taking over competi­
tors, using assorted strong-arm tactics to take over the new innovation of 
long-distance pipelines, market divisions, price discrimination, manipula­
tion of the political process, bribery and related exclusionary tactics that 
would not be tolerated in modem times.
-° Chernow , supra note 11, at 207-08.
27 Id. at 209-10.
-s T hore lli, supra note 19, at 94, Thorelli went on to observe: . . 
Standard’s monopolization of transportation facilities held the key to its 
success,” Id.
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th e  ed g e  o f f in a n c ia l fa ilu re  and  S ta n d a rd  to o k  o v e r  th e  new  
p ipeline  and gained a stranglehold  over the transporta tion  o f  crude 
and  refined oil product in the Eastern U nited S tates.-9
T hereafter, S tandard  O il re len tlessly  tracked  re fin ed  p roduct 
sh ipm ents by independents and  by targeted  price cu ts, exclusive 
dealing  and m anipulation  o f  transportation rates, drove ou t com ­
petito rs and m aintained a m onopoly over the refin ing  and d is tri­
b u tio n  o f  p e tro leu m  p ro d u c ts .30 Sales b e lo w  cost w ere used  to 
d riv e  out loca l c o m p e tito rs , a lthough  S tan d a rd  re c o g n iz e d  the 
po litical value in to lerating  m arginal com petito rs to  ex ist in o rder 
to  avoid  "public  sen tim en t . . . against us if  we refined  all the 
o il."31
A s Standard Oil grew in size and com plexity , the overall o rga­
n iza tion  o f  the com pany had  to  contend w ith  the absence o f a  co r­
p o ra tio n  law  th a t m ig h t p e rm it  the  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  its  m any 
separately  incorporated  en tities into a single corpora tion  to  m an­
age all o f its affairs. S tate co rpo ra tion  law s o f  the period  e ith e r 
lim ited  the authorized cap ita l o f  a corporation , lim ited  the scope 
o f  the business perm itted under its charter o r p roh ib ited  a corpora-
29 C h l r n o w , supra note 11, at 214—15.
50 Id. at 256. Tactics included b r ib in g  competitor employees to fur­
nish intelligence to Standard Oil and instructions to Standard’s operatives 
to main Lai n at least an 85% market share in local markets.
51 Id. at 259, quoting John D. Rockefeller. Chernow goes on to 
observe: “Rockefeller kept prices low enough to retain control of the 
market but not so low as to wripe out all lingering competitors.” Id. A 
contemporary observer of some note described Standard Oil as “an octo­
pus that held the trade in its tentacles and the few actual concerns that 
kept alive were allowed to exist by sufferance merely to maintain an 
appearance of competition.” W illiam Howard T aft, The A nti-T rust A c t 
and the  Supreme C o u rt 86 {1914).
Standard Oil significantly influenced crude oil prices, but did not fix 
them directly, by its control o f storage tank capacity, railroad tank cars 
and pipelines. Its primary control was over refined products until the 
depletion of the Pennsylvania oil fields. In the 1890s Standard began to 
vertically integrate into crude oil production, beginning with large acqui­
sitions in and around a new field in Lima, Ohio, to secure crude oil sup­
plies for its transportation and refining network. Chernow , supra note 11, 
at 286-88.
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tio n  from  ow n in g  the  stock  o f  o ther co rporations.3- R ockefeller 
o rganized  the m ultitude o f  different com panies into a trust in 1879 
m anaged by three em ployees o f S tandard  o f Ohio designated as 
trustees to  h o ld  the stock  of the separately incorporated com pa­
nies c o n tro lled  by S tandard  O il o f O hio. -3 T hereafter, the trust 
w as rev ised  to  ow n the stock o f  separately incorporated Standard 
O il and  o th e r  c o m p an ie s  w hose sh a reh o ld e rs  transferred  the ir 
stock to  the trust and were paid dividends based on the proportion 
o f the ir s tock  to  the d iv idends generated. By w elding together the 
v a rio u s c o m p a n ie s . S tan d ard  c o n tro lle d  90%  o f  A m erican oil 
refineries and p ipelines and  created  an in tegrated  firm  m onopoliz­
ing the re fin in g  and  transporta tion  sectors o f the industry.54
D uring this sam e period, a tim e when the bulk o f S tandard's 
p roduction  w as being  exported , new com petition  arose in Euro­
pean m arkets because  o f the discovery o f  m ajor oil fields in R us­
sia. and in  A s ia .35 S tandard  w as able to m aintain a large share of 
the E uropean  m arket because o f the superior quality  o f its refined 
kerosene, the fa ilu re  o f R ussian  producers and refiners to  organize
3- Justice Brandeis summarized the history of the reluctance to per­
mit business enterprise to make use of the corporate form to carry on 
business activity in his dissent in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541
(1933) and stated the reason for that reluctance wras “fear”: “Fear of 
encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual. Fear 
o f the subjection of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that the
absorption of capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring 
evils similar to those which attended mortmain. There was a sense of 
some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particu­
larly when held by corporations." Liggett, 288 U.S. at 548-49.
33 During the decade in which the Standard Oil Trust was in exis­
tence, 1882-1892. it was estimated that the trust acquired stock in 78 
more companies and dismantled 50 refineries. T h o r e l u , supra note 19, at 
96.
34 See Chernow, supra note 11, at 225-27 for a description of the
process by which the trust was organized and management and control 
were centralized.
55 See id . at 243 -49  describing international developments in this
period.
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their operations efficiently, and periodic agreements with foreign 
producers and refiners dividing particular markets.
Standard also tightened its control over the dom estic market 
by continuing to press for discriminatory railroad rates using not 
only its buying power, but also its control over railroads as the 
major supplier o f  railroad lubricants, ownership o f  most o f the 
tank cars leased to railroads and growing financial investments in 
major rail lines.36 At the same time. Standard began a program of 
vertically integrating into the wholesale and retail markets for d is­
tributing its products, particularly kerosene. W hile Standard did 
so in itia lly  to capture the middleman profit on kerosene, bring 
order to what was an otherwise chaotic distribution network and 
insure the integrity o f its product, the marketing arm o f  Standard 
wus "conducted with such controlled ferocity that they becam e 
the m ost hated part o f the entire organization.7’37 Local managers 
went to great lengths to force com petitors from retail markets, 
using tactics like giving away kerosene free to exclude com peti­
tors and establishing retail grocery stores to drive out competing 
retail groceries that would not sell Standard's product.
Standard also acquired a substantial interest in companies like 
the Waters-Pierce Company, which dominated the o il trade w est 
of the M ississip p i, and w as operated by Henry Clay P ierce, a 
bu sin essm an  o f  w hom  it was said: "He c o u ld n ’t do a th in g  
straight if  it could  be done crooked.”33 Other subsidiaries were 
created to take over the distribution business throughout the rest
^ id. at 2 5 1—52.
3‘ id . at 253. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, adopted in 1914, pro- 
(libiting price discrimination was enacted because of “the common prac­
tice of great and powerful combinations—notably the Standard Oil Co. 
and the American Tobacco Co. . . . t o  lower prices of their commodi­
ties, oftentimes below the cost of production in certain communities and 
sections where they had competition with the intent to destroy and make 
unprofitable the business of their competitors, and with the ultimate pur­
pose in view of thereby acquiring a monopoly in the particular locality or 
section in which the discriminatory price is made.” S. Rep, No. 698, at 3 
( I9I 4) .  The Senate Report went on to describe the practice as “evil,” 
“unfair and unjust.” id.
:,a C h e r n o w , supra note 11, at 255,
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o f the county enabling Standard Oil to divide the United States 
into 11 m ark etin g  d is tr ic ts  in  1886 and m anage each as an 
autonom ous region under the direction and control o f the N ew  
York headquarters o f  Standard Oil. Invasions o f any territory by 
com petitors were sw iftly  m et by tracing the source o f  product 
through railroad agents and em ployees o f  competitors on Stan­
dard’s payroll and localized price cuts designed to prevent a com ­
petitor from gaining a foothold in even the most local o f markets. 
An espionage network was built up and maintained to trace the 
shipment o f  individual barrels o f  oil and refined product shipped 
by c o m p e tito r s  so  that lo c a l c o m p e tit io n  co u ld  be s w if t ly  
excluded by localized price cutting with the full knowledge and 
support o f  Rockefeller. 50
R ockefeller justified  b is actions in altruistic terms: lo bring 
light to even the poorest in society through the operation o f a high 
volum e, low  cost and continually growing company designed to 
achieve the largest share o f  the business. Standard lowered prices 
to meet and exclude com petition and kept prices high where there 
was none, and often engaged in subsidizing prices at or b e lo w  
cost in markets where it faced com petition from profits in markets 
where it did not face com petition ,40 Sales below cost were used to 
drive out lo ca l com petitors, although Standard recognized the 
political value in tolerating marginal competitors to exist but only 
at Standard O il’s su fferance and to m in im ize public fear and 
resentm ent o f  the com pany.41 R ockefeller appeared to be m oti­
vated by a hostility to com petition and in favor o f cooperation as 
a way to manage the oil business, so long as the terms o f coopera­
tion were dictated by Standard Oil, Standard’s retail practices of 
d riv in g  out com p etito rs  and e lim in a tin g  m iddlem en was the  
so u rce  o f  c o n s id e r a b le  c r it ic is m  o f  the com p an y  and the  
widespread m isconception that the company gained its monopoly
39 Id. at 257. Tactics including bribing competitor employees to fur­
nish intelligence to Standard Oil and instructions to Standard’s operatives 
to maintain at least an 85% market share in local markets.
*  Id. at 258.
41 See note 31, supra.
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over refining by retail price discrimination and sales below  cost4- 
despite the fact that commentators o f the day, the historical record 
and the governm ent’s m onopolization case make clear that Stan­
dard O il gained control over the refining and transportation o f  
crude and refined products by collusion  with the railroads to fix 
railroad rates and d iscrim in ate in favor o f  Standard O il and 
against com peting refiners.'*3
Widespread popular hostility toward Standard Oii beyond that 
w h ich  had lo n g  preva iled  am on g o il producers began to be 
expressed in the form o f  legal actions brought by state attorneys 
genera] against Standard Oil and other members o f the trust. In
4- McGee, supra note 17, at 1.17, for example, made this unsubstanti­
ated assertion in his article: “Perhaps the most famous of all the monopo­
lizing techniques thal Standard is supposed to have used is local price 
cutting." Standard's monopolization of the refining business occurred 
well before it launched iis campaign of localized price discrimination and 
was achieved by the establishment of a railroad cartel managed by Stan­
dard Oil to drive out competing refiners and ultimately control the trans­
portation of crude and refined product. See Granitz &  Klein, supra note 
14. By gaining control over crude and refined oil transportation by rail 
and pipeline, local price discrimination and overwhelming domination of 
refining. Standard was able to maintain its monopoly and fend off all 
competitors in refining, transportation and retail distribution of petroleum 
products.
43 See, C hf.r n o w , supra note 11. at 443. Additional hostility toward 
Standard Oil resulted from the economic distress of producers in Kansas 
and Oklahoma who brought in large new oil fields producing far more oil 
than the market could handle. Overproduction brought a precipitous 
decline in the price for crude oil and producers blamed Standard Oil for 
manipulating prices for crude despite Standard’s efforts to explain other­
wise. See 1 Ral.ph W. Hidy & M uriel E, Hidy, History of S tandard  Oil 
671-76 (1955).
Boudreaux & Folsom, supra note 6, at 560-61, attribute the declining 
price of kerosene lo “efficiencies that permitted Standard continually to 
lower prices it charged consumers,” No support is cited for the claimed 
"efficiencies,” While Rockefeller attributed one-half of the substantial 
drop in kerosene prices to Standard Oil’s efficient management, a 1900 
Bureau of Corporations study attributed most, if  not all, of the drop in 
price to “a sharp decline in crude oil prices,” C h e r n o w , supra note 11, at 
258.
S tandard  o il and m icrosofl : 667
1890 the attorney general o f  Ohio filed an action in quo w arran to  
seeking repeal o f  Standard O il Company o f O hio’s charter and 
challenging transfer o f  the control o f  the Ohio corporation to a 
trust com bining Standard with more than 40 other com panies 
engaged in various parts o f  the oil business.44 The trust arrange­
ment involved the transfer o f  the stock in the Ohio corporation 
and the related companies to seven trustees and control over the 
affairs o f the corporations to the trust under the direction and con­
trol o f John D. Rockefeller, The Ohio Supreme Court found this 
divorcement o f ownership from control and vesting it in the hands 
o f  the trustees under the direction o f  R ockefeller was done “to 
e sta b lish  a v irtu a l m o n o p o ly  o f  the b u s in e ss  o f  producing  
petroleum, and o f manufacturing, refining and dealing in it and all 
its product throughout the country, and by w hich it might not 
merely control the production, but the price, at is pleasure.”45 The 
trust was found to be “contrary to the p o licy  o f  our state, and 
void.”46 Standard Oil o f Ohio was enjoined from participating in 
the trust and the parties were en joined  from  transferring their 
shares in  the company to the trust and transferring control o f  the 
company to the trust.47 Sim ilar suits were filed against members
•“ State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892). 
Similar actions by slate attorneys general were brought against the for­
mation of the Colton Oil Trust, the Sugar Trust and the Whiskey Trust. 
See T h o r e l l i, supra note 19, at 78-83.
4* Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. at 290.
46 The court went on to observe that while it may be true that the
trust had improved the quality and cheapened the cost of petroleum to the 
consumer, ‘‘ it is the policy of the law to regard not what may, but what
usually happens. Experience shows that it is not wise to trust human 
cupidity where it has the opportunity to aggrandize itself at the expense 
of others.” Id. And, quoting the Case on Monopolies, Darcy v. Allcin, 
Coke, 16, 84 at pt. 11, 84b, supra note 5, the court found that a monopoly 
results “in prices being raised, the commodity is not so good and mer­
chantable as before and it tend to the impoverishment of others who will 
now of necessity be contained to live in idleness and beggary.”
41 A second cause of action against Standard Oil and its related com­
panies charging violations of the Ohio antitrust statute for forming and 
operating a trust of 19 companies to fix the price and regulate the produc­
tion of oil and refined products and divide the market for sale of refined
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o f  the Standard O il Trust in other slates resulting in the exclusion  
of members o f the trust from doing business in individual states 
for violations o f  the state’s antitrust law s.48
The Standard Oil Trust responded to these actions by taking 
advantage o f  an amendment to the New  Jersey Corporation Act
products was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1900. rejecting 
defenses that the Ohio antitrust statute of 1S9S was unconstitutional. 
Slate v. Buckeye Pipe-Line Co., 6J Ohio St. 520, 56  N.E, 464 (1900/.
j; See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 44 S.W. 936 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1X98); 103 S.W. S36 (Tex. Ct. App. 1907): 105 S.W. 851 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1907); 106 S.W. 918 (Tex. Ct. App. 1908) (action excluding Waters- 
Vierce, a Missouri corporation and member of the Standard Oil Trust, 
from doing business in Texas for violations of the Texas antitrust statute 
and fining the company S I,549,500}; Stale v. Standard Oil Co., 91 S.W. 
1062 fMo. 1906), 116 S.W. 902 (S Cl, Mo. 1908) (action to exclude 
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, W aters-Pierce Oil Co. of Missouri and 
Republic Oil Co. of New York from doing business in Missouri for viola­
tions of the M issouri Antitrust Act). State actions were also brought 
charging Standard Oil with driving out retail competition by giving away 
its product in markets where competitors sought to enter. See Standard
Oil v. Slate, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705 (Tenn. 1906). For a partial list 
of slate cases brought against Standard Oil during this time period set- I 
Hiov & H id y , supra  note 43, at 633.
Standard O il’s national market share in refining began to decline as a 
result of the discovery of new oil fields in Texas and California. The 
actions of several states in excluding Standard Oil or its subsidiaries from 
engaging in business within the state lor violations of stale antitrust laws 
and the inability of even Standard Oil to keep control over a rapidly 
expanding crude oil market led to Standard's overall loss of market share 
nationally, if not in the then major population areas of the country. See 
C h e r n o w . supra  noie 11, at 431 describing the ouster of the Standard 
Oil’s widely haled subsidiary Waters^Pierce Oil Company from Texas for 
violating the Texas antitrust laws on the eve of the historic oil strike al 
Spindle top. By 1905, Texas accounted for 25% of U.S. domestic oil out­
p u t ‘'It is important to recognize that even after discovery of these new 
fields and Standard’s loss of control of the U.S. refining industry. Stan­
dard continued to maintain its monopsony power in the purchase o f crude 
from in the Oil Regions. This is because Standard continued to retain 
control of transportation from the Oil Regions.” Granitz & Klein, supra 
note 14, at 39.
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authorizing corporations to own stock in other corporations4*5 and 
reorganized the trust arrangement into a N ew  Jersey holding com ­
pany, Standard Oil Company o f  New  Jersey, ow ning the stock  
o f  the sam e c o lle c t io n  o f  corp oration s. T hose in control o f  
the trust remained in control o f  Standard Oil Company o f New  
Jersey and the new corporation controlled the same corporations 
that had been placed in the trust and that had come to dominate 
the refining and transportation of oil and the products made from
il. R ockefeller’s efforts to devise an efficient structure to manage 
the complex affairs o f a large and sprawling enterprise should be 
counted as a major contribution to the developm ent o f  a means for 
managing a large and complex business.bureaucracy and a mark 
of his organizational genius, even though these efforts carried on 
the monopolization o f  the transportation and refining o f  o il.30
The involvem ent o f  the federal government in the affairs o f  
Standard Oil increased significantly with the election o f President 
Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 despite efforts by Standard to influ­
ence the election  by cam paign contributions to R oosevelt.51 In 
1906, Roosevelt signed the Hepburn Act strengthening the Inter­
state Commerce C om m ission’s (ICC) regulatory authority over  
railroad rates and exten d in g  ICC ju r isd ic tio n  over the ra les  
charged by oil pipelines. In November 1906, the federal govern­
ment filed ils antitrust suit against Standard Oil o f  New Jersey, 65 
companies under its control and a number o f  individuals including  
John D . Rockefeller.5- A combination and conspiracy in violation
J!’ Laws of New Jersey, chap. 265. §4 (1889) The formation and 
structure of Standard Oil of New Jersey under this law is described m i 
Hidy & Hidy, supr# note 43, at 305-38.
See id. at 40-75.
51 Standard Oil made substantial contributions to the Roosevell cam­
paign, but he soon turned out to be the company's primary antagonist. A 
Standard officer was said to have remarked about Roosevell: ““We bought 
the son of a bitch, hut he wouldn’t stay bought.” C h lh n o w , supra note 11. 
at 519.
5- The complaint is  summarized in United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 173 U.S. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909).
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of sec tion  1 o f  the Sherm an A ct was charged by con trac ts secu r­
ing d iscrim inato ry  transpo rta tion  rates and rebates from  com m on 
carriers; con trac ts w ith co m petito rs  lim iting the production , ou t­
put and m arkets o f  com petito rs; the operation o f  supposed  com ­
p e tito rs  th a t  w ere  n o t in  fa c t  c o m p e tito rs ; e sp io n a g e  a g a in s t 
com petito rs by conspiracies w ith  railroad em ployees for the  pur­
pose  o f  d e s tro y in g  co m p e tito rs ; and, agreem ents to  se ll refined 
product below  cost to drive  ou t com petito rs and raising the price 
in m arkets w here there w as no com petition  to subsid ize  below - 
cost p ric ing  in m arkets w here the com pany faced com petition .51
The com pla in t also  in c lu d ed  a charge that S tandard  O il u n la w -, 
fu lly  m o n o p o lized  the  o il in d u stry  by o b ta in in g  d isc rim in a to ry  
ra ilroad  ra te s ; used  p ipe lines it con tro lled  to  exclude com petition; 
m ade agreem ents w ith co m petito rs to lim it p roduction  and divide 
m arkets; and  form ed a m onopo ly  over refining and transportation 
o f oil p roducts through the c rea tion  of the S tandard  Oil C om pany 
o f N ew  Jersey  by tran sfe rrin g  con tro l o f  o therw ise  com petitive  
com panies to  a com bination  fo r the purpose o f e lim inating  com ­
petition  am ong them  w hile engag ing  in  predatory pricing, indus­
trial esp ionage and the secre t ow nersh ip  o f com petito rs.54 C entral 
to  the go v ern m en t's  m onopo liza tion  charge was the con tro l exer­
c ised  by S tan d ard  O il o v e r tra n sp o rta tio n  by ra il and p ip e line ;
53 Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. at 190.
34 The formation of the original Standard Oil Trust and ihe successor 
Standard Oil Company were alleged to be for the purpose of acquiring a 
"commanding volume of the oil business in . . . and it has since exer­
cised and is using, the power to prevent competition between the compa­
nies which it controls, to fix for them the purchase price of the crude oil, 
the rates for its transportation, and the selling price of its products. It has 
prevented, and is preventing, any competition in interstate and interna­
tional commerce in  petroleum and its products between its subsidiary 
companies and between those companies and itself.” Standard O il Co., 
173 Fed, at 183. When the lawsuit was filed, Standard Oil controlled the 
market for 87% of all kerosene produced, 87% of exported kerosene and 
89% of domestic kerosene. C h e r n o w , supra note 11, at 537. Control over 
refining and transportation of crude and refined product was estimated by 
the trial court at over 80% of the oil from the Pennsylvania and Indiana 
oil fields, fields producing over 75% of domestic crude at the time of the 
case. Standard O il Co., 173 Fed. at 1S3.
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con tro l th a t w as used by S tandard  to set h igh p rices for tra n s­
porta tion  o f  crude to  oil p roducers and to  deny access to crude 
and re fin ed  product transportation to independent refiners.55
The tria l court held that the com bined S tandard Oil com panies 
violated section  1 o f the Sherm an A ct by transferring control o f 
otherw ise com peting com panies to Standard Oil and through the 
con tro l they  exerc ised  over tran sp o rta tio n  ra tes by agreem ents 
w ith  r a i lro a d s  fo r d is c r im in a to ry  ra te s  and  a g re e m e n ts  w ith  
p ipelines that were used to  stifle  com petition in oil refining. By 
the sam e token. Standard Oil w as found to have also violated sec­
tion 2 o f  the Act by com bining and conspiring to m onopolize the 
re fin in g  and  tra n sp o rta tio n  o f  c ru d e  and  re fin ed  p ro d u c t.56 In  
e ffec t, S tan d ard  O il w as d eem ed  to have o r ig in a lly  form ed a 
transpo rta tion  cartel w ith the railroads to gain a m onopoly over 
refining and then used its m onopoly over refining to m onopolize 
the transportation  o f crude and refined product by using  its ra il­
road transportation cartel and refinery m onopoly to exclude com ­
p e tin g  re f in e r ie s  and  the  n ew  te c h n o lo g y  o f  o il p ip e lin e s  to 
m aintain its control o f  refin ing, the price o f  crude and the sale of 
refined p roduct. R elated  p rac tices like industria l esp ionage and 
local p rice  d iscrim ination  and sa les below  cost were not, som e 
c o m m e n ta to rs  to  th e  c o n tra ry  n o tw ith s ta n d in g , th e  c e n tra l  
grounds upon which the governm ent com plaint was based and the 
grounds the trial court found the Standard Oil com bination  to  be 
in v io lation  o f  both sections 1 and 2 o f the Sherm an Act.
T h e  U n ited  S ta tes S uprem e C ourt affirm ed  the low er cou rt 
decision w ith  the m odification that the tim e for im plem enting the 
d isso lu tion  o f  the S tandard O il T rust be extended beyond that set 
by the tria l court.57 In the Suprem e C ourt, the governm ent’s argu­
m ent focused  on the com bining o f  otherw ise com peting refinery
ss See 2 Hidy & Hioy, supra note 43, at 691. There was also evi­
dence of sustained monopoly profits realized by Standard Oil. Between
1882 and 1905 it was estimated that Standard earned profits of $700 mil­
lion on an initial investment of $70 million. Id. at 692.
56 Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. at 191.
57 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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and transporta tion  com panies in to  a sing le  firm  w ith overw helm ­
ing control o f  refinery and transporta tion  fac ilities  for the o il busi­
n ess  a n d  the use o f  d is c r im in a to ry  ra i l  an d  p ip e lin e  ra te s  in 
ob ta in ing  and m ain tain ing  m onopoly  con tro l over refining.
The C ourt review ed the h istory  o f  S tandard  Oil from  1870 by 
considering  three d istinc t periods in  the developm ent o f  the com ­
pany: (1) 1870-1882; (2) 1882-1889 ; and  (3) 1889- and the filing 
o f  the com plain t in  1907. W hile recogn iz ing  that conduct during 
the firs t two periods took p lace before the adoption  o f  the S her­
man Act in 1890, the C o u rt nevertheless considered  the evidence 
o f  how  the d e fen d an t g a in e d  its m ark e t p o w er re le v a n t to  the  
a s se s sm e n t o f  w h e th e r  the  d e fe n d a n t sh o u ld  be c o n s id e re d  a 
m onopolist in v io lation  o f  the Sherm an A ct after 1890.5S D uring 
the first period, the C ourt no ted  thal R o ck efe lle r and Standard O il 
gained control o f refining in  C leveland  by ‘"large preferential rates 
and rebates in  m any and dev ious w ays over th e ir  com petitors from  
various ra ilroad  com pan ies, and that by m eans o f the advantage 
thus obtained , many, if  no t v irtually  all, co m petito rs were forced 
e ither to  becom e m em bers o f  the com bination  or were driven  out 
o f  b u s in ess . . . T he C o u rt fo u n d  th a t s im ila r  tac tic s  w ere 
used to  g a in  c o n tro l o f  re fin e rie s  in  N ew  Y ork, P en n sy lv an ia , 
O h io  and  e lsew h ere ,60 I t  w as fu rth e r fo u n d  th a t S tan d ard  used  
sim ilar tac tics  to gain con tro l over the transpo rta tion  o f  crude  oil 
from  o il fie lds to  refineries in  C leve land , P ittsbu rgh , T itusv ille , 
P h iladelphia , N ew  York S tate and N ew  Jersey  and that during this 
period  *‘had obtained com plete  m astery over the o il industry, co n ­
tro lling  90% o f  the business o f  p roducing , sh ipp ing , refin ing  and 
selling  petro leum  and its p ro duc ts, and thus w as able to fix  the 
price o f  crude and refined petro leum  and  to  res tra in  and  m onopo­
lize all in terstate com m erce in  those p ro d u cts .” 61
D urin g  the second period , (1882—1889) the C o u rt found  the 
defendan ts entered  in to  a  tru s t ag reem ent by w hich  the stock  of
** Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 46-47.
w Id. at 33.
«  Id.
<-1 Id.
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over 40 refining and transportation  com panies was transferred to a 
t r u s t  u n d e r  th e  c o n tro l  o f  Jo h n  D. R o c k e fe lle r .  T he C o u r t 
rev iew ed  the qu o  w a rra n to  proceedings in Ohio dissolving the 
tru st because it v io la ted  O hio  corporation law  and the an titrust 
law s o f  O h io . T h e  C o u r t th e n  su m m a riz e d  the  th ird  p e r io d  
(1 8 8 9 -1 9 0 7 ) as one w here R ockefeller and the m em bers o f  the 
unlaw ful trust created S tandard  Oil of New Jersey lo circum vent 
the  O hio  d ec is io n  en jo in in g  the fo rm ation  o f the S tandard  O il 
T rust by transferring  stock  ow nership o f the corporations prev i­
ously held by the trust to the New  Jersey holding company.
A fter rev iew ing  th is  h istory , the C ourt sum m arized the ev i­
dence show ing that S tandard  Oil had obtained and was m aintain­
ing  its m onopoly unlaw fully  over the refining and transportation 
o f  oil by m eans of:
Rebates, preferences and other discriminatory practices in favor of the 
combination by railroad companies; restraint and monopolization by 
railroad companies; restraint and monopolization by control of pipe 
lines, and unfair practices against competing pipe lines; contracts with 
competitors in restraint of trade; unfair methods of competition, such 
as local price cutting at the points where necessary to suppress compe­
tition; espionage of the business of competitors, the operation of bogus 
independent companies, and payment of rebates on oil, with the like 
intent; the division of the United States into districts and limiting of 
the operations of the various subsidiary corporations as to such dis­
tricts so that competition in the sale of petroleum products between 
such corporations had been entirely eliminated and destroyed; and 
finally reference was made to what was alleged to be the “enormous 
and unreasonable profits” earned by the Standard Oil Trust and the 
Standard Oil Company as a result of the alleged monopoly; which pre­
sumably was averred as a means of reflexly [s/c] inferring Lhe scope 
and power acquired by the alleged combination.6-
The C ourt held  that the un ification  o f the stock o f  the several co r­
p o ra tio n s  p ro d u c in g  and  tran sp o rtin g  oil and  o il p roducts was 
done for the purpose and w ith  the effect o f  gaining a m onopoly 
o v e r the o il b u sin ess; th a t i4no d isin te rested  m ind” can survey  
th e  p e r io d s  le a d in g  u p  to  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  the  S ta n d a rd  O il 
C om pany
Id. at 42-43 .
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without being irresistibly driven to the conclusion that ihe very genius 
for commercial development and organization which it would seem 
was manifested from the beginning soon begot an intent and purpose 
to exclude others which was frequently manifested by acts and dealing 
wholly inconsistent with the theory that they were made with the sin­
gle conception of advancing the business by usual methods, but which 
on the contrary necessarily involved the intent to drive others from the 
field and to exclude them from their right to trade and thus accomplish 
the mastery which was the end in view.65
The Court singled out steps taken by Standard to obtain control of 
transportation and the d ivision  o f  markets as clear grounds for 
finding an intent to exclude others and that the fact that the com ­
bination had little control over crude production as o f  no rele­
vance because absolute control over refining and transportation 
carried with it control over production o f  crude o il.64
It is im possib le to read the history o f  the form ation o f  the 
Standard Oil Company and the antitrust case o f 1911 ordering the 
breakup o f  the company for violations o f  sections 1 and 2 o f  the 
Sherman Act as being based solely  or even  primarily on Stan­
dard’s practice o f  se llin g  petroleum  products b elow  co st and  
engaging in retail price discrim ination. It is  also inconceivab le  
that anyone can fairly read the record as one o f  a firm succeeding  
and being unjustly punished because o f  superior business acumen, 
innovation or production e ffic ien c ies .63 Standard Oil gained its
65 Id. at 76. 
w Id. at 77.
65 Boudreaux & Folsom, supra note 6, at 561 claim that “the most
important of our thesis—even when Standard enjoyed its largest market
share it never acted like a monopolist. It always behaved as though it
faced stiff competition. In our view, the firm’s own observed behavior is
the best evidence of whether or not the firm enjoyed monopoly power.”
There can be little  doubt that S tandard O il “enjoyed m onopoly 
pow er’ and that it used that power to unlawfully monopolize. One can 
only read Boudreaux & Folsom’s proclamation of faith in what they view 
as Standard’s behavior as wholly at odds with the historical record, the 
legal standards followed in monopolization cases, and—in short—as an 
absurd standard for determining whether a firm  has, in fact, monopoly 
power. If the proclaimed subjective belief of defendants were sufficient
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m onopoly over refining by creating and managing a cartel o f rail­
roads to drive out competitors and then used its monopoly over 
refining and cartel over rail transportation to capture and maintain 
control over the innovation o f delivering crude and refined prod­
uct by oil p ipeline.6* By gaining m onopoly control over refining 
and transportation Standard had effective control over oil produc­
tion and was beginning to vertically integrate into crude oil pro­
duction by virtue o f  its monopoly over refining and transportation 
o f  o il. The Supreme Court finding that Standard had violated the 
Sherm an A ct and the com bination should  be d isso lved , even  
though it did not order a complete divestiture of overlapping stock 
ownership in the resulting companies, liberated the industry from 
the hands o f  R ockefeller and his small group o f  associates and 
began the process o f  bringing com petition and innovation to the 
o il industry.67
to dismiss evidence of whether a firm has monopoly power or not or of a 
violation of law. there would never be any cases finding monopoly power 
or violations of law.
If they meant to say that Standard Oil did not “monopolize” because 
it acted as if  it had competition by continuing to attempt to maximize 
profits, every economic theory' recognizes that all firms seek to maximize 
profits. Indeed, a hallmark of a “monopolizing” monopolist is that it is 
free to and often does ‘‘maximize profits.” Standard Oil acted in confor­
mity with this hallmark.
“  Granitz & Klein, supra note 14. conclude that Standard’s vertical 
relationship with and enforcement of the horizontal conspiracy of rail­
roads fixing rail rates and dividing the oil transportation market in 
exchange for discriminatory rates and drawbacks given Standard Oil was 
the source o f Standard gaining and maintaining monopoly power over 
refining. Once Standard gained its monopoly over refining and completed 
its integrated pipeline network, it also gained power over the railroads 
and was able to exercise that power to keep a lid on new and emerging 
competition in refining in the areas it dominated. Standard’s pipeline and 
refinery dominance were also key to its power over oil producdon, an 
activity it was beginning to enter aggressively when the federal antitrust 
action was initiated.
o’ One of the earliest innovations following the breakup of Standard 
Oil was the invention of the cracking process in 1913 for obtaining a 
much higher percentage of gasoline from crude oil than had been the 
case. The development and patenting of the process was attributed to the
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R o ck efe lle r rem ained ail enigm a th roughout m ost o f  the h is ­
tory o f  the  fo rm ation , evo lu tion  and  d isso lu tion  o f  the S tandard  
Oil C om pany. Ron C hernow ’s excellen t biography o f  R ockefeller, 
Than: The L ife o f  John D. R ockefeller. Sr., paints a po rtra it o f  a 
com plex  in d iv id u a l, deeply re lig ious, am bitious and ru th less  in 
h is d ev o tio n  to  gain ing  control o f  the oil industry. A t the  sam e 
tim e. R o ck e fe lle r  had the in sigh t to  recognize re fin in g  as m ore 
crucial than  oil production and th a t gaining contro l o f  the trans­
p o rta tio n  o f  c rude  and re fin ed  p ro d u c t a long  w ith  the  re fin in g  
function  conferred  control o f  upstream  and dow nstream  parts o f  
the bu sin ess . H e defended  the  crea tio n  o f the trust and  had  no 
reg re ts  ab o u t h is o ften  ru th le ss  busin ess  ta c tic s .68 H e b e liev ed  
S ta n d a rd  O il to  be a b e lo v ed  o rg a n iz a tio n  “ w o rsh ip ed  by the 
m asses fo r b rin g in g  them cheap  o il” and that S tandard  O il was 
one o f  the “ m ost rem arkable undertak ings o f all tim es.”69 B eneath 
the benign  ex terior o f  his la te r life  and his benevolence how ever, 
R o ck e fe lle r harb o red  a deep  an g er fo r those who a ttack ed  him  
ca lling  them  “soc ia lis ts  and  an arch is ts” ; persons w ho "p roduce  
no th ing" and  w ho ‘"subsist as suckers on w hat honest m en , frugal 
and industrious, produce.”™
He a p p a re n tly  d id  no t b e lie v e  th a t a c o m p e tit iv e  p ro c e ss  
should  govern  the organization and operation o f  the oil business, 
and believ ed  that only he and  S tandard  Oil could  b ring  the  bene­
fits  o f  the  new  techno logy  o f  re fin in g  o il to  the  m asses . L ike 
m any s ing le-m inded  entrepreneurs, one e ither did it  h is w ay  o r not 
at all, and  once he had acquired the pow er to do so he m ade cer­
tain that others engaged in  the oil business d id  as he saw  f it and 
not as a com petitive  process may have d ictated . A nd, he gained  
the  p o w er to  do  so no t by b e in g  m ore e ffic ien t and innov a tiv e
freeing up of the parts of the Standard Oil monopoly from the heavy hand 
of a “top heavy bureaucracy.” C h e r n o w , supra note 11, at 558. Standard 
of Indiana realized significant profits from the patent but restricted sales 
of cracked gasoline to its “cousin companies” in their pre-1911 marketing 
territories.
/d .a i6 1 7 .
Id.
70 Id. at 618.
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than h is  com petito rs, but by contracts and conspiracies with ra il­
roads ra ising  his r iv a ls ’ costs to gain a m onopoly over refining, 
taking o v e r the innovation  o f  others to m aintain S tandard 's refin­
ery  m o n o p o ly  and  m an ag in g  h is  em pire  w ith a sing le-m inded  
a tten tion  to  every detail to  prevent any erosion o f h is m onopoly 
contro l o v e r the oil industry.
III. U n i te d  S ta te s  v. M ic r o s o f t  C o rp .
L ike the la tte r part o f the 19th century and the developm ent of 
the oil industry  transfo rm ing  m ost o f the econom y and society, the 
end o f  the 20th  cen tu ry  saw the rapid grow th and dissem ination of 
a new and  transform ing  technology , the personal computer. M ost 
o f the econom y has been im pac ted  by the new technology and ju st 
as the oil industry  m ade fundam ental changes to the national and 
in te rn a tio n a l eco n o m ies an d  econom ic in frastru c tu re , the com ­
p u te r  in d u s t ry  is  p ro d u c in g  s im ila r  fu n d a m e n ta l c h a n g e  to  
e co n o m ies  and  in f ra s tru c tu re s . L ike the cen tra liz ed  con tro l o f  
transporta tion  and  refin ing  in  the oil industry held by Standard Oil 
at the end  o f  the 19th cen tury , the new technology o f  computing 
has key  segm ents o f  the busin ess  dom inated  by firm s that have 
captured a substan tia l share o f  the m arket for com puter chips and 
for softw are essen tia l to the  in ternal functions o f a PC, applica­
tions p rogram s and In ternet brow sers for com m unications between 
co m p u te rs . T he in tr ig u in g  p a ra lle ls  be tw een  S tan d ard  Oil and 
M icro so ft how ever, go fa r beyond  th is— p articu la rly  the m eans 
used by M icrosoft to  dom inate  and m aintain its dom inance o f the 
PC business.
C e n tra l to M ic ro s o f t’s b ir th , grow th and  dom inance  o f  the 
softw are m arket for P C s has been  W illiam  G ates, the cofounder o f  
M icroso ft.71 G ates and his cofounder, Paul A llen, realized that the
71 See generally K en  A u l e t t a , W o r ld  W a r  3.0: M ic r o s o f t  a n d  I ts 
E n e m ie s  (2001); J o h n  H e il e m a n n , P r id e  B e f o r e  t h e  F a l l : T he T r ia ls  o f  
B ill  G a t e s  a n d  th e  E n d  o f  t h e  M ic r o s o f t  E r a  (2001), An earlier version 
o f  H e ilem an n ’s re p o rt o f  the M icrosoft tr ia l appeared in W i r e d  
M a g a z in e , Nov. 2000, at 261 under the title: The Whole Truth and Noth­
ing But the Truth: The Untold Story o f the Microsoft Antitrust Case. See
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new ly em erging PC had  po ten tia l lo be used by boih business and 
in  the hom e if  it had  the appropriate  softw are. W hile the m ajor 
m a n u fa c tu re rs  o f  co m p u te rs  c o n c e n tra ted  on la rg e  c o m p u te rs  
fo r  business and the m anufac tu ring  o f PC hardw are , G ates and 
A llen  saw that so ftw are to  ru n  PCs could be the key  to  a m ore 
w idespread use o f com puter technology. L ike R ockefe lle r’s vision 
for the oil business, ga in ing  control over an essential part o f the 
p ro cess  o f b ring ing  the  inno v a tio n  o f com puters to  the m asses 
cou ld  be far more sign ifican t and profitable than being engaged  in 
the upstream  part o f  the business o f producing oil o r m anufactu r­
ing  com puters. In the case o f  o il, the essential process was re fin ­
ing  and transportation o f o il. In the case o f PCs, it w as operating 
softw are for com puters w hich perform s basic functions like a llo ­
ca tin g  m em ory, contro lling  the function o f peripheral dev ices like 
prin ters and keyboards and  serves as the p latform  by w hich ap p li­
cation  program s like w ord processing are in tegrated  w ith a com ­
p u te r’s operation.
B eginning  in  1975, G ates and A llen began providing softw are 
for the A lta ir 8800 ca lled  B asic 2 .0  and began selling  the softw are 
to o ther custom ers.7- T heir new  firm , M icrosoft, had the good fo r­
tune to  be chosen by IB M  in 1980 to provide the operating  sys­
te m — M S-D O S (M ic ro so ft D isk  O p era tin g  S ystem ) fo r IB M ’s 
firs t personal com puter u sing  In te l’s 16-bit ch ip  design . T h ere ­
after, M icrosoft in troduced  its version o f the m ouse, firs t used  by 
A pple, and M icrosoft WTord  w hich cam e to displace W ordPerfect 
as the  lead ing  w ord  p ro cess in g  program . IBM  belated ly  reco g ­
nized operating  system  softw are as the key to the em erging tech­
no logy  and  d ev e lo p ed  its ow n opera ting  system — O S /2 , w hich  
failed  to displace M ic ro so ft W indow s. By w orking  close ly  w ith 
In tel and the developm ent o f  ever more pow erful ch ips by Intel, 
the in ab ility  o f  IBM  to  d ev e lo p  a  com peting  opera tin g  system ,
also  J o e l  B r in k l e y  Sl S t e v e  L o h r , U .S . v. M ic r o so ft : T h e  In s id e  S tory  
o f  t h e  L a n d m a r k  C a s e  (2001); J a m es  W a l l a c e  & J im  E r ic k s o n , B il l  
G a t e s  a n d  t h e  M a k in g  o f  t h e  M ic r o s o f t  E m pir e  (1992); J a m e s  W a l l a c e , 
O v e r d r iv e : B il l  G a t e s  a n d  t h e  R a c e  t o  C o n t r o l  C y b e r spa c e  (1997).
7- See A u l e t t a , supra note 71, at 145^6 ; H e il e m a n n , supra note 71,
at 56-57.
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and m istakes by A pple in  refusing  to  license its software for use 
on non-A pple produced m achines, M icrosoft and Intel were able 
to dom inate the m arket fo r PCs through their control of the oper­
ating system  softw are and c h ip s .73 W hile the A ntitrust D ivision 
did not charge M icrosoft w ith gain ing  its m onopoly over operat­
ing system  softw are for In te l-com patib le  PCs by means sim ilar to 
the m eans used by Standard  Oil to  gain  control over the refining
71 A l l c t t a , supra note 71, at 149. Intel encountered antitrust diffi­
culties when it was charged by the FTC with suppressing competition in 
innovation by threatening to withhold access to technical information to 
three firms developing new chip designs, Intel allegedly demanded the 
companies cease innovation in new chip designs and license their tech­
nology to Intel or be cut off from receiving Intel technical information 
necessary to design computer systems based on new generation Intel 
chips. See. Intel Corp., Complaint Dkt. # 9288. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 
1124,440 (June 8. 1998). The case was resolved by a consent order pro­
hibiting Intel from refusing to deal or withholding technical information 
from a customer for ‘'reasons related to an intellectual property dispute 
with □ customer.^ Intel Corp., Consent Order, Dkt. # 9288, 5 Trade Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) H24,575 (Aug. 3, 1999). See also  Intergraph Corp. v. Intel 
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (private suit by Intergraph where 
the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of preliminary injunction against 
Intel for refusing to grant access to information about new Intel chips to a 
plaintiff developing technology for the graphics markets). In apparent 
disregard for the antitrust concern with protecting innovation competi­
tion, the court held: '‘U nilateral conduct that may adversely affect 
another’s business situation, but is not intended to monopolize that busi­
ness does not violate the Sherman Act.” Such a broad generality would 
appear to be at odds with cases like United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 106-07 (1948):
Section 2 is not restricted to conspiracies and combinations to 
monopolize, but also makes it a crime for any person to monopolize 
or attempt to monopolize any part of interstate trade or commerce. 
. . , It is indeed ‘'unreasonable p e r  se to foreclose competitors from 
any substantial market." . . . The anti-trust laws are as much vio­
lated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction. . . .  It 
follows a fortiori that the use of monopoly power, however law­
fully acquired, to foreclose com petition, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or to destroy a competitor is unlawful.
See  Flynn, supra  note 5, setting forth standards for antitrust cases alleg­
ing claims o f the suppression o f innovation.
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and transpo rta tion  o f  o il,74 its tactics in m aintain ing and extending 
its m onopo ly  over com puter operating  system s and related app li­
cations p rogram s began to  take on the characteristics o f intriguing 
para lle ls  to  S tandard  O il's  exclusionary  conduct rather than lim p­
ing an a lo g ies ,75
74 Others did c la im  Microsoft gained its monopoly over the operat­
ing system market for Intel-based PCs by means not honestly industrial. 
See Caldera. inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F.Supp. 2d 1295 (D.C. Utah 
1999) (claims that Microsoft tied its DOS operating system to its graphi­
c a l  interface system by its Windows program to exclude plaintiff’s com- 
pe iing  DOS system ). A n tico m p e titiv e  co n d u ct a lleged  included  
preannouncem ent of products known not to be ready for the market 
(vaporware); claimed misrepresentations about p laintiffs DOS system; 
imposition of licensing agreements on equipment makers requiring them 
to pay a license fee on a l l  machines produced, minimum commitments 
subject to forfeiture and increased license duration; and making Windows 
incom patible with p la in tif fs  DOS program. The case was settled by 
Microsoft paying a rumored sum in excess o f $250 million after the court 
rejected M icrosoft’s motion to dismiss and while the Antitrust Division 
monopolization ease against Microsoft was pending.
IBM”s OS/2 operating system program also failed to compete effec­
tively with M icrosoft's Windows program in part because it used more 
memory, few applications programs were written for it and restrictive 
contracts between Microsoft and independent software vendors (ISVs) 
limiting ISVs from selling their programs to Window’s competitors. See, 
A u l e t t a , supra note 71, at 115.
75 B oudreaux  & Folsom , su pra  no te  6, at 564, assert that if
M icrosoft were a m onopolist “then M icrosoft would behave like a
monopolist. It would restrict output and raise prices. . . . [I]ndustry 
studies would reveal a slowdown in innovation, a hike in prices (or a 
softening of a secular downward trend in prices), and a restriction in out­
put.” Each of these features of Microsoft’s behavior was evident, along 
with other indicators of what most observers conceded—Microsoft had a 
monopoly over operating software for PCs. It has been reported that 
Microsoft’s cash on hand now stands at 5>30 billion and that the company 
is adding $1 billion per month to its bank account “thanks to its Windows 
and office monopolies.” Jay Greene, Microsoft: How It Became Stronger 
Than Ever, Bus. Wk., June 4, 2001, at 75-76.
There was also an abundance of evidence at trial that Microsoft exer­
cised its monopoly power. Microsoft’s profits were 40 cents on each dol­
lar o f  revenue in 1998 and its 1999 after-tax profits were 39%. A u le tt a , 
supra note 71, at 304. It had nearly $20 billion in excess cash and a stock
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By the early  1990s. M ic ro so ft’s business p lan  was based on 
seeing to  it that M icrosoft operating system  softw are was installed 
by original equipm ent m anufacturers (O E M s) on new Intel-based 
PCs and to constantly  upgrade the W indow's program  as an ongo­
ing source o f  revenue fo r the com pany.76 W ith  the advent o f  the 
Internet by the m id-1990s, M icrosoft saw the business for content 
supplied to  the In ternet as a new source o f  revenue, and it made 
several investm ents in content com panies, A T& T’s cable system  
and Time W arner's cable m odem  and acqu ired  all or part o f 130 
co m p an ie s  b e tw een  1994 an d  1 9 9 9 .77 G a te s  an d  M ic ro s o f t 's  
genius lies in  seeing  and  im p lem en tin g  b u sin ess  opp o rtu n ities  
rather than technological in n ova tion .78 M ic ro so ft 's  core revenue
valuation exceeding that of General Motors at the time of the monopo­
lization trial. Id. at 49. That amount now is estimated to exceed $30 bil­
lion in cash on hand. See Greene, supra. Persistent high profitability, a 
characteristic of Microsoft through most of the 1990s, was recognized by 
Microsoft’s economic expert at trial, Professor Richard Sehmalensee, as 
"a good indication of long run power” in: Another Look at Market P ower,
95 H a r v . L. R e v . 1789, 1806 (1982), When confronted at trial concerning 
Microsoft’s profits on operating systems sales, Sehmalensee had to con­
fess he did not know what they might be because M icrosoft's accounting 
systems did not provide that information.
On the innovation issue, Microsoft was often a follower rather than a 
leader in innovation, produced a product often subject to malfunctions, 
and muscled firms like Apple, Intel, IBM and Sun Microsystems into 
dropping plans to use or bring innovative software to market. See Find­
ings of Fact, supra note 2, at 94—132; 386—407; H eile m a n m , supra note 
71, at 49 ,91, 93 & 151. “Microsoft is less famous for innovation than for 
popularizing the innovation of others." A u l e t t a , supra note 71, at 159. In 
addition, its pattern of buying up firms with innovative ideas, combined 
with its huge cash reserves and power to continue intimidate others, sug­
gests that Microsoft need not be innovative when it can simply buy up 
any new innovation that comes on the scene,
76 A u l e t t a , supra note 71, at 150.
77 Id. at 151-52.
76 Id. at 159: “M icrosoft's great successes—DOS, the graphical user 
interface, Windows have been clones,” Auletta quotes computer science 
professor David Gelernter of Yale as describing Gates as: “ [T]he Bing 
Crosby of American technology, borrowing a tune here and a tune there
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producer w as the W indow s operating  system  and O ffice program  
and  the com pany took steps to protect its m onopoly o f these sy s­
tem s by en g ag in g  in  s tep s  rem in iscen t o f  tac tic s  em p lo y ed  by 
S tan d ard  Oil m ore than  a century before.
M icro so ft in itia lly  offered  a per processor license for its oper­
ating  system  to In te l-based  O EM s w hich required that they pay a 
roy a lty  for W indow s on all com puters they m anufactured  whether 
th e  W in d o w s o p e ra t in g  s y s te m  w as in s ta lle d  o n  a p a r tic u la r  
m ach ine  or n o t.7"1 The effect w as akin to  S tandard O il 's  organiza­
tio n  o f  a ra ilroad  cartel fav o rin g  Standard Oil through d iscrim ina­
to ry  tra n sp o rta tio n  ra te s  and  im p o sin g  a tax  on sh ip m en ts  by 
co m p e tito rs  and turned  over 10  S tandard  as a ‘'d raw back ." S tan­
d a rd ’s tactics fo rced  ex is tin g  com petitors out o f  business or into 
the arm s o f S tandard  O il and  erectcd  a substantial entry  barrier to 
new refiners. M icrosoft o rgan ized  what w as in  effect a reluctant 
c a r te l .  A lth o u g h  i t  w a s  n o t a t ig h t-k n i t  a g re e m e n t lik e  tha t 
e n fo rc e d  by S ta n d a rd  O il fo r  the r a i lro a d s , O E M s fa v o rin g  
M ic ro so ft’s operating  system  and  paying a long-term  licensing fee 
on a per processor basis  created  an  effective entry barrie r to com ­
p e tin g  opera ting  system s. O EM s paying a fee for W indow s based 
011 ail the  com puters they  m anufactured , w hether W indow s was 
insta lled  on every  m achine o r no t, were not likely to  insta ll a com ­
peting  opera ting  system  on the ir m achines and pay an additional 
license  fee to a co m petito r and incur the costs o f serv icing  more
and turning them all into great botfo hits—by dint of heroic teats of 
repackaging and sheer Herculean blandness.”
7l) In 1988, Microsoft offered OEMs the option of a per processor 
license, a per copy license for each copy actually installed or a per sys­
tem license on the machine or model the operating system was actually 
installed. By 1993, the per processor license came to dominate the OEM 
channel. While the consent decree challenging the per processor license 
and term of the license enjoined these practices, the trial conn initially 
presented with the decree for its approval held that the decree did not go 
far enough in restraining the alleged use of vaporware and manipulation 
of the operating system 10 prevent a competitors’ application programs 
fro in functioning effectively with Microsoft’s DOS program. See United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995).
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than system .51"1 The A ntitrust D ivision challenged this practice and 
a consent decree was entered prohibiting the per processor license 
fee  and  lo n g -te rm  lic e n s in g  c o n tra c ts  w ith  O E M s, a co n sen t 
decree the federal d istric t court refused to enter because it did not 
go far enough in prohibiting  M icrosoft's  exclusionary tactics the 
tr ia l c o u r t  b e lie v e d  an tico m p e titiv e .* *  T h e  c o u r t  o f  a p p e a ls  
re v e rse d  the  d is t r ic t  c o u r t  o n  the  g ro u n d  th a t the c o u r t  h ad  
exceeded  its authority under the Tunnev A ct,s: rem anded the case 
to a d ifferent judge (it tu rned  ou t to be Judge Jackson  who was 
th en  a ss ig n ed  the su b seq u en t A n titru s l D iv is io n  case  ag a in st 
M icrosoft) and ordered the consent decree be entered.SJ
6l) See Caldera. /2  F. Supp. 2d at 1301,
61 U niled S tates v. M icrosoft C orp., supra  note 79. C uriously.
Boudreaux & Folsom ignore this conduct by Microsoft along with its
subsequent OEM contracts excluding Netscape from being installed or
featu red  on the PCs they m anufactured. They assert that because 
Microsoft "acts as though it faccs competitive rivalry,” that fact “is the 
best evidence that Microsoft in fact does face competitive rivalry.” Supra 
note 6. at 569. Such a claim is the equivalent of saying that because a 
person charged with murder believed the victim was out to injure him 
that the murderer’s belief is the best evidence that the murderer did face a 
threat in fact of being injured by the victim. Surely the circularity of such 
reasoning and its implicit invitation to ignore reality is the best cvidcncc 
of the shallowness of such an analysis. The first issue is a factual one— 
did Microsoft face “competitive rivalry” and second, if it did, were the 
tactics used by Microsoft to compete legitimate ones consistent with a 
competitive process or not. The first issue cannot be answered by circular 
reasoning divorced from reality but must confront the actual facts and 
circumstances unique to the case. The second issue is, unavoidably, a 
legal issue and is a policy question that must be both faced and answered 
in light of the policies behind the law and the consequences of the deci­
sion. For a thoughtful exploration of these issues in the context of the 
M icrosoft case rather than a simplistic and illogical attempt 10 avoid 
them, see Peter C. Carstensen, Remedying the M icrosoft M onopoly: 
M onopoly Law, the Rights o f Buyers and the Enclosure Movement in 
Intellectual Property, 44 A n t i t r u s t  B ull. 527 (1999).
65 15 U.S.C. 5 lt>.
83 United States v. M icrosoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCHI
1171,096 (D.D.C. 1995).
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A key term  o f ihe consent decree  that w ould becom e cen tral to 
a s u b s e q u e n t a t ta c k  on M ic r o s o f t 's  b u n d lin g  o f  its  In te rn e t  
Explorer program  w ith its W indow s operating system  provided:
Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the 
terms ol that agreement arc expressly or impliedly conditioned upon:
(1) any licensing of any other Covered Product, Operatinc System 
Software product or other product (provided, however, that this prov i­
sion in and o f itse lf  shall not be construed to prohibit M icrosoft front 
developing integrated products) . . . ,8J
M ic ro so ft w as cau g h t u n a w a re  o f  the  ful l  p o te n tia l o f  the  
In ternet as a cha llenge  to both  its m onopoly  over Ihe operating 
system  for PCs and  its pow er as a  po ten tia l alternative p latform  
for applications program s for all personal com puters. 85 T he In ter­
net challenge w as po.ced by N etscape , o rganized  in 1094, w hich 
r a p id ly  b e c a m e  th e  p r im a ry  I n te r n e t  b ro w s e r  fo r  PC  u se rs . 
M icrosoft fina lly  rea lized  that the  In te rn e t posed  a th reat to  its 
dom inance  over the o p era ting  sy stem  m arket and the con tro l it 
be.uow ed over ap p lica tio n s p ro g ram s because  app lica tions p ro ­
gram s cou ld  be loca ted  on the In ternet and accessed directly  by an 
In te rn e t c o n n ec tio n  using  a u n iv e rsa l lan g u ag e  code and  open 
‘'app lication  p rogram  in terfaces”  (A PIs) by N etscape w ithout the 
necessity o f  having  to rely upon M icro so ft’s proprietary applica­
tions program  interfaces.** T he risk  faced  by M icrosoft was like
^  Consent Decree, supra note 83. HIV E,(i) (emphasis added).
S1 Intel’s market share for PC chips has begun to decline in recent 
years as other chip manufacturers have made inroads into its dominance 
of the chip market for PCs. The chips of other manufacturers necessarily 
are manufactured lo be compatible with Microsoft’s Windows program. 
In addition. Apple’s market share continues to decline and it is more 
accurate to define the market currently dominated by Microsoft as "the 
personal computer market" rather than just Intel-based PCs. Microsoft’s 
dominance of the operating system market for PCs has also conferred 
upstream monopoly power over the development and evolution of the 
chip market for PCs generally and OEM manufacturers, as well as the 
downstream applications market and Internet browser market.
Rn By virtue of the “network effects" of having over 90% of the PC 
operating systems market, developers of applications programs were
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the risk to  S tandard  O il's  control over refining through its cartel 
a rrangem en t w ith  the ra ilro ad s posed by the innovation  o f oil 
pipelines. S tandard  Oil snuffed out that risk  by use ol the raib oad 
cartel it m anaged to engage in price discrim ination  against inde­
pendent oil refineries; buying up the refineries served by com pet­
ing o il p ip e lin e s ;  o b s tru c tio n s  p laced  in  the  w ay o f the new  
technology o f oil p ipelines seeking to  serve independent refinery 
com petitors; and then taking over the new technology o f pipelines 
to protect and ex tend  its refinery m onopoly.1*7 M icrosoft sought to
forced to write program1; compatible with Microsoft's Window >, opt rat­
ing svsteni and have access to Microsoft’s APIs in order to insure their 
programs worked with the dominant operating systems software. This 
“applications program barrier” in turn excluded the opportunity for rival 
operating systems and c row-pi at form systems capable of translating doc­
um ents from  one opera ting  system  to ano ther to  com pcte w ith 
M icrosoft’s operating system. Microsoft viewed the potential o f the 
Internet and cross-plat form programs like Java as a threat to its mainte­
nance of control over the “applications barrier” and dominance of the 
operating systems market. United States v. Microsoft. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1,
10-22 (D.D.C. 1999). See also A u l e t t a , supra note 71 at xx: "[Iff a sim­
ple browser could sit atop Windows or any other operating system, 
employing a universal language code such as Java, and if developers 
could hook into the APIs of the browser, then the vital software on a PC 
might no longer be Windows but the browser.”
The trial court found that the "applications barrier” enhanced the 
monopoly M icrosoft possessed over the operating system market for 
Intel-compatible PCs as a matter of law. Findings of Law, supra note 2, 
at 3b. relying upon United States v. A.T. & T. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 
1147—48 (D.D.C, 1981).
41 When long-distance oil pipelines first appeared on the scene. 
Standard Oil “became a benighted custodian of the status quo, squelching 
progress to safeguard its own interests.” C h e r n o w , supra note 11. al 207. 
Standard initiated several obstructionist tactics to prevent construction of 
the Equitable and Tidewater Pipelines to carry1 crude oil to the east coast 
including buying up a connecting railroad to serve the Equitable pipeline, 
refusals to deal with pipe companies dealing with the new pipelines, dis­
connecting Standard pipelines from refiners dealing with the pipelines, 
buying an exclusive charter from the Maryland Legislature to prevent a 
new pipeline from running through the state, buying up independent 
refineries the new line was meant lo serve, purchasing strips of land the 
new pipeline would have to cross, and wholesale bribery of state legisla-
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sn u ff out the risk  to  its operating  system  m onopoly  and its accom ­
panying  applications entry barrier by develop ing  its ow n brow ser 
(In ternet E xplorer), bundling  it w ith its W indow s opera ting  sy s­
tem for installa tion  by O EM s on all PCs they m anufactu red  and 
offering  the program  “free .’7 T he A ntitrust D iv ision  responded  by 
f i l in g  an a c tio n  fo r c o n te m p t c la im in g  M ic ro s o f t’s a c tio n  in 
bundling  its In ternet brow ser w ith its W indow s opera ting  system  
routinely  installed  by O EM s on In tel-based  P C s v io lated  the ea r­
l ie r  c o n se n t d e c re e ’s p ro h ib i t io n  u p o n  l ic e n s in g  a g re e m e n ts  
req u irin g  the  licensing  o f  any “ o th e r C o v ered  P ro d u c t . . .  o r 
o th e r product (p rov ided , h o w ev er that th is p ro v is io n  in  and o f  
itse lf  shall not be construed to p roh ib it M icrosoft from  developing  
in tegrated  products ) / ,i>6
Judge Jackson  found the p roh ib ition  o f  the consent decree fo r­
bidding a licensing agreem ent requ iring  the licensing  o f  an “other
lures. Despite all these obstructionist tactics the Tidewater line was com­
pleted. The Tidewater pipeline was finally brought to heel by Standard 
Oil buying up control of refineries it was intended to  supply and a 
ruinous price war implemented through its railroad cartel. Standard Oil 
purchased the pipeline 1 year after it was completed, id. at 214-15. Stan­
dard Oil only belatedly recognized the significance of oil pipelines and 
formed United Pipelines to both gain control of pipelines and hold the 
threat of pipeline competition over the beads of railroads tempted to get 
in the business or deviate from Standard’s rail rates. See id. at 171.
M icrosoft's response to Netscape and the threat posed to its operating 
system and applications barrier monopoly was similar to Standard Oil's 
response to a new technology threatening its refinery monopoly: a 
belated recognition of the importance of the new technology and its 
threat to the existing system for delivering product; steps taken to either 
buy out or drive out the new technology; and then taking over the new 
technology by bundling it with its operating system program for market­
ing through its OEM channel to secure its monopoly control over a key 
part of the industry threatening its operating system monopoly. OEMs 
faced with the ultimate threat of retaliation by M icrosoft if  they did not 
include its browser on the machines they manufactured and the increased 
cost of servicing their customers having problems with the programs on 
their machines, particularly if  there were more than one version o f a 
browser program, were made into an entry barrier to competing browser 
programs by Microsoft’s marketing scheme.
** United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997).
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p r o d u c t” a m b ig u o u s  w ith  r e g a rd  to  w h e th e r  it  a p p lie d  to  
M ic ro so ft’s bundling o f its b row ser with Window's in light o f  the 
p rov iso  excluding “ in tegrated  products” from  the prohibition. The 
court refused  to find M icrosoft guilty  o f contem pt because o f  the 
am bigu ity  o f  the consent decree, but did agree with the govern­
m en t's  in terpretation o f the decree that it was designed to prohibit 
unlaw'ful ty ing under the an titrust law s.89 The issue became cast as 
one o f w hether the bundling o f  the W indow s operating system and 
the M ic ro so ft’s Internet brow ser constitu ted  the tying of two prod­
ucts o r w hether the bundle shou ld  be considered a single ‘in te ­
g r a te d  p r o d u c t .” R e ly in g  u p o n  S u p re m e  C o u r t d e c is io n s  
em phasiz ing  a “consum er dem and test” for determ ining w'helher 
there w as one product or two p roducts,90 the district court found 
suffic ien t evidence that the operating  system  and Internet brow ser 
p rogram s constitu ted  tw o separate  products for purposes o f the 
per se ru le  prohib iting  tying arrangem ents to issue a prelim inary 
in ju n c tio n  ag a in st the b u n d lin g  o f  the tw o program s in to  one 
pend ing  a full trial o f  the issue.
M ic ro so f t  a p p e a le d  an d  the  co u rt o f ap p ea ls , tre a tin g  the 
ac tion  as a  m otion fo r c larification  o f the consent decree reversed 
the  issu an ce  o f  the p re lim inary  in ju n c tio n .91 A m ajority  o f  the 
court o f  appeals, view ing the m atter as one calling for review on 
the ex isting  record o f a request for a prelim inary injunction and 
th a t the consent decree prohib ition  in  question  did not em body all 
ty ing  law  under the Sherm an A ct,9- held the term s o f the consent 
decree d id  not bar the bundling  o f  M icroso ft’s In ternet brow ser 
p rogram  w ith  its W indow s 95 opera ting  system .113 But the court
fi,; M a t  541.
w See, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 
(1984); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 
(1992).
91 United Slates v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F,3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Circuit Judges Williams & Randolph).
92 Id. at 946.
The consent decree was directed at a complaint by N ovell that
Microsoft was tying its MS-DOS operating program with the graphical
did not stop with a literal reading o f  the consent decree in light o f  
the circumstances o f its adoption. The court, in dicta, speculated  
that a m onopolist who markets goods that are “com plem ents used  
in fixed proportions” has no “obvious reason to market the tied 
good separately . . . since all buyers o f the tied good  w ill also  
take the tied good.”‘M And the court held that: “if  the concern is 
that the tie-in makes it more difficult for competitors to enter the 
market for the tying good (because they must also offer the tied
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interface provided by Windows 3.11 and was enforcing the tie by its 
licensing practices with OEMs by requiring them to pay a per processor 
and per system license fee. The court thus saw the question of whether 
the purpose of the consent decree was analogous to the bundling of Win­
dows 95 widi Internet Explorer (IE). In a separate treble damage action 
involving the same facts and issues that triggered the consent decree, 
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp.2d 1295 (D.D.C. Utah 
1999), Judge Benson rejected the tying analysis of the D.C. Circuit in the 
M icrosoft case. Caldera Corp.. 11 F. Supp.2d at 1319-28, and held there 
was sufficient evidence on the tying count to send the question to a jury.
Like the issue of “relevant markets’7 in monopolization and merger 
litigation, the issue of whether there is one product or two products for 
purposes of tying analysis has become an end unto itself and divorced 
from the reason for why the question is being asked. Tying by a firm with 
power in the tying product market ought to be viewed as a problem of 
leveraging market power from one area of the economy to another with­
out a functional and necessary' justification for doing so. See notes 163 & 
165, infra. In such circumstances, competition on the merits does not 
determine success or failure in the lied product market and can be used to 
maintain power in the tying market. Power in the tying product market 
determines success or failure, a competitive process does not. Framing 
the actions of Microsoft as a tying case focused the case on the one prod­
uct versus two product issue instead of the more important question of 
whether Microsoft was leveraging what had become an essential facility 
(its operating system monopoly) into the related markets of Internet and 
application programs to protect its monopoly in the operating system 
market without a justification for doing so and proof that a less restrictive 
alternative was unavailable. For an analysis focusing on market power as 
the key to tying cases rather than one product versus two products, see 
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy fo r  M onopoly Leveraging by 
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw, U. L. Rev. 1, 5 -6  (1998),
w Microsoft Corp., 147 F. 3d at 948. What the court meant by “com­
pliments used in fixed proportions” is not precisely clear.
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good) . . . separate marketing o f  the tied good actually mitigates 
the posited harm by facilitating entry into the market for the tying 
good.”95 Thus the court concluded, the consent decree exception 
for integrated products should be read as permitting “any genuine 
technological integration, regardless o f whether elements o f the 
integrated  package are marketed separately.”M And the court 
defined “integrated product” as a product that combines function­
a lities  (w h ich  may a lso  be marketed separately and operated 
together) in a way that offers advantages if  the functionalities are 
brought separately and combined by the purchaser,9"7 Concluding 
that M icrosoft had "clearly met the burden o f ascribing facially 
plausible benefits to its integrated design as compared to an oper­
ating system  com bined with a stand-alone browser”^  the court 
reversed the district court’s grant o f  a preliminary injunction.
Judge W ald’s dissent pointed out the failure o f the majority 
opinion to take account o f  the “backdrop o f antitrust law” and the 
traditional test for “two products” o f  whether there was a “suffi­
cient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide 
[the first product] separately from [the second].”99 Moreover, she 
saw the test adopted by the majority o f sanctioning a design com­
bining functionalities in a way that offers ultimate users some 
plausible advantage otherwise unobtainable “as to safe a harbor
Id. Entry into both markets subsequently proved not to be '‘miti­
gated.” Manipulation of the OEM market and APIs for other browsers, 
restrictive contracts with Internet access providers (IAPs), independent 
software vendors (ISVs) and blocking removal of Microsoft’s browser 
from the Windows program were all proved to be devices relied upon by 
Microsoft to wage its battle with Netscape and reduce Netscape's ability 
to reach the m arket in the subsequent m onopolization case against 
Microsoft. See A u l e t t a , supra note 71, at 193-208.
M icrosoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 948.
^  Id.
1,8 Id. al 950.
Id. at 958. Quoting the test adopted in Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
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w ith too easily  nav igable  an en trance.” 100 O f even m ore sig n ifi­
cance, the d issen t noted:
[ A ] n t i t r u s t  la w  c a n n o t  a v o id  d e te r m in in g  w h e th e r  a  p a r t i c u la r  t e c h n o ­
lo g i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a s  o c c u r r e d  b e c a u s e  it  i s  e f f i c i e n t  o r  m e r e ly  
b e c a u s e  it  p e r m i ts  a m o n o p o l is t  to  e x te n d  i t s  m o n o p o ly  to  a  n e w  m a r ­
k e t .  , . . ltl1
[The] courts must consider whether the resulting product confers bene­
fits on the consumer that justify a product's bridging of two formerly 
separate markets.11)2
[I]f there are clearly two distinct markets, then Microsoft would need 
to demonstrate substantial synergies in order to compel OEMs to 
accept a new •'integrated" product that bridges those markets.Ja;
W hile no t avo id ing  com pletely  the "one p roduct” o r “ two p ro d ­
uct” m etaphysica l debate , the d issen t at least called  for a m ore 
search ing  inquiry  in  light o f  the reason an titrust policy  has sing led  
out ty ing  arrangem ents for special trea tm en t1W and the fact that 
the alleged ty ing arrangem ent in this instance was being im posed 
by a firm  w ith m onopoly  pow er in the claim ed tying product m ar­
ket— a product th a t had becom e an essen tia l facility  fo r OEM s, 
applications program s and Internet access prov iders.10’
100 Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 957.
>■" Id. at 958. The dissent might have also considered the effect of the 
tying arrangement on preserving a monopoly in the tying product market.
|i;'- Id.
Id. at 959. Judge Wald defined “synergies” as “real benefits to the 
consumer associated with integrating two software products.” Id. at 958.
'** Clayton Act, § 3, 15U.S.C. § 14.
1 “  One might have also raised the question of who is the “consumer” 
of the products involved for purposes of determining whether there was a 
consumer demand for the products to be considered separate products. In 
the case of sales o f a PC operating system and Internet browser pro­
grams, sophisticated OEMs and IAPs constituted a substantial share of 
the market for the programs. Presumably, they have the technical sophis­
tication and competitive interest to select the best combination of operat­
ing, Internet and applications programs for their customers. Microsoft’s 
bundling of products restricts the competitive freedom of OEMs and 
lAPs to offer the mix of programs they deem best to offer ultimate con-
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The m ajority  opinion reads like  a tax opinion construing som e 
obscure part o f  the In ternal R evenue C ode in light o f the co m ­
p lex itie s  o f  co m p u te r  p ro g ram m in g . It is an o p in ion  d iv o rced  
from  the overa ll context in  w hich the case arose, including preda­
tory  p r ic in g ;106 the o b jec tiv e s  o f  an titru s t policy, including  the
sumers and the freedom of ultim ate consumers to choose ihe mix of 
browser and other programs they deem best for their needs. In addition, 
OEMs and IAPs are deprived o f the revenue, revenue captured by 
M icrosoft, from the sale of program s installed on their machines or 
browsers. The effect was similar to Standard Oil buying up oil refineries
oil producers intended to serve through an independent pipeline: an 
insurmountable entry barrier to the ultimate market for the product of 
other browsers by capturing the capacity of OEMs and IAPs to offer 
competing browsers and applications programs.
J(K’ Microsoft not only gave away its IE “free,” but it also paid sub­
stantial sums to OEMs and valuable consideration lo others to promote 
Microsoft's browser. See Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. 
v. M icrosoft—An Econom ic A n a ly s is . 46 A n t it r u s t  B u l l . 1, 2 8-35  
(2001). Foregoing a return on the claimed millions of dollars devoted lo 
developing the program and giving large subsidies to promote it can only 
be “rational” if its purpose was to recover the investment in the long run 
after competition had been eliminated or to protect the (monopoly) prof­
its being realized on the W indows program. The issue of whether ihe 
present analysis of “predatory pricing” can ever be shown in cases where 
there is a large capital investment in plant or research and development 
costs and low variable cosls is problematic if the courts follow the stan­
dards adopted in cases like Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) and United States v, American Air­
lines, 2001 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 73,251 (D. Kansas 2001). Adopting a 
variable cost standard for products like a complex computer program 
costing millions to develop and pennies to reproduce and distribute by a 
computer disk or downloading the program from the Internet is an invi­
tation for firms with monopoly power like Microsoft to distribute pro­
grams like IE for a few cents per copy despite the substantial investment 
costs in its development. Adopting such a standard is a case of analyzing 
the conclusions of an unrealistic model in light of its assumptions rather 
than analyzing the facts and circumstances unique to a particular case in 
light of the policies behind the law involved and the consequences of the 
decision.
A more appropriate standard would be one premised on long-run 
average incremental cost: “the firm ’s total production cost {including the 
product), less what the firm’s total cost would have been had it not pro-
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m ain tenance  o f o p en  m arkets to  insure innovation effic iencies can 
take  p lace; the reality  that M icrosoft had and has m onopo ly  pow er
duced the product, divided by the quantity of the product produced.” 
Brodley, Bolton, &. Riordan, supra note 17, at 2272. It is a standard con­
sistent with both reality and common sense. There should be the further 
requirement of a specific inlent to exclude competition in order to avoid 
making legitimate competitive responses meeting competition unlawful. 
Otherwise, a standard based on average variable cos Is only as the test for 
predatory pricing means thal pricing tactics can he used with impunity to 
exclude legitimate competition by any dominant firm in industries like 
airlines, chip manufacturing and computer programs where there are high 
total costs and low variable costs.
It has been argued that the revenue generated by the bundling of a 
browser with other Internet technology and revenue from advertisers ben­
efiting from the browser connection should be considered as revenue 
front the “sale” of the browser. See Benjamin Klein, D id  M icrosoft 
Engage in Anticompetitive Exclusionary Behavior?, 46 A n titru s t B ull. 
71, 81-S3 (2001), It is clear that M icrosoft's browser pricing policy was 
designed "to cut off Netscape’s air supply” and the claim that Microsoft 
was motivated by a desire to earn revenue from Internet advertising and 
promotion of its Windows operating system is a posttrial rationalization 
rather than a proven fact. See Fisher & Rubin feld, supra.
It lias also been argued that free browsers are like free newspapers or 
broadcast television thal charge advertisers for placing advertisements. 
See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: 
M icrosoft and the Law and Economics o f  Exclusion. 7 Sup. C t. Ecgm. Rev. 
157, 209-10 (1999). Unlike Microsoft, free newspapers do not have con­
trol over the primary distribution kiosk in a community, and television 
stations do not have the power to have a consumer’s television set pre­
programmed to receive only their channel and rigged to make it difficult 
to receive any other. Aside from these considerations, there is no evi­
dence indicating what, if  any, revenue received from bundling other ser­
vices or advertising may be or whether it is sufficient to cover the costs 
associated with generating the revenue realized from the advertising, let 
alone the long-run average incremental cost of the browser program and 
the subsidies incurred to promote it. The trial court found as a matter of 
fact, for example, that Microsoft’s pricing of its referral server for LAPs 
far exceeded its cost of providing the service to the favored LAPs, Find­
ings of Fact, supra note 2, at 261, and that substantial financial incentives 
in the fonn of royalty reductions on the Windows operating system were 
ex tended  to large OEMs and o th ers  to  favor M icrosoft’s IE  over 
Netscape. Id. at 230-3S.
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o v e r  p e r s o n a l  c o m p u te r  o p e r a t in g  s y s te m s ;  th e  fa c t  th a t  
M ic ro so ft’s opera tin g  sy stem  had b ecom e an  essen tia l fac ility ; 
and that its bundling o f  the operating system  and browser func­
tions was forced on the d irect m arket o f  O EM s and the ultim ate 
m arket o f  retail consum ers by M icroso ft's  insistence that both be 
insta lled  by O EM s to g e th e r o r no t at a l l .1”7 W hile the m ajority  
opinion may be legally  ju s tif ie d  by the rea lity  that it was in te r­
preting the term s o f a consent decree aim ed at a  different factual 
c irc u m s ta n c e ,108 the c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  its d e c is io n  were th a t it 
appeared to sanction  M ic ro so ft’s aggressive m arketing practices 
an d  m ad e  in e v i ta b le  l i t i g a t i n g  a b r o a d e r  c a se  c h a lle n g in g  
M icro so ft’s m aintenance o f  a m onopoly o v e r the com puter soft­
ware operating system  softw are m arket in  particu la r and the appli­
cations softw are m arket generally  through the uses being made o f 
its W indow s operating  system  m onopoly com bined  with its In ter­
net browser.
D uring the pendency o f  the appeal o f  the interpretation o f  the 
consent decree and w hether it banned a ty in g  arrangem ent, con­
siderable lobbying by M ic ro so ft’s v ictim s o r enem ies, depending 
upon o n e ’s perspective, to o k  p lace to  conv ince  the D epartm ent of 
Justice to  file a broader case  against M ic ro so ft.109 The emerging 
consensus w as to  charge M ic ro so ft’s aggressive  tactics aim ed at
;|JT In response to Judge Jackson’s preliminary injunction and while 
the appeal was pending, Microsoft offered OEMs a choice of a 2-yeai-old 
version of Windows without its browser or a current version that did not 
function. After Judge Jackson’s law clerk ran the uninstall feature of 
W'indows 95 and made IE disappear, Microsoft agreed to make a version 
of Windows 95 available with the browser function disabled. See H±:il e - 
mann, supra note 71, at 68-69. This event apparently generated a mis­
trust of Microsoft in Judge Jackson's mind; a mistrust that contributed to 
the court’s decision to order a breakup of the company as the only effec­
tive remedy that would avoid future manipulations by Microsoft to cir­
cumvent constraints upon its conduct. Id. at 69—70.
Klf; See note 92, supra.
J09 Just as the states had been active before the federal government in 
pressing antitrust issues against Standard Oil, state attorneys general, par­
ticularly Assistant Attorney General Mark Tobey of Texas, became active 
leaders in the campaign to bring a broader federal antitrust case against 
Microsoft. See, Hellemann, supra  note 71, at 2 J-22.
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control o f the Internet browser market wrere part and parcel o f  a 
schem e to maintain its monopoly position in the operating system  
m arket.110 The m ost important antitrust value at stake was innova­
tion e ff ic ien cy ,111 because M icrosoft’s tactics were aimed at any 
innovalive threat to its lucrative m onopoly over the PC operating 
system  market, the power to take over whatever innovative appli­
cations markets it chose to take over and its power over OEMs to 
dictate ilie terms and conditions o f  innovative computer programs 
installed on the machines they make and se l l . ,i;
llu See id. at 75-94  describing the effort to organize a campaign lo 
convince the Departm ent of Justice to file a new and broader case against 
M icrosoft. Persons as diverse in views as Judge Robert Bork, Ralph Nader 
and Senator O rrin  Halch were enlisted  in the cause against M icrosoft, 
Judge Bork was apparently impressed by the similarity between the tactics 
involved in Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (refusal 
to deal by monopoly newspaper with advertisers dealing with a local radio 
stauon  com peting  fo r advertising) and those em ployed  by M icrosoft 
g a i n s t  N etscape. S enator H atch had concerns about tactics used by 
M icrosoft against Utah firms like Novell and Caldera. Sun Microsystems 
financed Projcct Sherman, a group o f leading economists and lawyers, to 
convince the D epartm ent of Justice for a  renewed antitrust attack upon 
M icrosoft. The thrust o f their analysis of M icrosoft’s conduct was that 
M ic ro so ft’s conduct w as im posing a long-term  cost to innovation by 
deterring com petition with M icrosoft in any market Microsoft entered or 
might enter. See, Heilemann, supra  note 71, at 93.
■u By the m id to late 1990s for example, “there was almost no R & D 
on o p e ra tin g  sy stem s an y m o re .” H eilem ann , su p ra  no te 71, al 93, 
M icrosoft's  overw helm ing share o f the operating system market meant 
that developers o f applications programs wrote their programs for use on 
M icrosoft equipped machines. Competing operating systems like IBM ’s 
OS/2 therefore, had little chance of success in the market and IBM aban­
doned efforts to make the program a com peting operating system plat­
form. See A l l e t t a ,  supra  note 71, at 115.
u: N one o f  the O EM s, save IB M , could  be convinced to  testify  
against M icrosoft. Sec A u le t ta ,  supra  note 71, at 252. Assistant Attorney 
G eneral K lein indicated that m ore m an hours had been expended on seek­
in g  o u t an O EM  w itn ess  to te s tify  abou t coercive  tactics M icrosoft 
applied lo O EM s. Klein is reported to have stated: “A lot of them said lo 
us, ‘W hat youTre doing is terrific, but we just can’t afford to stick out our 
necks.’ The pow er M icrosoft has over these people with the W indows 
license is simply e x tra o rd in a ry H e ile m an n . supra  note 71, at 120.
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While Gates claim ed that M icrosoft was engaged in innova­
tion by combining M icrosoft’s browser with its Window's program 
just like automobile companies were engaged in innovation when 
they decided to include radios in the cars they manufactured,115 
the analogy was a lim ping— if not stumbling— one. There is not 
much question that autom obiles and car radios are “two separate 
products” and that, even in the absence o f monopoly power in the 
automobile market, com petitive issues m ight be raised by lying 
automobiles- and car radios.JJJ Those issues to one side, automo­
bile manufacturers do not possess monopoly power over the man­
ufacturing o f  autom obiles. A better analogy to the M icrosoft 
circumstance would be where a single firm has a monopoly over 
the fuel used in automobiles and insists that automobile manufac­
turers purchase the engines, radios or tires they install in their 
autos from the fuel m onopolist. A lthough the end product o f a 
consumer-convenient integrated automobile with an engine, radio 
and tires designed for use with a common fuel may be the result, 
the impact o f the practice on competition in the auto manufaclur­
ing market and pricing and innovation in the separate products of 
fuel, engines, radios and tires would predictably be less than opti­
mum and a violation o f  the antitrust law s.115 M onopoly power in 
the fuel market would be used both to extend the m onopoly to
113 See id, at 42,
114 See Town Sound &. Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler M otors Corp., 
959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992), cen . den ied , 506 U.S. 868 (1992>; Auto­
matic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford M otor Co.. 242 F. Supp. 852 <D. Mass. 
1965).
Even where a monopoly is lawfully obtained, the antitrust laws 
constrain (he exercise of the power obtained by virtue o f the monopoly 
power conferred. The seller of a patented product, for exam ple, that sells 
the patented machine or device whose sole value is in its use, parts with 
the right to  restrict its use. See  Adam s v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873); 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal F ilm  Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
Nor may a copyright holder license users o f the copyrighted material on 
the condition that they not use com peting m aterial, Interstate Circuit, Inc. 
v. Uni led States, 306 U .S . 208 (1939). See  D epartm en t o f Ju stice  & 
FTC, A n titru s t Guidelines foe th e  Licensing o f I n te l le c tu a l  P roperty . 
§ 5.3 (April 6. 1995).
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engines, radios and tire*;, w hile also enhancing the monopoly and 
excluding innovation and price com petition in the fuel market and 
the manufacturing and assem bly o f automobiles.
M icrosoft’s status as a m onopolist in the market for operating 
system s is like a m onopolist over the manufacture o f  automobile 
fuel and M icrosoft's use o f  its power to require those buying or 
licensing its operating system  should be similarly constrained by 
requiring clear and convincing evidence that the products required
10 be purchased from M icrosoft and only M icrosoft are essential 
to the operation o f  the m onopolized (tying) product, not the tied 
product, and that there is  no le ss  restrictive alternative to the 
requirement.1*6 Otherwise. M icrosoft's m onopoly over the operat­
ing system  market can be extended to any related browser, con ­
ten t, serv ice  or a p p lic a tio n  program  m arket w ith  im punity , 
whether there is a technological justification and less restrictive 
alternative or not.
The second Antitrust D iv is io n  action against M icrosoft was 
filed  1 month before the court o f  appeals decision on the claim ed  
tying violations o f  the earlier consent decree. The case was joined  
in by 20 states alleging violations o f  their respective state and the
n For an exam ple o f such a unique ease, see  Dehydrating Process 
Co. v. A .O . S m ith  C orp.. 292 F .2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961). M ic ro so ft's  
monopoly pow er over the operating system  market is even greater than 
that possessed in  m ost m onopolization cases. For all practical purposes it
ii and is likely to rem ain the only operating system of significance for 
most PCs. T he overw helm ing installed base and applications barrier to 
other operating  system s, coup led  w ith the close w orking rela tionsh ip  
between In tel and M icrosoft, ju stify  classifying the W indows operating 
system an ‘'essential facility.” Cases like U nited States v. Term inal R.R. 
Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1911); O tter Tail Pow er Co. v. United Slates, 410 
U.S. 366 (1973); and M CI Telecom m unications Corp. v, A.T. &  T. Co., 
70S F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 198?) all constrain the power o f a firm 
contro lling  an essen tia l fac ility  to  refuse to  deal w ith com petito rs in 
related markets to  prevent exclusion of com petitors from related markets.
Similarly, a refusal to deal by a monopolist to limit or prevent com pe­
tition in the m onopolized market. Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 
U.S. 143 (1951) or to take over a com petitor's business, Aspen Skiing 
Co, v. A spen H ighlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) have been 
held to be unlaw ful acts o f m onopolization.
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federal antitrust law s and charged M icrosoft with four counts: 
exclusive dealing and unlawful tying under section 1 of the Sher­
man Act; the m aintenance o f  a m onopoly by unlaw ful means 
under section 2 o f  the Sherman Act; and attempted m onopoliza­
tion o f  the browser market in violation o f section 2 o f  the Sher­
man A c t.'17 The focus o f  the action in itia lly  appeared to be a 
renewed attack upon M icrosoft's bundling o f its browser program 
with its W indows operating system. But the court o f appeals deci­
sion reversing Judge Jackson's interpretation o f the consent decree 
and preliminary injunction entered a month after the filing o f the 
new Antitrust D ivision case against M icrosoft, appeared to under­
mine the central thrust of the second antitrust case.
Because o f the subsequent court o f  appeals decision, the g o v ­
ernment shifted the case to one centered on a claim that M icrosoft 
was en gaged  in practices designed  to unlaw fully m aintain its 
monopoly over the operating system  market with its accom pany­
ing m onopoly power over the Internet applications market and 
that it had both an intent and purpose to do so. Conduct evidence  
relied upon to prove an unlaw ful m aintenance o f  a m onopoly  
included M icro so ft’s restrictive contracts with OEMs forcing  
them to install M icrosoft’s browser and prohibiting changes in the 
o p e n in g  sc r e e n ; e x c lu s iv e  d e a lin g  a rran gem en ts to u se  
M icrosoft’s browser with Internet access providers (IAPs), inde­
pendent software vendors (ISV s) and Internet content providers 
(ICPs); tying its browser to its operating system monopoly; coerc­
ing Apple to use IE and abandon installing Netscape; undermining 
the cross-platform  capability o f  Sun’s Java program and, other 
practices engaged in with a purpose and the effect o f preventing 
other operating system s and cross-p latform  applications from  
challenging or circumventing M icrosoft’s domination o f  the PC 
operating system  market.
The case w as assigned to Judge Jackson who expedited the 
trial by lim iting the number o f  witnesses and ordered their testi­
mony to be taken by deposition with cross-examination to take 
place at trial. The case was tried over a period of' 8 months fol-
ji: United States v, Microsoft Corp., Civ, # 98-1232 (D .D .C  1998 l
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low ed by the unusual seep o f  the trial court first entering findings 
of fact,1'8 then encouraging the parties to settle and inviting Judge 
P o sn e r  o f  the S e v e n th  C ir c u it  to  a tte m p t to n e g o t ia te  a 
settlem ent,119 and then entering conclusions o f law upon the fail­
ure o f  the parties and Judge Posner to negotiate a settlement o f the 
c a s e . l-u The trial court fo u n d  M ic r o so ft  had m ain ta in ed  its 
m on op o ly  in the operating system  m arket by anticom petitive  
means; had unlawfully attempted to m onopolize the browser mar­
ket; and that its bundling o f  the browser with the operating system  
constituted an unlawful tying arrangement. The court also held 
that M icrosoft's contracts with Internet service providers, content 
providers and OEMs to distribute and promote M icrosoft's Web 
browser to the exclusion o f  com peting browsers did not constitute 
unlawful exclusive dealing arrangements.
The parallels to the S ta n d a rd  O il  case, despite the differences 
in the technologies involved , include both relatively superficial 
ones and more significant sim ilarities in the tactics allegedly used 
to maintain control over a  key technology that conferred upstream 
and downstream power on both Standard Oil and M icrosoft, On a 
relatively superficial level, som e o f the parallels include the dom­
inance o f  both firms by a single individual; the excessive drive of 
both firms to control a key part c f  their industry (refining in the 
case o f  Standard Oil and the operating system /applications plat­
form in the case o f M icrosoft); a b e lie f  by the respective firms 
that they were entitled to dominate their respective industries and 
a disdain for the com petitive process determining success or fa il­
ure o f  firm s in the market; and a startling sim ilarity in the manner 
o f both Rockefeller and Gates in testifying in the antitrust trials 
challenging their firm ’s dom inance o f the industry.121
116 Findings o f Fact, supra  note 2.
An outline of the attem pts to settle the case through the mediation
o f Judge Posner, including sum m aries of various settlem ent drafts may be
found in A lx e t ta ,  supra  note 71, at 340-62.
J-D Conclusions o f Law, supra  note 2.
i:l In appearances before courts and legislative bodies, Rockefeller 
“prided him self on his obfuscatory powers and excelled at fuzzy answers.
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The sign ificant an a log ies between the two cases lie in the 
methods by which both firms maintained their dominance o f the 
key part o f the industry and took aggressive steps to prevent an 
erosion o f that dominance. Both organized cartels— Standard Oil, 
a cartel in fact and M icrosoft, a cartel in effect— of related firms 
to erect and maintain entry barriers to competitors that might have 
eroded the monopoly control o f the bottleneck in their respective 
industries. W hile Standard Oil did so with the willing cooperation 
o f  the railroads, M icrosoft did so by enticements offered to and 
coercion o f OEMs in need o f M icrosoft's dominant operating sys­
tem  for preinstallation on the PCs they manufactured into an 
involuntary cartel and by agreements with IAPs, ISVs and others 
for the purpose o f  excluding competing browsers and alternative 
platforms and with the effect o f maintaining its monopoly over 
the operating system for Intel-based PCs.1:2 In both cases, control
U nder oath, he turned into a vague and forgetful fellow . . . who wan­
dered lost in the stupendous maze of Standard O il.” Chernow, supra  note
1 1, at 295. Heilem ann described Gates in his video deposition as: "not 
only the polar opposite o f his public persona, he was a caricature of the 
po lar opposite. He was dour and cantankerous. He was petulant and pas­
sive  aggressive , obfuscatory  and obscurantist. He w as a qu ibb ler, a 
pedant, an amnesiac^ a baby.7’ Heilemann, supra  note 71, at 126. Auletta 
described G ates’ deposition as “dum b” and “dism al,” A u le t ta ,  supra  
note 71, at 134. Throughout the deposition Gates appeared to deny or for­
get m atters contradicted by w ritten docum ents and e-mails sent by or 
addressed to Gates. B rin k le y  & L ohr, supra  note 71, at 14 describe 
G a te s ’ deposition  as portray ing  a “m um bling, evasive, obdurate and 
unaware of anything related to  the government’s charges” chief executive 
o f Microsoft.
1J; The trial court in  United States v. M icrosoft Corp., 65 F. Supp.2d 
at 10 (Finding o f Fact 35) (D.D.C. 1999} found Microsoft had 95% o f the 
m arket for Intel-compatible PC operating systems and if Apple’s Mac OS 
w ere included in  the m arket that M icrosoft's m arket share would still 
stand well above 80%. The court also found that M icrosoft’s dominance 
o f the operating system m arket conferred dominance over the PC applica­
tions program market and vice versa. Providers o f  applications programs 
w ould be required to write programs compatible with M icrosoft’s domi­
nant operating system  if they expected to realize any significant sales and 
the fact that most applications programs were written so they had to  be 
com patible with M icrosoft’s operating system enhanced the market bar­
rier fo r new entrants into the operating systems market for personal com-
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o f  au ‘'essential facility”-—the transportation system  for o il and 
the operating system  for personal com puters— conferred  the 
power to leverage lhat control from the m onopolized market to 
related markets and insulate those markets from  entry. W hile  
Standard Oil organized a cartel o f  suppliers o f  transportation ser­
vices to obtain and maintain its refining m onopoly and M icrosoft 
orchestrated an informal cartel o f  buyers o f  its operating system , 
application program providers and others, the effect o f  creating  
entry barriers to com petitors and potential com petitors w as the 
same.
Although ihc obvious and blatant entry barrier o f a large per­
centage o f  OEMs paying a lie ease fee for installing W indows on 
all the Intel-compatible PCs they manufactured rather than just on 
th ose  m ach ines the W in d ow s program  w as in sta lle d  in w as  
enjoined,1-  M icrosoft was left relatively unscathed by the consent 
decree. It rem ained the dom inant supplier o f operating system  
software and enjoyed the growing power conferred by virtue o f  
the network effect o f  being installed on the overw helm ing per­
centage o f PCs and the expanding applications barrier generated 
by more and more applications programs being w ritten e x c lu ­
sively for the W indows operating system. But like Standard O il’s 
not recognizing its refinery m onopoly  being threatened by the 
new technology o f  long-distance crude o il p ipelines, M icrosoft 
did not recognize the threat posed by the rapid developm ent o f the 
Internet and its potential as a method for circum venting the need  
t’or M icrosoft’s operating system .1-4
puters. M icrosoft C orp., 65 F. Supp. at 10-15 (Findings o f Fact 36-52). 
In order to write programs for an operating system, program  developers 
need access to the system ’s APIs so that the application can connect to 
code in the operating system. Thus, M icrosoft’s control over A PIs and 
the requirement thai writers of applications programs have acccss to  the 
dominant operating system created a significant applications entry barrier 
to com peting developers o f operaling system s o r w hat the tria l court 
described as the “ A pplications B arrie r to E ntry” faced  by com peting  
developers o f operating systems. See , Findings o f Fact, 13-15.
123 See United States v, M icrosoft, supra  note 83.
^  Netscape rapidly grew to dominate the Internet b row ser m arket 
and began to brag lhat its objective was to  reduce W indows to  “a poorly
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M icrosoft’s response was swift and on a number o f fronts. It 
was alleged and vigorously contested at trial that Microsoft pro­
posed that Netscape agree lo a market division, with M icrosoft’s 
IE browser to have the consumer market and Netscape being lim­
ited  to sa le s  o f  its brow ser for use w ith  older version s o f  
M icrosoft's operating system  and non-W indows platforms under 
the threat o f  b eing  crushed  by M ic r o so ft .i:s A fter N etscape  
rejected the a lleged  market d iv ision  offer, M icrosoft withheld  
APIs that Netscape needed to make its browser work with Win­
dows 95 for 3 months, bundled its IE with its Windows operating 
system program, gave its IE to subscribers “frec.‘’l> and entered 
into restr ictive  licen ses  w ith OEM s requiring them to install 
M icrosoft's browser with its operating system  and not alter the 
opening screen to display com peting browsers.1-7 Microsoft also
debugged set of device drivers.” Heilemann, supra  note 71, at 65. Gates 
belatedly recognized the threat a browser posed to M icrosoft’s operating 
system m onopoly and wrote a memo on M ay 26, 1^95 telling his man­
agers that the rapid penetralion of Netscape “could cheapen Windows and 
’com m oditize the underlying operating system .’ *' A u le tta . supra  note 
71. at 55. Netscape could do so by making its APIs widely available to 
application program developers and by m oving application programs to 
the Internet for access by consumers without having to use them in con­
junction w ith M icrosoft’s operating system.
i : - Findings o f Fact, supra note 2, al 79-92; A u le tta . supra note 71, 
at 55-56 .
Findings of Fact, supra note 2. al 90—92. Netscape had earned $80 
million in sales o f its browser in 1995, the principal source of its revenue. 
If giving away a com puter program for ‘‘free” without recovery of any of 
its developm ent costs in  conjunction with bundling il with a monopoly 
operating system  is not pricing below marginal cost and "'leveraging” in 
the tw o-dim ensional world o f some schools o f economic thought, it is 
difficult to  accord such schools of economic thought any credibility or 
respect for rational thought. See note J06, supra. The effect on Netscape 
has been predictable. Despite m assive cam paigns through every imagin­
able ou tle t to  distribute its browser uTree,” it has suffered a substantial 
reduction in market share and the revenues necessary to keep its browser 
up to date and com petitive with M icrosoft’s now dominant browser,
127 M icrosoft extended low er royalty rates to OEMs agreeing to make 
its IE the default Internet browser installed on their products and restrict 
changes in  ihe opening W indows sequence. See  Findings o f Fact, supra
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entered into restriciive contracts with IAPs and applications pro­
gram providers circumscribing their ability to do business with 
N e t s c a p e .J u s t  as Standard Oil had snuffed out the risk o f inde­
pendent refiners making inroads on its m onopoly over refining by 
choking o ff the new innovation o f long-distance pipelines, gain­
ing control o f  independent refineries the independent p ipelines  
were designed to serve and pricing its refined product below cost, 
M icrosoft snuffed out the risk o f a threal to its monopoly over the 
operating system  market by choking o ff N etscape’s market access, 
g iving its browser away below cost and then launching a cam ­
paign to take over the Internet browser market as a means for con­
tr o llin g  u s e s  m ade o f  the In tern et that m ig h t c ir c u m v e n t  
M icrosoft's m onopoly operating system. Standard O il preserved 
its refining m onopoly by using its railroad cartel to engage in rate 
discrim ination against the new technology o f  long-distance crude 
oil p ip elin es, buying refineries served by the new p ip e lin es ,);o
m;ie 2, at 231-38, Testimony indicated that M icrosoft also threatened lo 
eul oft OEM s from Jiccnsing o f the W indows operating system  if they 
ehosa to install Netscape on their machines. Sec  A u le t ta ,  supra  note 71, 
at 203.
M icrosoft also took steps 10 close off and dom inate the browser 
m arket by agreem ents with ICPs to promote M icrosoft’s IE and exclude 
prom otion o f N etscape’s browser. S im ilar arrangements were made with 
ISVs, Findings o f Fact, supra  note 2, at 144-48; 242-310. M icrosoft also 
paid Am erica Online to drop Netscape as its browser and use M icrosoft’s 
browser, A u le t ta ,  supra  note 71, al 56, and settled its patent dispute with 
Apple in  exchange for Apple prom oting M icrosoft’s browser and only 
displaying the M icrosoft browser on the opening desktop screen along 
with a S I50 m illion investment by M icrosoft in Apple, Id. at 104. Like 
Standard O ii’s policy o f  permitting a small percentage of the market to 
be supplied by other firm s to m aintain the appearance o f com petition, 
M icrosoft had an interest in preserving Apple as a small player tn the PC 
market rather than be seen as having 100% o f the market.
M icrosoft’s bundling o f its operating system  and browser in  Win­
dows 95 and 98 for installation by OEM s obviously increased the cost 
to OEMs o f installing and servicing any com peting browser. A signifi­
cant cost in  the highly com petitive OEM m arket is providing custom er 
support services for programs operating on the machines they m anufac­
ture. Installing more than one version o f a browser on a machine would
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engaging in  b e low -cost pricing tn com petition with refineries 
served by new pipelines, developing its own competing pipelines 
to underprice ex istin g  independent pipelines, dismantling Stan­
dard’s own pipelines once independents had been driven from the 
field and a variety o f  otherw ise unlawful or exclusionary tactics 
like bribery o f public o ffic ia ls designed to prevent the construc­
tion of com peting pipelines circumventing Standard’s control over 
the transportation o f  crude and refined product. Just as Standard 
O il's tactics were aimed at excluding competing pipelines and the 
taking over o f the new transportation technology as a means tor 
delivering crude and refined product to independent refineries in 
order to protect its m onopoly over refining, the trial court found 
M icrosoft's tactics were aimed at taking over the browser market 
to protect its m onopoly over the operating system market and fur­
ther extend  its applications barrier to control uses made o f  the 
Internet lo  on es dependent upon M icrosoft or, u ltim ately, to 
takeover by M icrosoft should il choose to do so .!3€
obviously increase custom er service costs and hence deter OEMs from 
doing so.
In addition, M icrosoft im posed limitations on OEMs in reconliguring 
or m odifying W indows 95 o r 98 which might enable OEMs to program 
the machines they m anufactured to use com peting browsers and extended 
financial and technical support to favored OEM s that agreed to install 
M icrosoft’s brow ser over com peting browsers. Each of these steps was of 
significance to OEM s that the district court found were operating on  slim 
margins. C onclusions o f Law , su pra  note 2, a t 39. L ike the railroads 
involved in the S tandard O il case, the OEMs profit margins were depen­
dent upon cooperating with the demands of the manager o f what was in 
effect—if not by explicit agreem ent— a cartel o f OEMs o f M icrosoft s 
making and under its control. The OEMs became M icrosoft’s distribution 
‘'channel" for its browser as well as M icrosoft’s customer for computer 
programs.
110 In United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1, 76 (1911) the Court 
observed in language sim ila r to  th a t which the trial court app lied  to 
M icrosoft:
No d isin terested  m ind can survey the period in question without 
being irresistibly driven to the conclusion that the very genius for 
com m ercial developm ent and organization which it would seem 
was m anifested from the beginning soon begot an intent and pur-
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M icrosoft was also found to have used its m onopoly power 
over the Intel-com patible operating system market to suppress the
pose to exclude others which was frequently manifested by acts and 
dealings wholly inconsistent with the theory ihat they were made 
wilh a single conception o f advancing the developm ent o f business 
pow er by usual m ethods, but which on the contrary necessarily  
involved the inlent to drive others from the field and to exclude 
them  from their righ t to trade and thus accom plish the m astery 
which was the end in view1. . . . The exercise o f the power which 
resulted . , , fortifies the foregoing conclusions since the develop­
ment which came, the acquisition here and there which ensued of 
ev e ry  e ff ic ien t m eans by w hich com petition  cou ld  have been 
asserted, the slow but resistless methods which followed by which 
means o f transportation were absorbed and brought under control, 
the system of m arketing which was adopied by which the country 
was divided into districts and the trade in each district in oil was 
turned over lo a designated corporation within the com bination and 
all others were excluded , all lead the m ind to the conviction of 
a purpose and in tent w hich we think is so certain  as practically  
to cause the sub ject not to be w ithin the dom ain o f  reasonable 
contention.
Judge Jackson concluded his analysis o f M icrosoft's conduct to prevent 
entry into a “middleware” role by competitors as unlawful monopoliza­
tion in violation o f § 2 o f the Sherm an Act as follows:
Only when ihe separate categories of conduct are viewed . . . as a 
single, w ell-coordinated course of action does the full extent of the 
violence that M icrosoft has done to the com petitive process reveal 
itself. . . .  In essence, M icrosoft mounted a deliberate assault upon 
entrepreneurial efforts that, left to rise o r fall on their own merits, 
could well have enabled the introduction o f com petition into the 
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. . . .M icrosoft’s 
anticom petitive actions trammeled the com petitive process through 
which the com puter softw are industry generally stim ulates innova­
tion and conduces to  the optimum bene 111 of consumers.
Viewing M icrosoft’s conduct as a whole also reinforces the con­
viction that it was predacious. M icrosoft paid vast sums o f money, 
and renounced many m illions more in lost revenue every year, in 
order to induce firm s to  take actions that would help enhance Inter­
n e t E x p lo rer’s share o f  b row ser usage at N av ig a to r’s expense. 
M icrosoft has no intention of ever charging for licenses to use or 
distribute its browser. . . . Moreover, neither the desire to bolster 
demand for W indows nor the prospect of ancillary revenues from
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threat o f  innovation posing risks to its operating system monopoly 
by leading firms in the computer industry in ways similar to Stan­
dard O il’s attempts to suppress the innovation of long-distance oil 
pipelines. The trial court found M icrosoft coerced Intel into drop­
ping its effort to develop software providing interfaces indepen­
dent o f its operating system  by pressuring OEMs to not install 
Intel’s new software and threatening to stop dealing with Intel;131 
coerced Apple Computer into adopting IE as its default browser 
and dropping its developm ent o f  a multimedia playback software 
for W indows;132 forced Real networks to integrate its software for 
streaming audio and video with M icrosoft’s platform for doing 
so ;133 attempted to subvert the cross-platform  capability of Sun’s 
Java program by creating a corrupted version o f the program and 
d e c e p t iv e ly  p ro m o tin g  it w ith  program  d e v e lo p e r s ;1-14 and
Internet E xplorer can explain  the length to  which M icrosoft has 
gone. In fact, M icrosoft has expended w ealth and foresworn oppor­
tunities to realize m ore in a m anner and to an extent that can only 
represent a rational investm ent i f  its purpose was to perpetuate the 
applications barriers to entry. . . . Because M icrosoft’s business 
p ractices ‘‘w ould not be considered p ro fit maximizing except for 
the expectation that . , . ihe entry o f potential rivals” into ihe mar­
ket for In tel-com patible PC operating system s will be “blocked or 
delayed” . . . , M icrosoft’s campaign m ust be deemed predatory. 
S in ce  the C o u rt has a lre a d y  found  th a t M ic ro so ft possesses  
monopoly power . . . , the predatory nature of the firm ’s conduct 
c o m p e ls  th e  C o u rt to h o ld  M ic ro so ft liab le  under § 2 o f  the 
Sherman Act.
M icrosoft C orp., 87 F. Supp.3d at 44.
iJ1 Findings o f Fact, supra  note 2. at 94—103, Microsoft viewed the 
Intel software as posing the threat o f developing an alternative platform 
to W indows.
1,; Id. at 104—10.
Id. at 111-14.
134 Id . a l 3 8 6 -4 0 7 ; F in d in g s  o f  L aw , su p r a  no te 2 , at 4 3 -4 4 . 
M icrosoft’s version o f Java, JVM , was found to  undermine ihe portability 
o f program s written for JVM  w ith  Sun’s Java com pliant program and 
vice-versa. The trial court found the effects o f this conduct was “to m ini­
mize N av ig a to r’s u sage” w ith S u n ’s version  o f  Java, to prevent “the 
development of easily portably Java applications” and to induce develop-
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a t te m p te d  to co e rce  IB M  fro m  d ev e lo p in g  und p ro m o tin g  its O S /2  
o p e ra t in g  sy s te m  an d  O ff ic e  a p p l ic a tio n s  by c h a rg in g  it h ig h e r  
l ic e n s in g  fe e s  and  d e la y in g  IB M  ac ce ss  to  W indow s A P Is e s se n ­
tia l lo  in s ta llin g  the la te s t M ic ro so ft so ftw are  on IB M  P C s .135 The 
c o u r t  r e lie d  o n  th is  c o n d u c t as e v id e n c e  o f  "M ic ro so f t’s b u s in ess  
s tra te g y  o f  d ire c tin g  its  m o n o p o ly  p o w e r  to w ard  in d u c in g  o th e r  
c o m p a n ie s  to  a b a n d o n  p r o je c ts  th a t  th re a te n e d  M ic ro s o f t  an d  
to w a rd  p u n ish in g  th o se  co m p an ie s  th a t re s is t .” 136
T h is  e v id e n c e  is a lso  s im i la r  to  S ta n d a rd  O i l 's  u s e  o f  i ts  
m o n o p o ly  p o w e r  to  d isc ip lin e  m em b ers  o f  its ra ilro a d  ca rte l and 
e x c lu d e  th e  th re a t o f  co m p e titio n  v ia  the new  tech n o lo g y  o f  in d e ­
p e n d e n t  o i l  p ip e l in e s .1’7 In  b o th  th e  c a s e  o f  S ta n d a rd  O il an d
crs to use the corrupted JVM  version thereby limiting the num ber of 
applications that are easily portable.
I3-- Findings of Fact, supru  note 2, at 115-32,
13lJ Id . a t 132. M ic ro so ft co n tin u e s  i ts  ag g ressiv e  cam p aig n  of 
bundling more features into its W indows operating system even while the 
case is on appeal. For example, the latest version of Windows, W indows 
XP, bundles instant messaging, stream ing audio, business applications, 
etc. into its operating system and makes it more difficult to locate third- 
party services. See  Rebecca Buekman & Julia Angwin, M icrosoft, AOL  
B ath e on Windtw j  XP, W a l l  S t. J., June 4, 2001, at A-3.
Chernow , supra  note 11, at 200 -04  describing Standard O il’s 
response io The Pennsylvania R ailroad’s attem pt lo escape from S tan­
d ard 's  control by operating a subsidiary, the Empire Transportation Com ­
pany with 500 miles o f pipelines and 1000 tank cars. Empire acquired 
refineries in New York City, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and began lay­
ing pipe to a new oil field in  Bradford, Pennsylvania. Standard responded 
by declaring  war on the Pennsylvania R ailroad and diverted shipm ents 
from  the Pennsylvania Railroad to other members of its railroad cartel, 
shut dow n S tandard’ s P ittsburgh refineries and prom ised to  undersell 
H m p ire ’ s r e f in e r ie s  in  ev e ry  m a rk e t w h ere  th ey  a ttem p ted  lo se ll 
kerosene. The Pennsylvania slashed w ages, upped working hours and 
doubled the length of trains without a corresponding increase in  the size 
o f crews. In 1877, the em ployees of the Pennsylvania struck in one o f the 
bloodiest strikes o f the era. The Pennsylvania 's stock tum bled and the 
ra ilro ad  cap itu la ted  and sold all o f its re fin eries , storage, p ipe lines, 
steam ships, barges and docks to Standard Oil. Standard also began devel­
oping its own pipeline network through a front com pany. United Pipe
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M ic ro so ft, c o n tro l o f  a l te rn a tiv e  m e th o d s  fo r  d e liv e r in g  p ro d u c t 
(o il, in the ca se  o f  S tan d a rd  and  ap p lic a tio n s  p ro g ram s and  a lte r­
native  co m p u te r  p la tfo rm s in  the c a se  o f  M ic ro so ft)  p o sed  th reats 
to  th e ir  m o n o p o ly  co n tro l o v e r th e  k ey  p a r t o f  th e  en tire  in d u stry  
( re fin eries  in the case o f  S ta n d a rd  an d  the o p era tin g  sy s tem  p ro ­
g ram  in th e  c a se  o f  M ic ro s o f t) .138 A n d  in  bo th  c a se s , the s te p s  
taken  to  p ro te c t th a t c o n tro l in v o lv e d  the su p p ress io n  o f  in d e p e n ­
den t p ro v id ers  o f  the new  te c h n o lo g y  and  th e n  assu m p tio n  o f  c o n ­
tro l o v e r  th e  t e c h n o l o g i e s . T h e  e f f ic ie n c ie s  re a liz e d  b y  new  
in n o v a tio n  a re  o ften  o f  m ore  lo n g - te rm  c o m p e ti tiv e  v a lu e  than 
o ther fo rm s o f  e ff ic ie n c ie s— both  b ec au se  o f  the value  o f  the new 
in n o v a tio n  and the co m p e titiv e  s tim u lu s  p ro v id ed  lo  th o se  in  c o n ­
Lines, and gave small stock interests in the line to the New York Central
and the Lake Shore Railroad lo increase his influence over those lines,
Chernow, supra  note 11, at 171-72.
138 In com bating the cross-platform  threat from  Sun M icrosystem s’ 
Java, the court found  M icrosoft c rea ted  a Java im plem entation  that 
underm ined portability  and w as incom patib le with o ther im plem enta­
tions, Findings o f Fact, supra  note 2, at 387-94. The court further found 
that M icrosoft bundled its corrupted version o f Java with its W indows 
operating program and pressured Intel not to share its technology with
Sun or Netscape to enable their version of Java to operate on the W in­
dows operating system. Id. at 395-403. The effect was to force applica­
tions programs to be written for M icrosoft’s version of Java lather lhan
the more open and flexjble version offered by Sun and Neiscape The 
court found the effect o f M icrosoft's conduct was to enhance the applica­
tion barrier to its operating system monopoly. Id. at 43—44.
13’ A further parallel between the modus operand! o f  the two com pa­
nies is ihe use o f political campaign contributions to buy favor with well- 
placed politicians. As previously m entioned, during Standard O il’s era 
the practice went beyond campaign contributions and included outright 
bribery. M icrosoft began spending several m illion dollars per year on 
political activities as its difficulties w ith antitrust scrutiny by government 
increased. Some o f its tactics w ere particu la rly  ham -handed like the 
effort to  have the Antitrust D iv ision’s budget cut during the pendency 
of the antitrust case against it. See E d itoria l, W ash. P ost, Oct. 24, 1999, 
at B-4. Olher noticeably clumsy efforts included using business groups 
as fronts for negative campaign advertising in  a Senate race. See  John 
R. W ilkes, M icroso ft Is Source o f  'Soft M oney ’ F unds B ehind A ds in 
M ichigan  j  Senate R ace, W a ll  S t. J., Ocl. 16. 2000. at B -l.
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trol o f  related tech n o lo g ies  affected by the new innovation .140 
W hile m ore d if f ic u lt  to p rove, clear-cut ca ses  o f  the use o f  
monopoly power to suppress innovation, whether for its own sake 
or som e other objective like protecting related m onopolies, justify  
condemnation o f  the conduct under section 2 o f the Sherman Act 
when monopoly power is used to accomplish the suppression.141
The court o f  appeals affirmed the finding that M icrosoft held a 
monopoly over the operating system for Intel-com patible PC s.14-
Some com m entators assume that ‘L[a]ntitrust prohibits only atiti- 
eoiu petiive  practices that exclude a rival in ways that reduce allocative 
efficiency and enhance monopoly p o w er” Lopatka & Page, supra  note 
106, at 190. Lopatka &  Page also view M icrosoft as innovative and that 
the regular upgrades o f its operating system are indicators o f M icrosoft's 
innovation. Both assum ptions are open to serious question. Many m ain­
tain that M icrosoft is not innovative and that its regular upgrades of the 
operating system  are aim ed at bringing M icrosoft additional monopoly 
profits and not significant innovation to consumers.
W hatever the m en ts  of these arguments, it is subm itted that among 
the econom ic ‘’efficienc ies '' promoted by a reliance upon a competitive 
process, innovation  and production efficiencies are o f far greater eco­
nomic significance than is allocative efficiency. Sec Brodley,, supra  note 
5. The use o f m onopo ly  pow er to prevent, suppress o r coopt m arket 
access by com petitors seeking to  bring innovation, production or alloca­
tive efficienc ies has been held to be unlaw ful ever since the C ase o f  
M on opolies, supra  note 5. And it is apparent that both Standard Oil and 
M icrosoft engaged  in  such conduct on a w holesale basis. W hile the 
antitrust laws may not prohibit a firm  from gaining a monopoly, they do 
prohibit the conduct o f a firm  acquiring or maintaining a monopoly by 
means not honestly industrial—i.e., by means inconsistent w ith a compet­
itive process determ ining success o r failure in a market.
Ul See Thomas M. JoRot & David J. Teece, A n titru s t,  [n o v a tio n  
amj Com petitiveness (1992)-, Brodley, supra  note 5; Flynn, supra  note 5,
14'  U nited S ta tes v. M icrosoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D .D .C . 2001). 
M icrosoft’s argum ent th a t the relevant product m arket should include 
M acintosh com puters, operating system s for non-PC devices like hand­
held devices and m iddlew are products or software products with their 
ow n application  p rogram m ing  in terfaces. M acintosh  com puters were 
found to  be in a separate market because they operate on a different pro­
cessor, had far few er application program s written for them  and cost con­
sid e rab ly  m ore to  su p p o rl. O perating  system s fo r non-P C  devices, a
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The court further found that M icrosoft's 95%  plus share o f  the 
operating system  market for Intel-com patib le PCs created an 
applications program barrier to other operating system s because 
programmers had to write programs compatible with M icrosoft's 
operating system should they hope to have any market success, 
and were unlikely to write programs for other operating s y s ­
tem s.143 The court proceeded to affirm the district court's findings 
that M icrosoft's licensing practices with OEMs, IAPs, and ISVs 
w ere d e s ig n e d  to m ain ta in  M ic r o s o f t 's  o p era tin g  sy s te m  
m onopoly  by foreclosin g  the threat o f  independent brow sers 
developing an alternative platform for applications programs. In 
particular the court o f  appeals singled out as unlawful conduct 
aimed at maintaining M icrosoft’s operating system monopoly:
1. OEM licensing restrictions prohibiting OEMs from altering the 
W indows desktop including removal o f the IE icon and inclusion 
of the Netscape icon;1"
2. Integrarion of IE with the W indows program by excluding the 
A dd/rem ove function ,145 designing W indows to  prevent a con­
rather silly argument on its face, were c\cluded  from the market because 
they “fall fa r short o f performing all of the functions o f a PC . . . And 
other middleware software w as found not to expose enough APIs to serve 
as a platform for most popular applications programs or to take over the 
PC operating system market. 253 F.3d at 52-54.
143 Tbe applications barrier to entry was found to stem from two char­
acteristics of the software market “ (1) most consumers prefer operating 
systems for which a large num ber of applications have already been w rit­
ten; and, i 2) most developers prefer to write for operating systems that 
already have a substantia] consum er base." 253 F,3d at 55.
144 Including more than one browser on the desktop posed the risk of 
substantial cost increases for OEM s in servicing customer problems with 
the programs installed on their machines, M icrosoft also sought to claim its 
licensing restrictions were a justified exercise of the rights of a copyright 
holder. H ie court o f appeals rejected this defense, noting that it “bordered 
on the frivolous,” to argue that the exercise of intellectual property rights 
cannot give rise to antitrust liability. The court observed: “That is no more 
correct than the proposition that the use of one’s personal property, such as 
a  baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.” 253 F.3d at 63.
145 The court affirmed the finding that the purpose of doing so was to
reduce the use o f  rival browsers and exclusionary  because it was not
710 The an titrust bulletin
sumer from using an alternative brow ser,N(’ and commingling code 
specific to W eb browsing in the same file as code providing oper­
ating system functions with the result that deleting any file con­
ta in ing  b ro w sin g -sp ec ific  ro u tin e s  w ould e lim inate  operating  
system code crucial to the functioning of W indow s:1-*7
3. Exclusive dealing contracts with leading lA Ps placing the lA P ’s 
icon on W indows desktop and agreeing not to supply competing 
browsers like N etscape to an lA P ’s custom ers ;l4i!
based on com petition on the m erits o f com peting browsers. 253 F.3d
at 67.
N'J The court affirmed the finding that this conduct was anticom peti­
tive be cause it reduced the market share o f rivals and was not based on 
com petition on the merits. 253 F.3d at 67. The court refused to affirm  the 
trial court’s finding that in te re s tin g  IE code with the W indows operating 
system code to override a user’s choice o f a default browser was unlaw­
ful. M icrosoft claim ed that the design o f W indow s made it technically 
necessary  lo override the u se r ’s b row ser p reference  fo r som e o f the 
nearly 30 ways lo access the Internet. The court held ihe governm ent 
failed to rebut M icrosoft’s justification on this issue, id , at 67,
l4; The court affirm ed the trial court’s finding of disputed fact thal 
this conduct was exclusionary because it deterred OEMs from installing 
com peting browsers. 253 F.2d at 66. M icrosoft has sought a rehearing on 
this issue because it is crucial to M icrosoft’s plans for its W indows XP 
program bundling m usic, video, instant m essaging and electronic busi­
ness programs into the XP system. See M icroso ft R equests That A ppeals  
C ourt R ehear P a n  o f  C ase, W a l l  S t. J., July 19, 2001, at A2. Commin­
gling code with b row ser and applications program s so that deleting a 
function can prevent a user from  choosing some other program or none al 
all w ithout disabling the operating system  on their com puter is obviously 
exclusionary' and a means to extend the basic monopoly of the operating 
system  to any Internet or application program M icrosoft might choose to 
take over. The class o f consum ers im m ediately affected includes OEMs 
and lAPs, “consum ers” the court o f appeals did not focus upon. They are, 
however, the “consumers” whose hands would be tied by such a restric­
tion in offering their custom ers—ultim ate “consum ers”—the most inno­
vative and attractive package o f  program s. C om petition  betw een the 
OEM and the IAP consum ers for browser and application program rev­
enue is also elim inated by M icrosoft’s tactics.
14,1 The court found this conduct exclusionary because it foreclosed 
com petitors from  an im portan t d is trib u tio n  channel and a substantial 
opportunity for browser distribution, thereby foreclosing rival browsers
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4, E x c lu s iv e  d e a lin g  c o n tra c ts  w ith  IS V s w hereby  M ic ro so ft 
extended preferential support and access to new versions of W in­
dows in exchange for making IE the default browser for browsing 
softw are ISVs develop and use a “help” function on their p ro­
grams only accessible through
5. Threatening Apple Com puter with term inating M icrosoft's p ro ­
duction of the Mac Office application program, a vital program 
for A pple’s survival, unless Apple ceased using Netscape as its 
default browser and adopted IE as its default browser and securing 
an agreement with Apple doing so;1*1
from posing a threat to M icrosoft's operating system monopoly. 253 F.3d 
at 71.
The court rejected the additional claim that giving the IE program to 
lAPs for “free” and in  some cases paying them substantial promotional 
and other sum s fo r prom oting the program  to the exclusion of o ther 
browsers did not constitute predatory pricing. The court’s analysis o f this 
claim  is  summ ary and less than convincing. The court held lhat “ the 
antitrust laws do noi condemn even a monopolist for offering its product 
at an attractive price 253 F.3d at 68, W hile that statement may be
true in  the abstract, the clear effect of M icrosoft giving its browser away 
free and subsidizing its distribution was to m ortally wound N etscape’s 
ability to remain in the market by depriving it o f an important source of 
revenue. The governm ent argued that M icrosoft was able to recoup the 
cosl o f developing and promoting its browser from monopoly profits on 
its W indows operating system, while also protecting its monopoly from 
erosion. The court disposed o f the argument by finding the trial court did 
not predicate liability on this predatory pricing theory and the govern­
ment did not press the argument on appeal. 253 F.3d at 68. The argument 
should have been pressed aggressively because substantial cross-platform 
c o m p e ti t io n  f ro m  a l te rn a t iv e  b ro w se rs  m ay have  he lp ed  e ro d e  
M icrosoft’s operating system monopoly and reduced the monopoly price 
o f it. See note 106, supra,
149 253 F.3d at 72. The effect of these contracts was to make IE the 
only browser available on the most popular applications software and to 
exclude com peting brow sers from this channel o f distribution, thereby 
maintaining M icrosoft’s operating system monopoly.
A sim ilar challenge to  M icrosoft’s contracts with ICPs was found to 
be unsupported by Ihe district court because of a lack of evidence that the 
contracts had a significant impact on Netscape’s market share.
150 This conduct was found to have a “substantial effect upon the d is­
tribution o f rival browsers . . . 253 F.3d at 74 and to be exclusionary
- in  violation of § 2 o f the Sherman Act,
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fi. Using its license for the Java cross-platform  program  to im ple­
ment a scheme lo undermine its use by issuing a M icrosoft cor­
rupted version of the program Java Virtual M achine (JVM), which 
generated incom patib ilities betw een  app lica tions fo r JVM  and 
their use with other platforms and vice-versa, and inducing IS Vs 
to use JVM  exclusively thereby fragmenting cross-platform  use of 
Java;1'’1 ’ *
7. Causing Intel to stop developing high-perform ance Java software 
compatible with M icrosoft's JVM version o f Java to prevent the 
threat of such software to M icrosoft’s operating system monopoly 
by threatening to refuse to deal w ith Intel by bundling its tech­
nologies with W indows.1'-'
Each category o f  conduct in vo lved  the use o f  M icrosoft's  
monopoly power to erect substantial barriers to com petition that 
could have eroded its monopoly power in the operating system  
market. And, like the conduct engaged in by Standard Oil to pro­
tect its refinery m onopoly, each category o f  conduct was found  
sufficient to establish a violation o f  section 2 o f  the Sherman Act 
for unlawfully using monopoly power to maintain its m onopoly.'55
151 253 F.3d at 75-77. W hile the court held that changes m ade by 
M icrosoft to ihe Java program  allow ed the program  to opera te  more 
quickly and it could  not be held liab le  fo r m aking such changes, the 
im position of exclusive dealing com  ra d s  on IS Vs, deception o f JVM  
developers by not disclosing incom patibility problem s and coercion of 
Intel into dropping its effort to develop a faster Java cross-platform  pro­
gram by threatening (o deal with another chip m anufacturer were all held 
to be exclusionary conduct in violation o f § 2,
This conduct was found to be exclusionary in violation of § 2 of 
the Sherman Aci. 253 F.3d at 78-79.
111 M icrosoft attem pted to argue that there w as no ev idence o f  a 
causal connection between its conduct and the maintenance o f its operat­
ing system  m onopoly because there w as no ev idence the alternatives 
o f an independent brow ser like N etscape and cross-platform  program s 
like Java would have "ignited com petition for Intel-com patible PC oper­
ating system s.” 253 F.3d at 77. The court o f appeals rejected this argu­
ment with the observation: “W e may infer causation when exclusionary 
conduct is aim ed at producers o f oascent com petitive techno log ies as 
well as when il is aim ed at producers o f estab lished  substitu tes.” 253 
f .3 d  at 79.
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W hile the court o f  appeals rejected the additional ground that 
M icrosoft’s overall pattern o f conduct constituted a separate cate­
gory o f  conduct evidence to support the charge o f  violating sec­
tion  2 by conduct unlaw fully  m aintaining a m on op oly ,134 the 
specific grounds found by the court o f appeals amount to an over­
all pattern o f  conduct clearly aim ed at protecting M icrosoft’s 
operating system  monopoly from erosion by alternative platforms. 
They are also analogous to the course o f conduct fo llow ed by 
Standard Oil to choke off ihe risk to its maintenance o f  its refin­
ery m onopoly by mourning an all out war on the new technology  
of transporting crude and refined oil by long-distance pipeline. In 
both cases, monopoly power was used to orchestrate related busi­
nesses dependent upon that monopoly power to foreclose com pe­
tit io n  in the m o n o p o liz e d  m ark et— refin in g  in the ca se  o f  
Standard Oil and PC operating systems in the case o f Microsoft. 
M on op oly  control was then used to extend the m onopoly  to 
related markets— pipelines in the case o f Standard Oil and Inter­
net browsers in the case o f M icrosoft. The extension o f monopoly 
power to the key transportation function was then used to begin 
m oving into related businesses, o il production in the case o f  Stan­
dard Oil and Internet applications in the case o f Microsoft. And in 
the case o f  M icrosoft, the tactics fo llow ed  indicate an overall 
strategy and intent— similar to that o f Standard Oil— o f using any 
means available to prevent com petition on the merits with not 
only its monopoly operating system  but also with any application 
program or content it finds profitable to capture and dominate.
The trial court also found that Microsoft attempted to monop­
olize  the browser market in violation o f section 2 o f the Sherman 
A ct.155 W hile the trial court found the alleged 1995 proposal made 
by M icrosoft to Netscape that the two firms divide the market to 
the great advantage o f  M icrosoft w as sufficient to sustain an 
attem pt to m onopolize charge,156 the court also found that the
253 F .3d at 78.
155 Findings of Law, supra  note 2, at 45—46.
15(1 The court found that despite the fact that Netscape had 70% o f Ihe
browser m arket at the lime the proposal was made, the fact that Microsoft
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p re d a to ry  co u rse  o f  c o n d u c t M ic ro s o f t fo llo w e d  a f te r  N e tsc a p e  
re je c te d  the a lleg e d  o ffe r to  d iv id e  the b ro w se r m a rk e t w as su ff i­
c ie n t to  p ro v e  a  dan g e ro u s p ro b ab ility  o f  M ic ro so ft m o n o p o liz in g  
the b ro w se r  m arket. N e ts c a p e ’s m arke t sh a re  d e c lin e d  rap id ly  in  
the fa c e  o f  M ic ro so ft 's  ta c tic s  lo c k in g  in  O E M s to  in s ta llin g  its  
b ro w s e r  p ro g ra m  w ith  W in d o w s , b e lo w -c o s t p r ic in g ,  e x c lu s iv e  
c o n tra c ts  w ith  access  p ro v id e rs , an d  o th e r  ex c lu s iv e  a rra n g e m e n ts  
w ith  firm s like A pple  to  u se  M ic ro s o f t 's  IE  b row ser. C o rre sp o n d ­
in g ly ,  M ic r o s o f t ’s b ro w s e r  m a rk e t  s h a re  in c re a s e d  r a p id ly  to  
a b o v e  50%  by the tim e th e  case  w as d e c id e d  an d  w as p red ic ted  to  
e x c e e d  60%  by Jan u ary  2 0 0 1 .137 A lth o u g h  the S ta n d a r d  O il c a se  
d id  n o t in v o lv e  a co m p arab le  a t te m p t-to -m o n o p o liz e  is su e , s e v ­
e ra l a c tio n s  tak en  by  S tan d a rd  O il du ring  its fo rm a tiv e  y ea rs  co u ld  
h av e  b ee n  co n s id ered  a ttem p ts  to  m o n o p o lize  i f  the S h erm an  A c t 
h a d  b ee n  in  p lace  w hen the ac ts  o cc u rre d . A cts d e s ig n e d  to  tak e  
o v e r  co m p e tin g  o il p ip e lin e s  a n d  re f in e rie s  lo c a te d  in  c itie s  S ta n ­
d a rd  e i th e r  w ished  to  ta k e  o v e r o r d rive  o u t o f  b u s in e ss  o ften  w ere 
u n d e rta k en  w ith  the p o w e r  to  a c co m p lish  th e  o b je c tiv e  o f  m o n o p ­
o liz in g  re fin in g , the sp ec ific  p u rp o se  o f  d o in g  so  a n d  the d a n g e r­
o u s  p ro b a b il ity  o f  do in g  s o .158
was the only other significant com petitor in  the browser market, could 
leverage its power from the operating  system  m arket to dom inate any 
po ten tia l entrant and would have gained a m onopoly over the browser 
m arket if the proposal had been accepted, was sufficient to find the act o f 
proposing  the division o f m arkets to the disadvantage o f  N etscape an 
unlawful attempt to monopolize, 87 F, Supp.2d at 46.
i:; id .
136 S tandard O il’s reaction  to the first m ajor attem pt to transport 
crude oil by long-distance pipeline was sim ilar to M icrosoft’s reaction to 
the initial stages of the developm ent o f the Internet—a wary ignoring of 
the effort and then a swift response on all fronts to stamp out the threat to 
its dom ination of the industry once the pipeline becam e a success. The 
T idew ater Pipeline project sought to  transport crude oil from  Oil City, 
Pennsylvania to Baltimore. Standard QO becam e “the benighted custo­
dian o f the status quo, squelching progress to safeguard its own in ter­
ests.” Chernow, supra  note 11, at 207. It did so, by buying an exclusive 
pipeline franchise from the M aryland Legislature (spending $40,000 to 
do so) forcing the new pipeline to cross 2600-foot m ountains; bought up 
tank car m anufacturers’ capacity to prevent them from  supplying the ven-
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T h e c o u r t  o f  ap p e a ls  tre a tm e n t o f  the a ttem p t to  m o n o p o lize  
c la im  c e n te re d  o n  its  a s s e r tio n  th a t the tr ia l co u rt h ad  fa iled  to 
d e f in e  the re le v a n t m a rk e t M ic ro so ft w as charged  w ith  a ttem p tin g  
to  m o n o p o liz e  an d  th e  p la in t i f f 's  c la im ed  fa ilu re  to  o ffer ev idence 
d e f in in g  th e  p a ra m e te r s  o f  th e  re le v a n t m a r k e t . T h e  c o u r t ’s 
a sse rtio n  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  sp e c if ic ity  w ith  w h ich  a m arket m ust 
be d e f in e d  fo r  p u rp o se s  o f  a n  a ttem p t to  m o n o p o lize  c la im  is less
ture with ro lling  slock needed for the project; gave price concessions 
(like M icrosoft did lo OEM s and others) to refiners using S tandard’s 
pipelines; bought up any rem aining independent refiners that might make 
use o f the new  pipeline; and bought up strips o f land (including an entire 
valley) to prevent the new pipeline from crossing its planned route. Id. at 
207—OS. D espite these actions by Standard Oil to prevent cons [ruction of 
the pipeline, it w as com pleted in 1879 and everyone held their breath to 
see “if crude oil would actually scale the intervening mountains." Id. at 
211. After 7 days o f pumping. crude began trickling out of the line at the 
W illiam sport end o f the line prom ising relief for producers and indepen­
dent refiners from  Standard O il’s refining monopoly. Id, at 211.
Relief w as short lived. Standard Oil attem pted to bottle up Tidewa­
te r’s access to  crude and bought up New Y ork refineries before they 
could become T idew ater customers. Standard reduced rates on Standard 
O il p ipe lines and railroad  ra tes to such levels that il was said ‘‘they 
scarcely covered the wheel grease.” and the price war forced Tidewater 
to operate at h a lf  capacity. Id. at 214, Ultim ately, Standard bought an 
interest in T idew ater and in 1882 entered into an agreement dividing up 
the Pennsylvania pipeline business with Standard having 88.5% of the 
market and T idew ater 11.5%, id . at 215, an agreement with consequences 
sim ilar to that M icrosoft proposed to impose on Netscape.
159 The court pointed to the absence of evidence describing the tech­
nological com ponents or functionalities provided by a browser and why
products like brow ser shells and Internet extensions were not included in
the market defined. 253 F.3d at 81-82.
The independent status o f the attempt to monopolize offense under
§ 2, has been considerably diminished by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. M cQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) converting the 
offense from  an attem pt to “m onopolize” (fix prices or exclude com peti­
tors) to an attem pt to “m onopoly” (gain a monopoly over a relevant mar­
ket). Aside from  contradicting the specific language of the statute, the 
decision im m unizes a considerable range of potentially anticompetitive 
unilateral conduct by firm s with m arket power like that engaged in by 
Standard O il and M icrosoft.
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than  co n v in c in g . T h e  co u rt had  reco g n ized  the ' ‘b ro w ser m ark e t’7 
e a r l ie r  in  its  o p in io n  w h en  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  is su e  o f  M ic ro so ft 
u n la w fu lly  m a in ta in in g  a m o n o p o ly  o v e r  th e  o p e ra tin g  s y s te m  
m a r k e t '60 a n d  r e c o g n iz e d  th a t s e v e ra l o f  M ic r o s o f t ’s l ic e n s in g  
p rac tice s  w ere d e s ig n e d  to  m a in ta in  its m o n o p o ly  o v e r the o p e ra t­
ing  sy s tem  m a rk e t, p rese rv e  the ap p lica tio n s  b a rr ie r  an d  p rev en t 
c ro ss -p la tfo rm  c o m p e titio n  from  In te rn e t b ro w sers . B ro w ser c u s ­
to m ers , b o th  the im p o rta n t m id d lem an  cu s to m ers  like O E M s and 
IA P s (cu s to m ers  ig n o red  as “co n su m ers” by th e  c o u rt o f  ap p e a ls) 
and  u ltim a te  co n su m ers  b u y in g  co m p u ters  w ith  p re in s ta lle d  p ro ­
g ram s o r d o w n lo a d in g  th e ir  ow n , trea ted  b ro w se rs  as  a sep ara te  
“m a rk e t.” T h e  fa c t th a t a ll co n c ern ed  s im p ly  a ssu m e d  the o b v i­
ous, th a t b ro w sers  w ere  a  se p ara te  m arket, m ay  e x p la in  the la ck  o f  
e v id e n c e  p ro v in g  th e  o b v io u s  b u t d o es  n o t ju s t i fy  th e  c o u r t  o f  
ap p e a ls  ig n o rin g  th e  ob v io u s.
W h ile  the aL iem pt to  m o n o p o lize  c la im  w a s  n o t e sse n tia l to 
the ca se , w ith  the p o ss ib le  ex c ep tio n  o f  rem e d ies  th a t m ig h t h av e  
o th e rw ise  been  c o n s id e red  fo r  such  a v io la tio n ,14,1 th e  c o u r t’s a n a l­
y sis  o f  the issu e  le a v e s  the im p ress io n  th a t it w as u n w illin g  fo r 
som e u n sp o k en  rea so n  to  perm it the case to  go  o f f  in  the d irec tio n  
o f  f in d in g  w h a t a p p e a rs  to  have  been  an u n la w fu l a ttem p t to  b o th  
g a in  a  m o n o p o ly  o f  th e  b r o w s e r  m a r k e t  a n d  a n  a t t e m p t  to
See, e.g.,  253 F.3d at 60: “The reason that market share in the 
browser market affects market power in the operating system market is 
complex . . . '‘Therefore, Microsoft’s efforts to gain market share in 
one market (browsers) served to meet the threat lo Microsoft’s monopoly 
in another market (operating systems) by keeping rival browsers from 
gaining the critical mass of users. . .
141 A finding that Microsoft had unlawfully monopolized the browser 
market, would suggest a structural solution to remedy the attempt to 
monopolize as the primary way to rectify the violation or a stringent pro­
hibition upon requiring buyers to take both the operating system program 
and the browser program as a package with equal access to Windows 
APIs for competing browsers. In view of the fact that the browser war is 
now over with Microsoft having successfully gained dominance in the 
browser market, the more appropriate remedy would be to require 
Microsoft to reduce its share of the browser market by a structural 
remedy.
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“m o n o p o liz e ” th e  b ro w s e r  m a rk e t by  ex c lu d in g  specific  b ro w ser 
c o m p e tito rs . T h e  lo w er c o u r t ’s f in d in g  th a t M ic ro so ft’s c o n d u c t 
co n s titu te d  an  u n la w fu l a t te m p t to  m o n o p o lize  th e  b row ser m ark e t 
a p p e a rs  to  h av e  b eco m e a re a lity  in  fac t i f  not in  the m ind  o f  the 
co u rt o f  a p p e a ls , w ith  the ra p id  d o m in a tio n  o f the b row ser m ark e t 
by  M ic ro so ft and  its  e x p a n d in g  d o m in a tio n  o f  the b row ser m ark e t 
by  b e in g  b u n d le d  w ith  th e  o p e ra tin g  sy s tem  p re lo ad ed  o n  m o s t 
PC s,
T he fu rth e r  c la im  th a t  in it ia l ly  ap p eared  to be the cen tra l issu e  
in  th e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e ’s m o n o p o l i z a t io n  c la im ,  th a t  
M ic ro so ft v io la te d  the S h e rm an  A c t by  u n law fu lly  ty ing  its o p e r­
a tin g  sy s tem  p ro g ra m  to its  b ro w s e r  p ro g ram  in o rder to re s tra in  
tra d e  in  th e  b ro w s e r  m a rk e t ,  b e c a m e  a se c o n d a ry  c la im  to th e  
m ore  c e n tra l m o n o p o liz a tio n  c a s e  th e  g o v e rn m e n t b u ilt  a g a in s t 
M ic ro so ft. I n  th e  m o s t c o n tro v e rs ia l and  co n fro n ta tio n a l p a r t  o f  
h is  su b s ta n tiv e  d ec is io n , Ju d g e  Ja c k so n  found  th a t the D is tr ic t o f  
C o lu m b ia  C irc u it  C o u rt f in d in g  in  the ea rlie r case in te rp re ting  the 
c o n s e n t d e c re e  as  n o t p r o h ib i t in g  th e  b u n d lin g  o f  M ic ro s o f t ’s 
b ro w s e r  w ith  i ts  o p e ra tin g  sy s te m  p ro g ra m  “ is at o d d s  w ith  th e  
S up rem e C o u r t’s o w n  a p p ro a c h ” to  ty ing  c a s e s . 162
165 87 F. Supp.2d at 49. While Judge Jackson recognized that the court 
of appeals’ decision involved the interpretation of the earlier consent 
decree and was not an application of antitrust tying doctrine, he appeared 
to go out of his way in a confrontational challenge to the court’s earlier 
opinion reversing his interpretation of the consent decree. Judge Jackson 
need not have done so, but couid have simply treated the case as one rais­
ing an issue not decided by the prior court of appeals decision interpreting 
a consent decree and not antitrust tying doctrine generally. His analysis of 
the tying issue, relying upon Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2 (1984) and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) was sufficient to establish a basis for holding 
that existing tying doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court justified 
holding that the operating system and the browser were two separate prod­
ucts in view o f consumer demand and the ability to provide the two prod­
ucts separately. The “consumer demand” test for determining one or two 
products is the analysis followed by Judge Benson in Caldera, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp.2d 1295 (D.D.C. Utah 1999) involving a 
claim that Microsoft unlawfully tied its operating system software to its 
graphical user interface to exclude compering operating system software 
on the PCs they manufactured or assembled.
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The tacts undoubtedly presented a clear case o f at least three 
o f the four elements o f a tying case (1 > power in the tying product 
(W indow s operating system ); (2) an effect upon a substantial 
amount o f commerce; and (3) a forcing o f consumers to take the 
tied product (browser) in order to get the tying product (the W in­
dows operating system). The trial court found the fourth elem ent 
o f “tw o separate products'’ must be determined by whether there 
is consumer demand for the two products as separate products.
“ In the instan t case, the com m ercial reality is thal consum ers 
today perceive operating systems and browsers as ‘separate products,’ for 
which I he re is separate demand. . . . This is true notw ithstanding the 
fact that the software code supplying their discrete functionalities can be 
com m ingled in virtually infinite com binations, rendering each indistin­
guishable from the whole in term s of files of code or any other taxon­
o m y .” M ic ro so f t C o rp ., 87 F. S u p p .2d at 49 . The court o f appeals  
majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with prior Supreme Court prece­
dent. See  Norman H. Hawker, C onsisten tly Wrong: The Single P roduct 
Issue an d  the Tying C laim s A g a in st M icrosoft, 35  C a l . W . L . R ev . 1 
(2000) fo r an extensive analysis o f the court o f appeals decision inter­
preting the consent decree and prior Supreme Court and lower court anal­
ysis o f the two product issue in  tying cases.
For a view critical of Judge Jackson’s findings on the tying issue by a 
M icrosoft consultant, see  J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule f o r  Software  
Integration, 18 Y ale  J. Reg. 1 (2001). Sidak proposes a far more complex 
rule for defining the legality o f tying arrangements in the context o f what 
he describes as ‘‘technologically dynam ic markets.”  Sidak’s test is depen­
den t upon  a show ing that the m arket involved  is a  “techno log ica lly  
dynam ic m arket,” that there are econom ies of scope in  having a single 
firm  integrate the “separate functionalities,” and appears to defer to the 
paternalism o f the dominant firm ’s decision as to whether it is best that 
the products be sold as an integrated package rather than market demand 
making that decision. To defer to the firm imposing the tie as to whether 
to sell the product as a bundle, particularly where the firm has a monopoly 
over the tying product, would exem pt a decision to do so from judicial 
review of whether the decision was justified. Justification o f a tie where 
the firm  imposing a tie has a monopoly in the tying product market should 
be lim ited to circum stances w here offering the separate functions as a 
bundle is  essential to the operation o f the tying product and there is no 
less restrictive alternative to bundling to achieve that end.
In the case o f integration o f  the operating system  and a particular 
b row ser program , the “consum ers” involved were largely  O EM s and 
lA Ps, equally  sophisticated decision-m akers who were precluded from
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While the court found there was a demand for the two products as 
separate products, the “consum er” focused upon was the ultimate 
consumer o f  PCs and no m ention was made of other classes of  
consum ers— the OEMs required to install M icrosoft’s browser 
along with its operating system , and IAPs and ISV s induced to 
use M icrosoft's browser and exclude N etscap e’s browser from  
their programs. OEMs, IAPs and ISVs had expressed a continuing 
in te r e st  in  p r o v id in g  N e t s c a p e ’s b ro w ser  sep arate  from  
M icrosoft's operating system  but were precluded from doing so by 
M icrosoft’s requirement o f  OEMs that they either took the operat­
ing system  and the browser together or not at all, and by exclusive  
dealing arrangements with IAPs and ISV s to use IE,164
By locking in the OEMs and Apple to IE, M icrosoft locked in 
most buyers o f  PCs, extended its m onopoly over the installed base 
to include new buyers and replacement buyers with preinstalled 
M icrosoft browser software, eroded N etscape’s market share, and 
further en h an ced  the a p p lica tio n s  barrier for a lternatives to  
M icro so ft’s operating system . C onsequently , it is d ifficu lt to 
understand how M icrosoft’s bundling o f  its IE browser with its 
m on op o ly  operating sy stem  program  d o es not con stitu te  an 
unlawful tying arrangement under section 1 o f  the Sherman Act,
making a presumably rational choice in favor o f offering a non-Microsoft 
b row ser i f  they chose to  do so ra th e r  th a n  being fo rc ed  to accep t 
M icrosoft’s browser in order to install M icrosoft’s monopoly operating 
system  on the m achines they  p roduced . T here was no evidence tha t 
bundling was essential to the functioning o f the operating sy s iem  other 
than to protect it from erosion by browsers with published APIs posing a 
threat to M icrosoft’s monopolized operating system market.
164 A u le t ta ,  supra note 71, at 294—97. M icrosoft not only gave away 
its browser "free,” but also engaged in  bartering services to IAPs and 
ICPs for preferential placement o f its brow ser system, prevented OEMs 
from rem oving IE from the bundled W indows package, deleted a method 
for ultim ate consum ers not w anting an Internet program on their com ­
puter Lo remove IE, forbid OEM s and other suppliers from altering the 
display o f icons on the opening  screen, and extended price breaks on 
W indows to  OEMs agreeing to  prom ote IE and curtail distribution of 
Netscape. See F indings o f Fact, supra  note 2, at 149-71. Similar steps 
were taken with IAPs and ICPs to induce them  to promote LE and drop 
Netscape. Id. a t 272-336.
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and an act o f un law ful m onopolization  under section 2 o f the 
Sherman Act, particularly where there is the less restrictive alter­
native o f  offering both programs separately along with offering 
them as a bundle.ltl5
Elsew here, I have argued that per si; rules like that prohibiting 
lying arrange mentis ought to be considered evidentiary presumptions of 
illegality  subject to justifica tion  or excuse. John J. Flynn, R ethinking  
S herm an A c t S ec  n on  I A n a ly s is :  Three P r o p o s a ls  f o r  R educin g  the  
C haos, 49 A n ti t ru s t  L.J. 1593 (1980). In view of M icrosoft’s monopoly 
pow er over the operating system market and the status of its operating 
system program as the only practical alternative for most PCs, the only 
justification  that might offset a finding o f illegality once it is shown that 
there are two separate products, forcing and a not insubstantial amount of 
com merce involved should be a clear and convincing showing that only 
by com bining the two programs can an essential functional benefit in the 
lying operating system market be realized. Even in those circumstances it 
ought to be required that the less restrictive alternative of making it pos­
sible for com petitors in  the tied market to also offer the same technologi­
cal advantages should  be requ ired  in view  o f the adverse efficiency 
effects upon innovation in both the tied and tying markets likely to take 
place should a single firm  monopolize both markets. See note 163, supra. 
Providing equal and tim ely access to the W indows APIs for competing 
browsers if  there is some functional benefit to the operating system by 
v irtue o f bund ling  it w ith a brow ser function  m ight constitute a less 
restrictive alternative. S ee  International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 
U .S. 392 (1947) (specifications o f salt quality a less restrictive alternative 
than req u irin g  le sse e s  o f  sa lt p rocessing  m ach ines to purchase sa lt 
requirem ents for use in patented machines from defendant International 
Salt).
The essence o f the § 2 m onopolization conduct standard applicable to 
such conduct is sum m arized in Jonathan Baker, P rom oting Innovation  
T hrough  th e  A sp e n /K o d a k  R u le , 7 Geo, M aso n  U .L . Rev. 495, 496 
(1999): “ [A] firm  with monopoly power violates Sherman Act §2  if it 
excludes rivals from  the monopolized market by restricting com plimen­
tary  o r co llaborated  rela tionsh ips w ithout adequate business justifica­
tion.” M icrosoft’s exclusionary campaign against Netscape even appears 
to sa tisfy  the m ore restric tive  test proposed by H erbert Hovenkamp: 
"[W ]e can define unlaw ful monopolistic conduct as  acts that 11) are rea­
sonably capable o f creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by 
im pairing the opportunities of rivals; and, either do not benefit consumers 
at all, o r (b) are unnecessary for the particular consum er benefits that the 
acts produce, or produce harms that are out o f reasonable proportion to 
th e  re su lt in g  b e n e f its .” H erb ert H ovenkam p , The M o n o p o liza tio n
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The court o f appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that 
Microsoft unlawfully tied its operating system  and browser pro­
gram on the grounds that the trial court applied a per se standard 
instead o f  a rule o f  reason standard to the conduct. W hile the 
practice o f  tying is less "per se” than the trial court appeared to 
claim ,1”6 tying is and should be considered more ‘“unreasonable” 
than the court o f  appeals appeared to a llow .167 The court assumed 
the concern with tying arrangements to be the impact in the tied 
product market and appeared to ignore the potential o f a tying 
arrangement to impair competition in the tying product market as 
w ell, particularly competition from innovation in the tied product 
market. And the court considered the test developed for identify­
ing whether there were two products, the consumer demand te s t ,lt,B
O ffense, 61 O hio  S t . L.J. 1035, 1042 (2000). P rofessor H ovenkam p 
points out, quite correctly , that the M icro so ft case applies the m ost 
"orthodox of antitrust principles” to the kind o f practices “that have been 
condemned by the antitrust laws for generations." Id. at 1047.
106 The degree of per se illegality of tying is often litigated under the 
rubric of whether there is one product or two involved, Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); whether there is “power” 
in the tying product m arket assum ing there are two products, F ortner 
Enterprises v. U.S. S le d  Co., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), 429 U.S. 610 (1977); 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, supra  at 26; whether the tie 
affects an appreciable am ount of com merce in the tied product market, 
Eastman Kodak v. Im age Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); 
or, whether there are justifications for the tying arrangement, D ehydrat­
ing Process Co. v. A.O. Sm ith, C orp ., 292 F .2d 653 (1st C ir.), cert, 
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
16- W here there is monopoly power in the tying product market, past 
Supreme Court decisions have given short shrift to rule o f reason analysis 
once the conduct is identified as a tying o f tw o separate products and a 
use of monopoly power in the tying market to force purchases in the tying 
product market. See  M otion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 
392 (1947); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 
(1958). As the Court stated in Jefferson Parish , “Per se condemnation— 
condem nation w ithout inquiry  in to  actual m arket conditions—is only 
appropriate if  the existence o f forcing is probably,” 466 U.S. at 15.
16t A lest developed in  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
supra  note 165.
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as a "pro.\y for whether a tying arrangement may, on balance, be 
welfare-enhancing, and unsuited to per se condemnation.’*169 The 
court did not succeed in evading the one versus two product issue 
with its dubious "proxy,” but shifted the analysis to one o f  assum ­
ing there were two products, whether there was a justification for 
the t ie — a “ w e lfa r e -e n h a n c in g  in n o v a t io n ”— ju s t ify in g  the  
bundling o f  M icrosoft’s operating system  with its browser pro­
gram. The sidestep was fo llow ed  by a ducking o f the issue raised 
because o f  the court’s inexperience with the technology involved, 
a h esitan cy  to interfere w ith  ju d gm en ts in a tech n o lo g ica lly  
dynam ic industry and the lack  o f  jud icia l experience with the 
issue where the tying and tied products are physically intermin­
g le d .17'1 The court o f appeals rem anded the entire issu e  for an 
evaluation under an ill-defined  rule o f  reason analysis generating 
more ambiguity than it resolved .'71
lf,c 253 F .3d at 87. No support is cited for reading this im plication 
in to  ihe J efferso n  P a rish  case . It has the appearance o f  an ana ly sis  
designed lo circum vent the e a r lie r  confron tation  betw een the d istric t 
court and court of appeals over the consent decree and whether it banned 
tying ‘‘two separate products” and the lower court’s analysis in this case 
basing its per se analysis in  part on a consum er demand test for identify­
ing products as separate products for purposes o f tying analysis. It is also 
an unnecessary conversion o f the test for one or two products into a legal 
concept lik e  "p rox im ate  c a u se ”— a con fu sin g  legal concep t used lo 
express a variety o f policies w ithout saying so and greatly com plicating 
the litigation of to n  cases. The court should have continued the relatively 
simple “consum er dem and” test developed by Jefferson Parish  and left 
the question o f whether there w as any justification for tying, assuming it 
was found there were two products and the other elements of a tying case 
had been shown, to  proof o f the affirm ative defense outlined, supra  notes 
163 &  165. The need for hospitals offering 24-four hour surgical services 
to have staff anesthesiologists who work with staff surgeons to provide 
the surgical services offered, rather than depend upon patients enlisting 
their own anesthesiologists, should justify  the sale o f the two services as 
a package in cases like Jefferson P arish ,
253 F.3d at 93-95.
171 Id. The court set forth the broad outlines of an analytical process 
for evaluating the tying cla im  in this case: 1. That the p laintiffs show 
M icrosoft’s conduct '‘unreasonably  restrained com petition” in  the tied 
market o f browsers with no m ention o f the impact o f the practice on the
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Throughout its d iscussion  o f  the tying issu e , the court o f  
appeals appeared to measure the impact o f  the bundling o f  the 
W indows program with IE in light o f its impact upon ultimate 
consumers. W hile ultimate consumers were forced to take the two 
products together w ithout a c lear ju stifica tio n  for d o in g  so , 
another and arguably more important class o f  “consumers'’ was 
ignored. OEMs and IAPs are the primary consumers o f browser 
programs as a practical matter. They have an interest in and the 
sophistication o f choosing and installing the best combination o f  
browser and other programs to offer their customers. M icrosoft’s 
bundling o f  W indows and IE into one package and steps taken to 
prevent its unbundling (found to be unlawful maintenance o f  a 
m onopoly over the operating system ) locked in. both OEMs and 
IAPs to installation o f IE,173 The impact o f this bundling deprived 
OEMs and IAPs from exercising their judgment o f what combina­
tion o f  programs to install or not install, eliminated competition  
between OEMs and IAPs on the products they could offer ultimate 
consum ers and foreclosed them from revenue they might have 
gained from  sale o f access for browsers and programs to their
tying market and that M icrosoft be permitted to assert a presumably wide 
range o f ill-defined pro com petitive justifications for the tying arrange­
m ent despite its monopoly pow er in the tying market; 2. To show the 
practice o f refusing to permit OEMs to uninstall IE or remove it from the 
desktop is an unlawful tying arrangement under § 1, the plaintiffs must 
show the benefits are outweighed by the harms in the tied product market 
wiih no mention made of the im pact o f the practice in the tying market, 
what benefits are and are not permitted to be considered, and the fact lhat 
M icrosoft has a monopoly in the tying product market; and 3. To show 
“price bundling” or the price for W indows with IE would have been 
higher than the price for W indows alone constitute unlawful tying, the 
plaintiffs must demonstrate a positive price increment and that the anti­
com petitive effects o f the practice m ust outw eigh the procom petilive 
effects o f the practice. No mention is made o f the import and issue o f the 
impact o f the practice of price bundling upon innovation in  either the tied 
or tying product markets or how the balance of pro and ami benefits is to 
be struck.
172 Findings of Fact, supra note 2, al 157-74. The court of appeals 
affirmed these findings and found them  to be unlawful exclusionary con­
duct designed to maintain M icrosoft’s operating system monopoly, 253 
F.3d at 26-35 .
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machines or Web sites. The effect o f  the tying arrangement was to 
organize OEMs and IAPs into cartels managed by M icrosoft, just 
as Standard  O il m anaged  a carte l o f  r a ilr o a d s , to prom ote  
M icrosoft’s goals o f  maintaining its operating system  monopoly 
and extend that monopoly to the browser market to both prevent 
an erosion o f  its monopoly and extend its m onopoly power into 
related Internet markets.
The court’s treatment o f the tying issues is com plex and con­
fused and may also have been adopted with the problem o f  reme­
dies in mind. If bundling o f  W indows and IE is found to be an 
unlawful tying arrangement, it is  d ifficult to envision  a remedy 
short o f  a structural one that can resolve the problem  over the 
long term. While properly recognizing the evolution o f tying doc­
trine has proceeded to a place short o f  a traditional per se analy­
sis, the court’s opinion does not appear to appreciate fully the 
risks o f  tying when it is  engaged in by a firm with an overwhelm ­
ing market share in the tying product market. I f  the S ta n d a rd  O il  
case had included a tying claim, which it could have conceivably- 
done w ith  S tan d ard ’s m o n o p o ly  co n tro l o v er  lo n g -d is ta n c e  
pipelines forcing oil producers to ship on ly  to Standard’s refiner­
ies, a violation would certainly have been found. More important, 
the remedy for the violation would have included the remedy that 
was ultimately im posed in  the S ta n d a rd  O il  case— divestiture of 
the p ip elin es from Standard’s control and their operation as a 
common carrier.
A more appropriate and understandable standard for analyzing 
tying arrangem ents should rem ove the analytical burden from  
"surrogates” like the one product versus tw o product issue and 
explicitly recognize that som e tying arrangements by a firm with 
market power may be ju stified  w here there is a tech n ologica l 
necessity for the functioning o f the tying product that other prod­
ucts be bundled with it. The issue o f  whether there is one or two 
products involved could continue to be litigated  on the basis o f  
whether there is an independent consumer (including middleman) 
demand for the products independent o f one another. I f  there is, 
and there is  power in the tying product market and a not insub­
stantial amount o f commerce is affected in the tied product mar­
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ket, the use o f  power to im pose the tie should be considered pre­
sumptively unlawful subject to a defense that the tie is justified. 
The justification  defense, particularly where there is monopoly 
power in the tying product market, should then be limited to a 
technological one, clear evidence that the tying arrangement is 
essential to the functioning o f  the tying product and that there are 
no less restrictive alternatives available to resolve the technologi­
cal difficulty other than selling  the two products as one. Justifying 
a tie by a m onopolist on the vague standard o f whether it is “w el­
fare enhancing” to consumers is too ambiguous and open-ended a 
standard, particularly where there are sophisticated “consumers” 
like OEMs and IAPs capable o f  determining whether to bundle 
the products or not and compete with one another in the package 
o f  programs they offer consumers with the machines they manu­
facture. The court o f appeals analysis of the tying issue makes it 
unlikely that the lower court on remand will wend its way through 
the am bigu ities to find w hat appears to be an unlaw ful ty ing  
arrangement on its face is  in fact the selling o f two separate prod­
ucts despite the realities o f  the marketplace for the tied product, 
the effect o f  the practice on maintaining M icrosoft’s operating 
system  monopoly, and the consequences likely to follow  in the 
tied product market o f  Internet browsers and Internet services if 
the practice is  allowed to continue.
IV. C onclusion
Courts wrestling with issues raised by cases like S tandard  O il  
and M icrosof t  are engaged in determining the basic ground rules 
for firms and individuals to realize and exercise state created, 
state protected and state defined property and contract rights. The 
antitrust constraints lim iting these state defined rights have been 
recognized since early com m on law as necessary and essential to 
society’s interest in the fair and efficient use of these rights and in 
order to protect the rights o f  others to enjoy and use their property 
and contract rights for the benefit o f society generally. Among the 
objectives long recognized as justifying the imposition o f antitrust 
constraints upon the gaining, maintaining and exercising of prop­
erty and contract rights have been prohibitions upon certain means
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for obtaining, exercising or maintaining m onopoly power over an 
identifiable form o f  econom ic activity and contracts or conspira­
cies displacing the com petitive process as the rule o f trade. S o c i­
eties adopting and enforcing these policies do so in the b e lie f that 
reliance upon a com petitive process will ensure the efficient a llo ­
cation o f  resources, that production e ff ic ien c ies  w ill be m axi­
m ized , that in n ovation  w ill not o n ly  take p lace  but w ill  be  
stimulated by a free and open com petitive process, and that undue 
wealth transfers from consumers to those displacing the com peti­
tive process by conduct m onopolizing markets17* and other p oliti­
cal and social i lls174 w ill be constrained by law.
A s mentioned at the outset, the most important o f the econom ic  
values, significant political and social values to one side, is  the 
prom otion o f innovation. It is  also the m ost d ifficu lt to assess  
whether innovation is being thwarted or promoted by market struc­
tures or practices because proving what innovation might or might 
not have taken place but for the existence o f  an existing market 
structure or agreement presents the difficulty o f  proving a nega­
tive. Thus, in cases like Standard  Oil and M icrosof t ,  proof o f  both 
a purpose and an effect o f excluding com petition was and should 
be required to distinguish conduct that is honestly industrial and 
innovative from  that w hich is  not. In addition , and as clearly  
proved in both cases, a connection between the use o f  m onopoly  
power or anticompetitive agreements and the displacement o f the 
competitive process should be required because the essence o f  the 
offense is not the possession o f  monopoly power but the way in 
which it was obtained or maintained that is made unlawful.*75
173 See, Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers a s  the O rig inal a n d  P ri­
m ary Concern o f  A ntitrust: The E fficiency In terpreta tion  C hallen ged , 34 
H astings L.J. 65 (19S2); Robert H. Lande, P rov in g  the O bviou s: The 
A ntitrust Laws W ere P a ssed  to  P ro tec t C onsum ers (N ot Just to  Increase  
Efficiency) 50 H astings L.J. 959 (1999),
174 See Flynn (1990), supra note 4; James M ay, A ntitrust in the F or­
m a tiv e  E ra : P o l i t ic a l  a n d  E co n o m ic  T h eo ry  in C o n s ti tu t io n a l a n d  
A ntitrust A nalysis 1880—1918, 50 Onto S t. L.J. 257 (1989).
l7i United States v. A luminum Co., 148 F .2d 416, 428-30  (2d Cir. 
1945).
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In S ta n d a rd  Oil, a railroad transportation cartel managed by 
Standard Oil was used to gain a m onopoly over oil refining and 
the m onopoly over oil refining was then used along with preda­
tory railroad transportation pricing, acquisitions o f pipeline cu s­
tom ers and refusals to deal to gain a m onopoly over the new  
technology o f  delivering crude and refined product by pipeline to 
prevent an erosion o f  Standard’s refining monopoly. In Microsoft, 
w h ile  there w ere c la im s that som e ta c t ic s  used to ga in  its 
m onopoly over Intel-compatible PC operating systems were anti­
com petitive. it is clear that the monopoly thus gained over virtu­
ally all o f  the PC operating systems market has been maintained 
by means engaged in with both a purpose and an effect of exclud­
ing com p etitors and preventing the com petitive process from  
determining price, production efficiencies and innovation via an 
independent Internet browser and alternative operating system  
platform s. O nce having gained a m onopoly over the operating 
system  market, M icrosoft has maintained lhat monopoly by anti­
com petitive licen sin g  restrictions, blatant attempts to suppress 
new innovations like Java and Intel’s efforts to develop Java soft­
ware, predatory pricing and suppressing and ultimately taking  
over an alternative cross-platform  (the browser market) for the 
delivery o f  applications programs. The conduct Microsoft adopted 
to foster its operating system m onopoly and protect it from ero­
sion by alternatives to its operating system  is analogous to that 
often condem ned in past antitrust m onopolization cases, not the 
least o f  which is  the S ta n d a rd  O il  case o f  1911.
The consequences in both cases were the acquisition o f com ­
plete pricing discretion over the price for the monopolized prod­
ucts and the power to prevent innovation by others that may have 
generated new and better products for the consuming public. Both 
firms were able to dominate and maintain their dominance over 
business and technology basic to the econom y by means not hon­
estly industrial. The impact upon innovation in the Microsoft  case 
has been apparent, despite M icrosoft’s claim  to be innovative 
its e lf  and having spent b illion s o f  dollars in innovation. It is 
w idely acknow ledged that most o f the new  innovation in PC tech­
n o lo g y  and program m ing has taken p lace  outside M icrosoft, 
w h ich  has then co p ied  and bought up or sought to suppress
728 : The an titru st bulletin
sources of new innovation like DOS, the mouse, the graphic inter­
face, word processing programs, business applications, the Inter­
net browser function, Internet services like streaming audio and 
cross-platform programs like Java.1™
W hile the M icrosoft trial court's public and inflam m atory  
rhetoric in disagreeing with the court o f appeals earlier opinion on 
violation o f the consent decree by tying the operating system  and 
browser program did not, understandably, earn the wholehearted  
endorsement o f  the court o f appeals, it is an understandable state­
ment o f frustration with what appeared to be an excessively  lega l­
is t ic  in terp re ta tio n  o f  the ea r lier  c o n se n t  d ecree  and a 
m isstatem ent o f the standards for determining whether a tying  
arrangem ent w as in fact im p osed  by M icroso ft b u n d lin g  its 
browser program with its m onopoly operating system  program. 
The court o f  appeals response, while legitim ately expressing a 
concern for determining whether any technological concerns ju sti­
fied the tying arrangement, m uddled the tying issue further by 
adopting a complex and confusing set o f standards for determin­
ing whether bundling o f  the operating system  and the browser 
programs violated section 1 o f  the Sherman Act, The judge deal­
ing with the case on remand faces a daunting task in  sorting out 
the variables outlined by the court o f  appeals when a much clearer 
and more straightforward test recognizing that a tying arrange­
ment by a firm with a monopoly in the tying market is presump­
tively unlawful and laying out the limited circumstances in which  
it m ight be justified, including the requirement that there be no 
less restrictive alternatives.
T he in e x p lic a b le  and m ore q u e s t io n a b le  a c t io n  o f  the  
M icrosoft trial court discussing the case with journalists prior to 
his decision, left open the more serious problem— fully exploited
17(1 Internet sites devote considerable space to the issue o f M icrosoft’s 
claim  that it is an innovator. Comments range from praise and aw ards for 
M ic ro so ft’ s in n o v a tio n  to  a s se r tio n s  th a t the on ly  in n o v a tio n  th a t 
M icrosoft has made are that it is the first software company to have the 
gall to charge people to test their unfinished products. For a more bal­
anced view see  Competition, Innovation  and th e  M ic ro so ft M onopoly: 
A n titru s t in th e  D ig ita l M ark e tp lace  (A. Eisenach ed, 1999).
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by M icrosoft-—o f  M icrosoft trying the trial court’s ethics and 
objectiv ity  on appeal rather than the merits of the devastating 
m onopolization case made out by the Antitrust Division and the 
states at trial. W hile this conduct did not result in overturning the 
trial court's findings o f  fact or law', it should and did result in a 
stern reprimand by the court o f  appeals and the removal o f the 
trial judge from further proceedings on rem and.7"
The further step  o f  the trial court ordering the breakup of 
M icrosoft in order to remedy the violations found, while certainly 
appropriate in view  o f  the type o f  violations found, M icrosoft’s 
uncooperative com pliance with the consent decree and the d iffi­
culty o f  fashioning a workable behavioral remedy, was also found 
vulnerable by the court o f  appeals because the trial court entered 
the breakup order fo llow ing an abbreviated hearing and only after 
a few days o f deliberation.178 Doing so, denied M icrosoft and oth­
ers an opportunity to have a fair hearing on the appropriate rem­
edy and lent credence to the claim  of bias by the trial court even  
though there were substantial grounds for the trial court to believe  
that M icrosoft could not be trusted to comply with a less drastic 
regulatory decree requiring a high level o f  cooperation.
M icrosoft’s earlier apparent attempt to circum vent the trial 
court’s antitying temporary restraining order and often less than 
cred ib le perform ance during trial o f the m onopolization  case  
might ultimately have justified, in part, the more serious step of 
ordering that M icrosoft be split in two or more parts rather than 
be trusted to com ply w'ith com plex conduct remedies requiring 
extensive supervision. Standing alone how'ever, such conduct did 
not ju stify  short-circuiting a fu ll and fair hearing on what is a 
m ost co m p lica ted  is su e  o f  h ow  to prevent future actions by 
M icrosoft maintaining its operating system  monopoly or extend­
ing its power over the Internet to new markets.
The court o f  appeals further observation that a structural rem­
edy o f  divestiture w as questionable except in cases aside from  
m onopolies obtained or maintained by merger, overstated the his-
l7‘ 253 F.3d at 107-1 S.
™ Id. at 97-107.
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torical record. 17‘* A structural remedy should remain a serious 
alternative in light o f the continued monopoly power M icrosoft 
enjoys in the operating system  market, the virtual elim ination of 
alternative browsers from the browser market, the exclusion  of  
.lava from M icrosoft’s new W indows XP program ,iao and steps 
underway to extend M icrosoft’s Internet presence by bundling ser­
vices like audio, video, instant m essaging, commercial transaction 
features and business applications into its new W indows XP sys­
tem ind icating a con tin u ed  com pany p o licy  o f  ex ten d in g  its 
monopoly power from one market to related markets.
[( is difficult to imagine how a workable conduct remedy can 
be effectively  enforced when changing a few lines o f  computer 
code or m ingling operating system  code with applications code 
can generate in co m p a tib ilitie s  betw een application  program s 
dependent upon a common operating system  under the control of 
ii com petitor or disable the operating system  program if  a con­
sumer attempts to use non-M icrosoft programs.181 This is particu­
I7V id . ai 105. W hile courts have been reluctant to order divestiture in 
eases o f integrated firms. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 
319 (1947), they have done so in  significant monopolization cases where 
dissolution or divestiture is necessary to prevent the continued abuse of a 
monopolized market structure. Sec United States v, Standard Oil Co., 221 
U.S. I (.1411); Uniied States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 
( 19 4 8 ), United States v. United Shot Machinery Corp., 1969 Trade Cas, 
(CCH( ^72,6£& M ass) (divestiture ordered after earlier decree failed
1 l> remedy anticom petitive effects); United Slates v. American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 198 2 j. o f f  d. sub nom ., M aryland 
v Uniied Stales. 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (conscm decree and injunction 
breaking up AT&T after trial court rejccled earlier consent decree sought 
to be entered in a different court).
1!t0 See M ic ro so f t P u lls  B a ck  Its S u p p o rt f o r  J a va , W a l l  S t.  J., 
July 18, 2001. at A3.
JS1 For an argument in  favor o f a behavioral remedy se e  Piraino, Jr., 
supra  note 93, at 4 4 -5 0 . P ira ino  believes a structural rem edy w ould 
imperil standardization in  the operating system, market. Such a risk is not 
likely because a separate operating system essential facility would have a 
primary interest in maintaining standardization while making its platform 
ava ilab le  to  the w idest range o f applications. S im ilarly , O EM s and
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larly the case in light o f the fact that Microsoft controls a strate­
gic and essential facility— the operating system  for virtually all 
PCs, much like AT&T's control over the telephone network and 
Standard O il’s control over the transportation system  for crude 
and refined product. So long as control over what is a bottleneck 
in the computer industry is in the hands of a single firm free to 
engage in upstream and downstream tactics to both maintain its 
control over the bottleneck and exploit related opportunities, a 
com petitive process will not be fully functional in any part o f  the 
PC industry. C onduct rem edies like requiring open access to 
M icrosoft’s APIs: equal access to its operating system and Inter­
net programs by OEM s, IAPs and ISVs without fear of blatant or 
subtle retaliation; and limitations upon further bundling of related 
programs would all require constant and long-term supervision by 
a knowledgeable special master or judge with little else to occupy 
their tim e. In any event, a substantial and significant remedy, 
whether structural or behavioral, needs to be implemented lest 
recurring litigation is required to rein in M icrosoft’s continuing 
aggression in related and emerging markets such as instant m es­
saging, stream ing audio and v id eo  and widespread uses o f the 
Internet for variety o f  other ends and to free up competition in the 
OEM, IAP and ISV markets from M icrosoft’s dictates.
Whatever the subsequent history o f  the M icrosof t  case might 
be in light o f  the vulnerabilities o f  the trial court’s opinion, rem-
providers o f applications program s would have a substantial interest in 
installing and writing programs having the widest possible market appeal. 
Piraino has also argued that breaking up M icrosoft rather than relying 
upon conduct rem edies would likely inhibit innovation by Microsoft with 
regard  to  its o p era tin g  system . T h o m as A. P ira ino . Jr., Iden tify in g  
M on opo lists' Illega l Conduct U nder the Sherman A ct, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
809, 887 {2000}. Aside from the fact that there has been little innovation 
in the operating system  market by M icrosoft in recent years other than 
bundling m ore innovations made by others with ihe operating system 
program, one would assume that part o f M icrosoft left with the operating 
system under a structural remedy w ould have an incentive to engage in 
innovation should it face any realistic threats to its operating system mar­
ket share. For a thoughtful exploration o f these and related issues con­
cerning rem edies in  m onopolization cases, including the M icrosoft case, 
see  Comanor, supra  note 1,
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edy and conduct, and ihe court o f  appeals’ questionable analysis 
o f  the attempt to m onopolize and tying claim s, it is an intriguing 
replay o f  many o f  ihe practices and issues raised by the S ta n d a r d
O il case despite the differences in the industries and technologies 
involved and the fact that no two cases are ever the same. Rather 
than the S ta n d a r d  O il  case being no or a limping analogy for the 
M ic r o s o f t  ease, it is an intriguing parallel o f  two firms seeking to 
d om in ate  industries basic  to the econ om y by sim ilar tactics. 
W hile B oudreaux and F o lsom  appear to b elieve  governm ent 
should have no role in overseeing markets to insure they are gov­
erned by a com petitive proc ess ,ls: the experience o f  the common 
law since the C a s e  o f  M o n o p o lie s  and that o f  the Sherman Act for 
the past century is not so naive. A s W oodrow Wilson observed: 
‘‘W ithout the watchful eye  o f  governm ent, there can be no fair
ls: The em phasis of our straightforward point is indeed radical. The 
specialization and entrepreneurial creativity lying at the heart of a 
m arket econom y are fundam entally at odds with antitrust over­
sight by adm inistrators, judges and ju rors who necessarily have no 
specialized knowledge nor experience o f the kinds that are neces­
sary' for success in the industries in question. To have nonspecial­
ists  sit in  judgm en t o f business dec is ions of specia lists—and, 
m oreover, specia lists w ith experience and their own w ealth at 
stake— prom ises for more consum er harm  than benefit. It is best to 
strip administrators and courts o f such powers.
Boudreaux & Folsom, supra  note 6, at 575.
One w onders why Boudreaux. & F olsom  stop with just je ttisoning 
governm ent an titrust oversight. The sam e argum ent can be m ade for 
stripping adm inistrators, judges and jurors o f the power to define and 
enforce contract, property, tort, crim inal, intellectual property, securities 
and a host o f o ther legal reg im es necessary  to  the functioning o f the 
econom y and society in general. The entire infrastructure of law could be 
turned over to  a corporate elite “with their w ealth  at stake’7 in legal mat­
ters o f  every sort. One could argue the process is well underway with 
regard to the federal and state legislative and executive branches o f gov­
ernm ent given the abuses o f cam paign financing now extant. Since the 
filing o f the M icrosoft case, it is apparent that M icrosoft now appreciates 
the im portance o f  financing politicians w illing to  promote M icrosoft’s 
interests. One should be careful in doing so, however, in light o f Standard 
O il’s experience with President Teddy Roosevelt. See note 51. supra.
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play between individuals and such powerful institutions as the 
trusts.”13-1
S ta n d a rd  O il v. U n ite d  S ta te s  is a striking precedent dictating 
the conclusion that Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws o f  the 
United States and those o f several states by unlawfully maintain­
ing its monopoly o f the market for operating systems for PCs. It 
has also used its monopoly power over that market to take over 
the browser market and erect unlawfully entry barriers to the mar­
ket for applications programs for PCs. S ta n d a r d  O il  also stands 
for the need to seriously consider a structural remedy for the v io ­
lations found in M ic ro so f t  rather than trust in the w illingness of 
an otherwise unwilling and aggressive firm to subject its conduct 
to the demands that all markets be subject to the competitive pro­
cess unless otherw ise affirm atively regulated by a governm ent 
agency. Price com petition  and the future o f  the tech n o lo g ies  
involved require that innovation be allow ed to have its way under 
the regime o f a competitive process and not be subject to the d ic­
tates of a single firm that believes it, and only it, knows what is 
best and uses its monopoly power unlawfully to achieve that end. 
Friedrich von H ayek’s R o a d  to  S e r f d o m 1*4 can be built and paved  
by the centralized planning o f a private corporation dominating a 
technology basic to the econom y and not subject to the legal con­
straints o f  a com petitive process, just as it can by governm ent 
centralized planning unresponsive to individual human needs and 
creativity sorted out by a free and com petitive market wherever 
possible.
1S3 Q uoted in A rthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Q uestion o f  P ow er, The 
Am. P rospect, April 23, 2001, at 2 6 ,2 7 .
lfr* Friedrich A. von Hayek, T he Road to Serfdom (1994).
